ROMESH THAPPAR versus THE STATE OF MADRAS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 26 May 1950 | [1950] 1 S.C.R. 594 | 1950 INSC 14
Key facts
- Decided
- 26 May 1950
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, SIR SYED FAZL ALI
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- WRIT TO PETITION (CIVIL)... No. 16/1950
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Citation
- [1950] 1 S.C.R. 594
- Neutral citation
- 1950 INSC 14
Text of the judgment
I
594
1950
May26.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950}
ROMESH THAPPAR
I/.
THE STATE OF MADRAS
[SHR1 HAR1LAL KANIA C. J., SA1Y1D FAZL Au,
PATANJALI ~ASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.]
Constitution of India, Art. 19, els. {I) (a) and (2), 32-Application under Art. 32-Preliminary ob1ection-Fundamental right of
freedom of speech and expression-Law imposing restrictions for
securing public order and maintenance of public safety-Validity-Seuerability of Act-Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act
tXXXIll of 1949), s. 9 ( 1-A)-Validity.
Held, by the Full Court (i) (overruling o preliminary objections)
-TJnder the Constitution the Supreme Court is constituted the
protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, con·
sistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain
applications seeking prota:tion against infringement of such right$,.
although such applications are made to the Court in the first
instance without resort to a High Court having concurrent juris-diction in the matter.
Urguhar v. Brown (205 U. S. 179.) and Hooney v. Kolohan
(294 U. S. 103) distinguished.
(ii) Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of
propogation of ideas and that freedom is ensured by the freedom
of circulation.
Ex parte /ackson (96 U. S. 727) and Lovell v. City of Griffin
(303 U. S. 444) referred to.
Held per KANIA C. J., PATANJAL.I SAsTRJ, MEHR CttAND
MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs IJ.-(FAzL Au J. dissenting):
(i) Apart from libel, slander etc. unless a law restricting freedom
of speech and expressiofi is directed solely against the undermining of the: st:curity of the State or the overthrow of it, such law
cannot fall within the reservation under cl. (2) of the Art. 19 of the
Constitution, although the restrictions \vhich it seeks to impose may
have been conceived generally in the interests of public order. Section 9 0-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, XXXlll
of 1949, which authorises impositions of restrictions for the wider
purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public
order falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under cl. (2)
and is therefore void and unconstitutional; (ii) Where a la\\' purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental
right in langauge wide enough to cover restrictions both within
and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative
actiOft. affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so I
far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is1
not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied
purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled o~
for
· S.C.R.
SUPREME- COURT REPORTS
595
be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. Section
9 (1-A) is therefore wholly unconstitutional and void.
Per FAZL Au J.-Rcstrictions which s. 9 (1-A) authorised
arc within the provisions of cl. (2) of art. 19 of the Constitution
and s. 9 (1-A) is not therefore uncoqstitutional or void. (1)
Brij BhuJhan and Another v. The State (1950) S.C.R. 60)
it must
referred to.
.
.
·ORIGINAL Ju&Is01c110N: Petition No. XVI of 1950.
Application under article 32 of the Constitution for a.
writ of prohibition and certiorari. The facts are set
out in the judgment.
C. R. Pattabhi Ra1nan, for the petitioner.
K. Rajah Ayyar, Advocate-Gene;al of Madras, (Ganapathi Ayyar, with him) fQr the opposite party.
1950. May 26. The Judgment of Kania C. J., Mehr
Chand ~1ahajan, Mukherjea and Das JJ. Was delivered
by Patanjali Sastri, J. Fazl Ali. J. delivered a separate
judgment.
PATANJALI SASTRI J.-The petitioner is the printer,
publisher and editor of a recently started weekly
journal in English called Cross. Roads printed and
published in Bombay. The Government of Madras,
the respondents herein, in exercise of their powers
under section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of
Public Order Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the
impugned Act) purported to issue an order No. MS.
1333 dated 1st March, 1950, whereby they imposed · a
ban upon the entry and circulation of the journal in
that State. The order was published in the Fort St.
George Gazette and the notification ran as follows :"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 9
(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order, Act,
1949 (Madras Act XXlII of 1949) His Excellency the
Governor of Madras, being satisfied that for the purpose
of securring the public safety and the maintenance of
puolic order, it is necessary so to do, hereby prohibits,
with effect on and from the, date of publication of this
order in the Fort St. George Gazette the entry into or
the circulation, sale or distribution in the State of Madras
or any part thereof of the newspaper entitled Cross
Roads an English weekly published at Bombay."
The petitioner cl;iims that the said order contravenes
the fundamental right of the petitioner to freedom of
. ( 1)
Sec the .headnote to Brij Bhus.%an v. The Stale of Delhi, p. 60~ Infra.
6-5 S. C. India 1N.Dl 58
1950
Ramesh Thappar.
v.
The Stat• a}
Madras.
Patanjali
Sast1iJ.
596
1950
R...,sh 1'happar
v.
T "- Slau of
Madras.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
l1950]
speech and expression conferred on him by article 19
( 1) (a) of the Constitution and he challenges the validity of section 9 (1-A) of the· impugned Act as being
void und~r article 13 ( 1) of the Constitution by reason
of its being inconsistent with his fundamental right
aforesaid.
Palanjali
Sastri].
The Advocate-General of Madras appearmg on behalf of the respondents raised a prelimmary objection,
not indeed to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
the application under article 32, but to the petitioner
resorting to this Court directly for such relief in the
first instance. He contended that, as a matter of
orderly procedure, the petitioner should first resort to
the High Court at Madras which under article 226 of
the Constitution has concurrent jurisdiction to deal
with the matter. He cited criminal revision petitions
under section 435 ot the Criminal Procedure Code,
applications for bail and applications for transfer
under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code as instances where, concurrent jurisdiction having been
given in certain matters to the High Court and the
Court of a lower grade, a rule of practice has been
established that a party should proceed first to the
latter Court for relief before resorting to the High
Court. He referred to Emperor v. Bishes11Jar Prasad
Sinha( 1 ) where such a rule of practice was enforced in
a criminal revision case, and called our attention also
to certain American decisions Urquhart v. Brown(')
and Hooney v. Kolohan( ') as showing that the
Supreme Court of the United
States ordinarily
required· that whatever judicial remedies· remained
open to the applicant in Federal . ancl State Courts
should be exhausted before the remedy
in the
Supreme Court-be it habeas corpus or certiorariwould be allowed. We are of opinion that neither the
instances mentioned by the learned Advocate-General
nor the American decisions referred to by him are
really analogous to the remedy afforded by article 32 of
the Indian Constitution. That article does not merely
confer power on this Court, as article 226 does on the
(') I. L, R. 56 All. l58.
i'j 20s u. 5. 179.
(') 294 U.S. W
S.C.R.
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
597
High Courts, to issue certain writs for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other
purpose, as part of its general jurisdiction.
In that
case it· would have been more appropriately placed
among articles 131 to 139 which define that jurisdiction. Article 32 provides a "guaranteed" remedy for
the enforcement of those rights, and this remedial right
is itself made a fundamental right by being included in
Part UL This Court is thus constituted the protector
and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot,
consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it,
refuse to entertain
applications seeking protection
again.~t infringements of such rights. No similar provision is to be found in the Constitution of the United
States and we do not consider that the American
decisions are in point.
Turning now to the merits, there can be no doubt
that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom
of propagation of ideas, and that . freedom is ensurt:d / by
the freedom of circulation. "Liberty of circulation is
as esscn tia I to that freedom as the liberty of publication. Indeed,
without
circulation the
publication
would be of little value". Ex parte fackso11(1 ). Sec
also Lovell v. City of Griffin( 2 ). It is therefore perfectly clear that the order of the Government of Madras
would be a Yiolation of the petitioner's fundamental
right under article 19(1) (a), unless section 9 (I-A) of
the impugned Act under which it was made is saved
by the reservations mentioned in clause (2) of article 19
w!iich (omitting immaterial words regarding laws relating to libel, slander, etc., with which we are not concemed in this case) saves the operation of any "existing law in so far as it relates to any matter which
undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the
State." The question accordingly arises whether the
impugned Act, in so far as it purpo:-ts by section 9(1-A)
to authorise the Provincial Government "for the purpose of ''ecming the public safety or tlie maintenance
·of public order, to prohibit or regulate the entry into
( 1)
96
u,s. 727.
(') 303 U.S. 444.
1930
Romesh T happar
v.
The Stale of
Madras.
Patanjali
Sastri, J.
598
1950
Ronush T happar
v.
Tiu State of
Madras.
Patanjali
Sastri, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1950]
or the circulation, sale or distribution in the Province of
Madras or any part thereof of any document or class
of documents" is a "law relating. to any matter which
undermines the security of or tends to overthrow the
State."
. The impugned Act was passed by the Provincial
Legislature in exercise of the power conferred upon it by
section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, read
with Entry I of List II of the Seventh Schedule to
that Act, which comprises among other matters,
"public order." Now "public order" is an expression
of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquillity which prevails among titc members of a political
society as a result of the internal regulations enforced
by the government which they have established.
Although section 9 (1-A) refers to "securing the public
safety" and "the maintenance of public order" as
distinct purposes, it must be taken that "public safety"
is used as a part of the wider concept of public order,
for, if public safety were intended to signify any matte1
distinct from and outside the content of the expression "public order," it would not have been competent
for the Madras Legislature to enact the provision so
far as it relates to public safety. This indeed was not
disputed on behalf of the respondents. But it was
urged that the expression "public safety" in the impugned
Act, which is a statute relating to law
and order, means the security of the Province, and,
therefore, "the security of the State" within the meaning
of article 19 (2) as "the State" has been defined in
article 12 as including, among other things, the Government and the Legislature of each of the erstwhile Provinces. Much reliance was placed in support of this
view on Rex v. Wormwood Scrubbs Prison(') where it
was held that the phrase "for securing the public. safety and the defence of the realm" in section I of the
Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, was
not limited to securing the c~untry against a foreign
foe but included also protection against internal disorder such as a rebellion. The decision is not of
much assistance to the respondents as the context in
(') L.R. [1920] 2 K.B. 305.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
599
which the words "public safety" occurred in that Act
showed unmistakably that the security of the State
was the aim in view. Our attention has not been
drawn to any definition of the expression "public
safety," nor does it appear that the words have acquired an.y technical signification as words of art.
1950
Romnh T hap/HJt
v.
The S1aJe of
Madras.
PaJanjali
"Public safety" ordinarily means security of the
public or their freedom from danger. In that sense,
anything which tends to prevent dangers to public
health may also be regarded as securing ,public safety.
. The meaning of the expression must, however, vary
according to the context. In the classification of offences in the Indian Penal Code, for instance, Chapter XIV
enumerates the "offences affecting the public health,
safety, convenience, decency, and morals" and it
includes rash driving or riding on a public way (section 279) and rash navigation of a vessel (section 280),
among others, as offences against public safety, while
Chapter VI lists waging war against the Queen (section
121), sedition (section 124-A) etc. as "offences against
the State", because they are calculated to undermine
or affect the security of the State, and Chapter. VIII
defines "offences against the public tranquillity"
which include unlawful assembly (section 141) rioting
(section 146), pr~moting enmity between classes
(section 153-A), affray (section 159) etc. Although in
the context of a statute relating to law and order
"securing public safety" may not include the securing
of public health, it may well mean securing the public
against rash driving on a public way and the like, and
not necessarily the security of the State. It was said
that an enactment which provided for drastic remedies
like preventive detention and ban on newspapers must
be taken to relate to matters affecting the security of
the State rather than trivial offences like rash driving
or an affray. But whatever ends the impugned Act.
may have been intended to subserve, and whatever
aims its framers may have had in view, its application
and scope cannot, in the absence of limiting words in
the statute itself, be restricted to those aggravated
forms of prejudicial activity which are calculated to
Sastri, J.
600
1950
Ro""'h Thappar
v.
The Stall of
Madras.
Patanjali
Sastri, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1950l
endanger the security of the State. Nor is there any
guarantee that those authorised to exercise the powers
under the Act will in using them discriminate between
those who act prejudicially to the security of the State
and those who do not.
The Government of India Act, 1935, nowhere used
the expression "security of the State" though it made
provision under section 57 for dealing with crimes of
violence intended to overthrow the Government.
While the administration of law and order including
the maintenance of public order was placed in charge
of a Minister elected by the people, the Governor was
entrusted with the responsibility of combating the
operations of persons who "endangered the peace or
tranquillity of the Province" by committing or attempting "to commit "crimes of violence intended to
overthrow the Government."' Similarly, article 352
of the Constitution empowers the President to make a·.
Proclamation of Emergency when he is satisfied that
the "security of India or any part of the territory thereof
is thr~atene<l by war or bv external aggression or by
internal
disturbance."
These
provisions
recognise
that disturbance of public peace or tranquillity may
assume such grave proportions as to threaten the security of the State.
As Stephen in his Criminal Law of England ( 1 ) observes :
"Unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections,
rebellions, levying of war, are offences which run into
each other and are not capable of being marked off by
perfectly defined boundaries. All of them have in
common one feature, namely, that the normal tranquillity of a civilised society is in each of the cases
mentioned disturbed either by actual force or at least
bv the show and threat of it." Though all these
offences thus involve disturbances of public tranqua.
lity and are in theory offences ·against public order,
the difference between them being only a difference of
degree, yet for the purpose of grading the punishment
to be inflicted in respect of them they may be classified
into different minor categories as has been done by
(')Vol. TT, p. 242.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
601
the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, the Constitutiop.,
in formulating the varying criteria for permissible
legislation imposing restrictions on the fundamental
rights enumerated in article 19 (1), has placed in a
distinct category those offences against public order
which aim at undermining the security of the State or
overthrowing it, and made their prevention the sole
justification for legislative abridgement of. freedom of
speech and expression, that is to say, nothing lcrs than
endangering the foundations of the State or threatening its overthrow could justify curtailment · of the
rights to freedom of speech and expression, while the
right of peaceable assembly "sub-clause (b )" and the
right of association "sub-clause ( c)" may be restricted
under clauses ( 3) and ( 4) of article 19 in the interests
of "public order", which in those clauses includes the
security of the State. The differentiation is also
noticeable in Entry 3 of List Ill (Concurrent List)
of the Seventh Schedule, which refers to the "security
of a State" and "maintenartce . ·of public order". as.
distinct subjects of legislation. Th~ Constit~tio~ thus
requires a line to be drawn in the field of public order
or tranquillity marking off, may be, roughly, the boundary between those serious and aggravated forms of
public disorder which are calculated to endanger the
security of the State and the relatively minor breaches
of the peace of a purely local significance, treating for
this purpose differences in degree as if they were
differences in kind.
It is also worthy of note that the word "sedition"
which occurred in article ,13 (2) of the Draft Constitution prepared by the· Drafting Committee was
deleted before the article was finally passed as
article 19 (2). In this connection it may be
recalled that the Federal Court had, in defining sedition
in Niharendtt Dutt Majumdar v. The King Emperor( 1 ), held that "the acts or words complained of
must either incite to disorder or must be such as to
satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or
tendency'', but the Privy Council overruled that
(1)
[1912] F.C.R. 38.
1950
llomesh ThaptmT
v.
The Stale oj
Madras.
Patlllijali
Sastri, ].
602
1950
v.
Tlw S<a1< ef
Matku.
P°'flllia/i
Sanri, ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
decision and emphatically reaffirmed the view expressed in Tilak's case( 1 ) to the effect that "the offence
consisted ·in exciting or attempting to excite in others
certain bad feelings towards the Government and not
in exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion,
or any sort of actual disturbance, great or small"-·
King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao (').
Deletion of the word "sedition" from the draft
article 13 (2), therefore, shows that criticism of
Government exciting disaffection or bad feelings towards it is not to be regarded as a justifying ground
. for restricting the freedom of expression and of the
press, unless it is such as to undermine the security of
or tend to overthrow the State. It is also significant
that the corresponding Irish formula of "undermining the public order or the authority of the State"
[article 40 (6) (i) of the Constitution of Eire, 1937] did
not apparently find favour with the framers of the
Indian Constitution. Thus, very narrow and stringent
limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgement of the right of free speech and expression, and
this was doubtless due to the realisation that freedom
of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all
democratic organisations, for without free political
discussion no public education, so essential for the
proper functioning of the processes of popular government, is pos,ible. A freedom of such amplitude might
involve risks of abuse. But the framers of the
Constitution may well have reflected, with Madison
who was "the leading spirit in the preparation of the
First Amendment of the Federal Constitution," that
"it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to
their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away,
to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper
fruits": [Quoted in Near v. Mi1111esotta (')].
We are therefore of opinion that unless a law restricting freedom of speech '11<1 expression is directed solely
against the undermining of the security of the State or
the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the
reservation under clause (2) of article 19, although the
( 1)
22 Botn. 112.
(z) L.R. 74 I. ..\. $9.
·') 282 U.S. 607. 717-8
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
603
restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been
conceived generally in the interests of public order. It
follows that section 9 (1-A) which authorises imposition of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing
public safety or the maintenance of public order falls
outside the scope of authorised restrictions under
clause (2), and is therefore void and unconstitutional.
It was, however, argued that section 9 (1-A) could
not he considered wholly void, as, under article 13(1 ),
an existing law inconsistent with a fundamental right
is void only to the extent of the inconsistency and no
more. · In so far as the securing of the public safety or
the maintenance of public order would include the
security of the State, the impugned provision, as
applied to the latter purpose, was covered by
clause (2) of article 19 and must, it was said, be held
to he valid. We are unable to accede to this contention. 'Vhere a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language
wide enough to cover restrictions both within and
without
the lirpits of constitutionally
permissible
legislative action affecting_ such right, it is not possible
to uphold it even so far as if may be applied within
the constitutional limits, a:s it is not severable. So
long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes
not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out,
it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void.
In other words, clause (2) of article 19 having allowed the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of
speech and expression only in cases· where danger to
the State is involved, an enactment, which is capable
of being applied to cases where no such danger could
arise, cannot be held to be constitutional and valid to
any extent.
1950
Romesh T happat
V.
The Slate of
Madras.
Patanjali
Sastri, ].
The application is therefore allowed and the order
of the respondents prohibiting the entry and circulatton of the petitioner's journal in the State of Madras
is hereby quashed.
FAZL Au J.-For
the reasons given by me in B1'ij
Bhushan and Another v. The State( t ), which practically
( 1)
[19:0] S.C.R. 601.
Fa~l
Ali ].
604
Ronush Thappar
v.
Ti.. Sia/I of
Madras.
Fad Ali,].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950}
involves the same question as is involved in this case,.
I hold that the reliefs sought by the petitioner cannot
be granted. In this view, I would dismiss this .petition, but I should like to add a few observations to
supplement what I have said in the other case.
It appears to me that in the ultimate analysis the
real question to be decided in this case is whether
"disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province" and ailecting "public safety"
will be a matter which undermines the security of the
State or not. I have borrowed the words quoted
within inverted commas from the preamble of the Act
which shows its scope and necessity and the question
raised before us attacking the validity of the Act
must be formulated in the manner I have suggested.
If the answer to the question is in the affirmative, as
I think it must be, then the impugned law which
prohibits entry into the State of Madras of "any
document or class of documents" for securing public
safety and maintenance of··public order ,,hould satisfy
the requirements laid down in article 19 (2) of the
Constitution. From the trend of the arguments addressed to us, it would appear that if a document is
seditious, its entry could be validly prohibited, because sedition is a matter which undermines the
security of the State ; but if, on the other hand, the
document is calculated to disturb public tranquillity
and affect public safety, its entry cannot be prohibited,
because public disorder and disturbance of public
tranquillity are not matters which undermine the
security of the State. Speaking for myself, I cannot
understand this argument. In Brij Bhushan and
Another v. The State( 1 ), I have quoted good authority
to show that sedition owes its gravity to its tendency to
create disorders and an authority on criminal law
like Sir James Stephen has classed sedition as an
offence against public tranquillity. If so, how could
sedition be a matter which would undermine the security of the State and public disorders and disturbance
of public safety will not be such a matter? It was
argued that a small riot or a affray will not
( 1)
[19;0) S.C.R. 605.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
605
undermine the security of the State, but to this line of
argument there is a two-fold answer :( 1) The Act, as its preamble shows, is not intended
for petty disorders but for disorders involving menace
to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, (2) There
arc degrees of gravity in the offence of sedition also
ahd an isolated piece of writing of mildly seditious
character by one insignificant individual may not also,
frotn the layman's point of view, be -a matter which
undermines the securitv of the State, but that would
not affect the law whi~h aims at checking sedition. It
was also said that the law as it stands may be misused by the State executive, but misuse of the law is
one thing and its being unconstitutional is another.
We are here concerned with the latter aspect only. I
shall not pursue the matter further as I have said
enough on the subject in the connected c~se.
Petition allotved.
Agent for the petitioner :-K. /. Kale.
Agent for the opposite party :-P. A. Mehta.
BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER
ti.
THE STATE OF DELHI.
[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL Au,
PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuxHERJEA and DAs JJ.J
)
-!
Constitution of India. A1·t. 19. els. (I )(a) and (2)-Fundamental
right of freedom of speech and expreuion-Law imposing pre-censorship on newspapers for securing public safety and preventing public
disorder-Validity-Matter disturbing public safety or causing public disorder, whether "undermines the secut·ity of, or tends to overthrow, the State"-Scope of Art. 19. cl. (2)-East Punjab Public
Safety Act, 1949, sec. 7 (I) (c)-Validity.
Section 7 (I) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949,
as extended to the Province of Delhi provided that "the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf,
if satisfied that such action is necessary for preventing· or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing adGresscd to a
printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a
1950
Romtsh T hap/HJ•
v.
The Stau qf
Madras.
Faz.I Ali,].
1950
May 26.
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