DR. BABU RAM SAKSENA versus THE STATE
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 May 1950 | [1950] 1 S.C.R. 573 | 1950 INSC 8
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 May 1950
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, SIR SYED FAZL ALI
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2/1949
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1950] 1 S.C.R. 573
- Neutral citation
- 1950 INSC 8
Text of the judgment
s. c. R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
573
DR. BABU RAM SAKSENA
1950
ti.
ltlig 5.
THE STATE
rSttRI HARILAL KANIA c. J., SAIYID FAZL Au,
PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA
and DAs JJ.]
Constitutioll of India-Merger of. States-Effect-Treaty of
Extradition between British Government and Indian State-Whether
subsists after merger-Extradition Act 1903, ss. 7, IS-Provision
i11 Act for extradition for additional offences-Whether "derogates"
from Treaty-F.xtradition warrant for additional offences-Legality.
In 1869 the British Government and Qie State of Tonk
entered into treaty which provided for the extradition of
offenders in respect of certain offe11ces specified therein called
"heinous offences," which did not include the offences of chcati ng and extortion. In 1903 the Indian Extradition Act was
passed which provided for extradition in respect of cheating and
extortion
also, but s. 18 of the Act provided that nothing contained in the Act "shall derogate from the provisions of any
treaty for the extradition of offenders." Under the Independence
of India Act, 1947, the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian
States lapsed ana with it all ~reaties and agreements in force;
but under a "standstill agreement," between the Indian Dominion
and the States (including Tonk) all agreements between His
Majesty and the States were continued, including agreements in
respect of extradition. Tonk acceded to the Dominion of lridia in
1947 and became a member State of the United State of
Rajasthan. The appellant was a member of the Uttar Pradesh
Civil Service and his services were lent to the State of Tonk in
1948. After he had reverted to the Uttar Pradesh he was charged
with the offences of cheating and extortion alleged to have been
committed while he was in Tonk and was arrested under an
extradition warrant issued under s. 7 of the Extradition Act,
1903. He applied under ss. 491 and 561-A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure for his release, contending that in view of the
provisions of s. 18 of the Extradition Act and the Tre~ty of
Extradition of 1869, his arrest was illegal :
· Held per KANIA C. J. and PATANJALI SAsTRI J. (FAzL ALI J.
concurring).-Even assuming that the Extradition Treaty of 1869
subsisted after the merger of the Tonk State, by providing for
extradition for additional offences the Extradition Act of 1903 did
not derogate . from the provisions of the Treaty of 1869 or the
rights of Indian citizens thereunder, and the arrest and surrender
of the appellant under s. 7 of the Act was not, therefore, rendered
unlawful by anything contained in the said Treaty.
574
1950
Dr. Babu Ram
Salama
v.
The Siok.
Patdnjali
Sastri].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1950J
Per MuKHERJEA J. (FAZL AL1, ivfAHAJAN an<l DAs JJ. concurring).-The Extradition Treaty of 1869 \Vas not capable of
being given effect to in vie'v of the n1erger of the Tonk State ;n
the United State of Rajasthan, and, as no enforceable treaty
right existed, s. 18 of the Extradition Act of 1903 had no application ; and inasn1uch as the conditions of s. 7 of the said Act had
been complied with, the warrant of arrest issued under s. 7 of the
Act \Vas not illegal.
APPELLATE JuR1so1cTroN: Criminal Appeal No. II
of 1949.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment of the
Allahabad High Court (Harish Chandra J.) dated 11th
November, 1949, in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No.
960 of 1949. The facts of the case and the arguments
of coumel are set out fully in the judgment.
Alladi, Krishnaswami /year (Alladi Kuppuswami
with him) for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (V.
N.
Sethi, with him) for the respondent.
1950. May 5. The judgment of Kania C.J. and
Patanjali Sastri J. was delivered by
PATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an appeal by special
leave from an order of the High Court at Allahabad dismissing an application under sections 491 and 561-A of
the Code of Criminal Procedure for release of the
appellant who was arrested in pursuance of an extradition warrant issued by the Regional Commissioner
of the United State of Rajasthan who is the principal
officer representing the Crown in tbe territory of that
State.
The appellant who is a member of the Uttar Pradesh
Civil Service was appointed in 1948 to serve what was
then known as the Tonk State in various capacities,
and during such service he is alleged to have helped
the Nawab in obtaining the sanction of tbe Government
of India to the payment of Rs. 14 lakhs to the Nawab
out of the State Treasury for the discharge of his
debts, and to have induced the Nawab bv threats and
deception to pay the appellant, in return. for such help,
sums totalling Rs. 3 lakhs on various dates. On these
allegations the appellant is charged with having committed offences under section 383 (Extortion) and
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
575
section 420 (Cheating) of the Indian Penal Code which
are extraditable offences under the Indian Extradition
Act, 1903 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The
warrant was issued under section 7 of the Act to the
District Magistrate, Nainital, where the appellant was
residing after reverting to the service of the Uttar
Pradesh Government, to arrest and deliver him up
to the District Magistrate of Tonk.
The appellant's case is th:it the sum of Rs. 3 lakhs
was paid to him by the Nawab to be kept in safe
deposit in a bank for the Nawab's use in Delhi, that
no offence was committed and that the amount was
returned when demanded by the authorities of. the
Tonk State. The warrant was issued mala fide on
account of enmity. Various technical objections were
also raised to the validity of the warrant and to the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Nainital to take
cogmsance of the matter and ~rrest the · appellant:
The High Court overruled all the objections and dismissed the. application for the release of the appellant.
On behalf of the appellant Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami
Aiyar contended that section 7 of the Act under which
the warrant purports to have been issued had no
application to the case and that the ' entire proceedings
before the Magistrate were illegal and without jurisdiction and should be quashed. Learned counsel, relying
on section 18 of the Act which provides that nothing in
Chapter III (which contains section 7) shall "derogate
from the provisions of any treaty for ·the extradition of
offenders," submitted that the treaty entered into
between the British Government and the Tonk State on
the 28th January, 1869, although declared by section 7
of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, to have lapsed
as from the 15th August, 1947, was continued in force
by the "Standstill Agreement" entered into on the
8th August, 1947, that that treaty exclusively governed
all matters relating to extradition between the two
States, and that, inasmuch as it did not cover the
offences now charged against the appellant, no extradition of the appellant could \>c demanded or ordered.
1950
Dr. Babu Ram
Sahtna
v.
The Stott.
Patwifoli
Sastri].
576
1950
Dr. Babu Ram
Saksnld
v.
T/,. Statt.
Patalljllli
Sanri ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I 1950]
The Attorney-General appearing for the Government
advanced three lines of argument in answer to that
contention. In the first place, the standstill agreement
entered into with the various Indian States were purely
the
temporary arrangements
designed to maintain
status quo ante m respect of certain administrative
matters of common concern pending the accession of
those States to the Dominion of India, and they were
superseded by the Instruments of Accession executed
by the Rulers of those States. Tonk having acceded
to the Dominion on the 16th August, 1947, the standstill agreement relied on by the appellant must be
taken to have lapsed as from that date. Secondly, the
treaty was no longer subsisting and its execution
became impossible, as the Tonk State ceased to exist
politically and such wvereignty as it possessed was
extinguished, when it covenanted with certain other
States, with the concurrence of the Indian Government
·"to unite and integrate their territories in one State,
with a common executive, legislature and judiciary,
by the name of the United State of Rajasthan," the
last of such covenants, which superseded the earlier .
ones, having been entered into on the 30th March, 1949. '
Lastly, even assuming that the treaty was still m
operation as a binding executory contract, its prov1s10ns were in no way derogated from by the application of section 7 of the Act to the present case, and the
extradition warrant issued under that section and the
arrest made in pursuance thereof were legal and valid
and cou Id not be called in question under section 491
of the Criminal Procedure Code. As we are clearly of
opm10n that the appellant's contention must fail on
this last ground, we consider it unnecessary to pronounce on the other points raised by the Attorney- .
General especially as the issues involved are not purely
legal but partake also of a political character, and we
have not had the views of the Governments concerned
on those points.
It was not disputed before us that the present case
would fall within section 7 of the Act, all the requirements thereof being satisfied, if only the applicability of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
577
the section was not excluded, under section 18, by
reason of the Extradition Treaty of 1869, assuming that
it still subsists. The question accordingly arises whether
extradition under section 7 for an offence which is not
extraditable under the treaty is, in any sense, a derogation from· the provisions of the treaty, which provides
for the extradition of offenders for certain specified
offences therein called "heinous offences," committed
in the respective territories of the high contracting
parties. Under article 1 the Government of the Tonk
State undertakes to· extradite any person, whether a
British or a foreign subject, who commits a l_leinous
offence in British territory. A reciprocal obligation
is cast by article 2 on the British Government to extradite a subject of Tonk committing such an offence
within the limits of that State. Article 3 provides, inter
alia, that any person other than a Tonk subject committing a heinous offence within the limits of the Tonk
State and seeking asylum in British territory shall be
apprehended and the case investigated by such Court
as the British Government may direct. Article 4 prescribes the procedure to be adopted and the conditions
to be fulfilled before extradition could be had, and
:article 5 enumerates the offences which are "to 1)e
deemed as coming within the category of heinous
offences" which, however, do not include the offences
charged against the appellant.
The argument on behalf of appellant was put thus:
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
:applicable, as pointed out by McNair on The Law of
Treaties, (1938-pp. 203, 204), to the interpretation of
treaties. According to that rule the treaty in question
should be read as allowing extradition only for the
specified offences and for no others, that is to .say, as
implying a prohibition of extradition by either State
for any other offence than those enumerated in article
5. Further, while the treaty entitled each of the high
contracting parties to demand extradition on a reciprocal basis; an unilateral undertaking by the Indian
Government to grant extradition for an offence for
which it could not claim extradition under the treaty
1950
Dr. Babu Ram
Saksenu
v.
Tk State.
Patanjali
Sastrij.
578
Dr. Babu Ram
Saksena
v.
Tk Stale.
Pat1171iali
Sas1ri].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950}
violates the principal of reciprocity which is the recognised basis of all international compacts for extradition.
Such an arrangement places the State of Tonk in a more
advantageous position which was not contemplated by
the framers of the treaty. And wh~re, as here, the
person whose surrender is demanded is an Indian
subject who is not liable to be ,extradited under the
treaty, his surrender under section 7 trenches upon the
liberty of the subject. In so far, therefore, as that sec.
tion authorises extradition of a person, especially
when he is an Indian subject, for an offence which is
not extraditable under the treaty, it derogates from the
provisions of the treaty within the meaning of section
18, and its application to the present case is thereby
excluded. The argument proceeds on a misconception
and cannot be accepted.
No doubt the enumeration of "heinous offences"
in article 5 of the treaty is exhaustive in the sense that
the high contracting parties are not entitled, under
the treaty, to claim extradition of criminals in respect
of other offences. But we cannot agree that such
enumeration implies a prolzibition against either of
those parties providing by its own municipal laws for
the surrender of criminals for other offences not covered by the treaty. It is difficult to imagine why the
contracting States should place such a fetter on their
respective legislatures in advance not only in regard
to their subjects but also in regard to alien offenders,
for, if such prohibition is at all to be implied, it should
cover both. As pointed out in Wheaton's International
Law, there is no universally recognised practice that
there can be no extradition except under a treaty, for
some countries grant extradition without a treaty :
(Fourth Edition, sections 116 (a) to (d), pp. 186-189).
No doubt the constitutional doctrine 'in England is that
the Crown makes treaties with foreign States for extradition of criminals but those treaties can only be carried
into effect by Act of Parliament : (Ibid-section 116
(b ), p. 187). Accordingly, the extradition Acts arc
made applicable by an. Order in Council in the case
of each State which enters into an extradition treaty
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
with the Crown, and they are made applicable only
so far as they can be applied cons~tently with
the terms and conditions contained in the treaty.
Under such a system where the high contracting parties
expressly provide that their own subjects shall not be
delivered up, as in the case of the treaty between England and Switzerland, the power to arrest and surrender does not exist: Regina v. Wilson(1 ). This it was
observed by Cockburn C.J. in that case, was a "serious
blot" on the British system of extradition, and the
Royal Commission on Extradition, of which he was the
chairman, recommended in their report that "reciprocity in this matter should no longer be insisted upon
whether the criminal be a British subject or not. If
he has broken the laws of a foreign country his liability to be tried· by them ought not to depend upon his
nationality ...... The convenience of trying crimes in the
country where they were committed is obvious. It is .
very much easier to transport the criminal to the place
of his offence than to carry all the witnesses and proofs
to some other country where the trial is to be held :"
(Wheaton, section 120 (a), pp. 197, 198). Evidently,
similar considerations led to the passing of the Act by
the Indian Legislature providing for the surrender of
criminals, including Indian subjects, for a wide variety
of offences, with power to the Governor-General in
Council to add to the list by notification in the
Gazette generally for all States or specially for any one
or more States. This statutory authority to surrender
cannot of course enlarge the obligation of the other
party where an extradition treaty has been entered
into, and this is made clear by section 18. But it is equally clear that the Act does not derogate from any such
treaty when it authorises the Indian Government to
grant extradition for some additional offences, thereby
enlarging, not curtailing, · the power of the other party
to claim surrender of criminals. Nor does the Act
derogate, in the true sense of the term, from the position of an Indian subject under the treaty of 1869.
That treaty created no right in the subjects of either
(11
3 Q· B. D. 42.
5--5 S. C. India ;N.D.)/58
19So
Dr. Babu Rom
Saksma
v.
Thi State.
PaJanjali• .
Sastri J.
580
1950
Dr. Babu Ram
Saksma
v.
The Stau.
Patanjali
Sastri j.
F.,J Ali j.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
State any more than in fugitive aliens not · to he
extradited for other than "heinous offences". It is
noteworthy that even in Wilson's case, (ubi supra)
where there was an exception in the treaty in favour of
the subjects of the contracting States, the decision was
based not on the ground that the treaty by itself conferred any right or privilege on English subjects not
to be surrendered but on the ground that the Order
in Council applying the Extradition Act, 1870, to
Switzerland limited its operation, consistently with
the terms of the treaty, to persons other than English
subjects. It is, therefore, not correct to say that, by
providing for extradition for additional offences, the
Act derogates from the rights of Indian citizens under
the treaty or from the provisions of the treaty. We
are accordingly of opinion that the arrest and surrender of the appellant under section 7 of the Act is not
rendered unlawful by anything contained in the treaty
of 1869, assuming that it still subsists.
The appeal fails and is dismissed.
FAzL Au J.-I have had the advantage of reading
the judgments prepared by my brothers, Sastri and
Mukherjea, who have given different reasons for arriving at the same conclusion. As I am inclined to agree
with the line of reasoning in both the judgments, I
concur in the order that this appeal should be dismissed.
Malrf!ia;o j.
MAHAJAN J.-I agree with the judgment going to be
delivered by my brother Mukherjea. For the reasons
given therein this appeal should be dismissed.
Muk/rerfea].
MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal, which has come up
before us on special leave granted by this Court, is
directed against a judgment of Harish Chandra J. of
the Allahabad High Court dated 11th of November,
1949, by which the learned Judge dismissed an application of the appellant under sections 491 and 561-A
of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The facts which are material for purposes of this
appeal are not in controversy and may be shortly
stated as follows: The appellant Dr. Babu Ram
/
S.C.R.
_,
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
581
Saksena, who is a resident of the United Provinces,
was a member of the Executive Civil Service in that
province, and during his official career, extending
over 30 years, held various important posts, both in
and outside that province. In January, 1948, he was
appointed Administrator of the Tonk State, where a
disp.ute was going on at that time regarding succession
to the rulership of the State between -two rival claimants. On 11th of February, 1948, the dispute was
settled and Ismail Ali Khan was recognised as the
Nawab or the Ruling Prince of the State and appellant was then appointed Dewan and Vice-President
of the State Council, of which the Nawab was the
President. In April, 1948, the Tonk State, together
with several other States in Rajputana, integrated and
formed together the United State of Rajasthan and
the appellant thereupon became the Chief Executive
Officer of the Rajasthan Government. Towards the
end of July, 1948, he got a'nother special post under
the Rajasthan Governtllent, but soon afterwards, he
took leave and proceeded to Naini Tai, where he has
been residing since then. On 23rd May, 1949, he was
arrested at Naini Tai on the strength of a warrant
issued under section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act,
1903, by Shri V. K. B. Pillai, Regional Commissioner
and Political Agent of the United State of Rajasthan.
The warrant, which is dated the 8th of May, 1949,
was addressed to the District Magistrate of Naini Tai
and directed to the arrest of Dr. Saksena and his removal to Rajasthan, to be delivered to the District Magistrate of Tonk for enquiry into certain offences :igainst
the laws of that State which he was alleged to have
committed. After his arrest, the appellant was released
on bail in terms of the warrant itself and was directed
to be present before the District Magistrate of Tonk
on the 7th of June, 1949. The allegations against the
appellant in substance are, that while he was the
Dewan of the Tonk State and Vice-President of the
State Council, the Nawab, being in urgent need of
money to meet his personal demands, requested
Dr. SakSena to help him in obtaining for his own use
1950
Dr. Babu Ram
S.7kstna
v.
The Stair.
Mukhtrjea ].
582
1950
Dr. Babu Ram
sots...
v.
TM Slat<.
Muklrerjea ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11950.1
a sum of Rs. 14 lakhs from the State Treasury.
Dr. Saksena promised his assistance on condition that
the Nawab would give him a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs out
of this amount as his share. By dint of his efforts,
the appellant succeeded in inducing the State Ministry
to pay the full amount of Rs. 14 lakhs to the Nawab
in different instalments. The first instalment, amounting to over Rs. 2} lakhs was paid on· 31st March, 1948,
and a further sum of Rs. 5 lakhs was paid on 21st of
April following. On that date, it is said, the Nawab
paid to Dr. Saksena a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 which
was only half of the promised amount. A few days
later, Dr. Saksena pressed for payment of the balance
and held out threats to the Nawab that in case the
money was not paid, the latter would find himself in
serious difficulties as his position as a Ruling Prince
of the State was not at all secure and there were grave
charges against him. As a result of these threats and
misrepresentations, the Nawab was induced .to pay .to
the appellant the balance of Rs. 1,50,000 m two mstalments. The matter became known to the Regional
Commissioner some time in November 1948 and he
called Dr. Saksena for an interview and succeeded in
getting back from him the entire sum of Rs. 3 lakhs
which the Nawab had paid. On the basis of these
facts, Dr. Saksena has been accused of having committed offences under sections 383 and 420 of the
Indian Penal Code.
On 3rd June, 1949, Dr. Saksena filed an application
in the High Court of Allahabad under sections 491 and
561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, complaining of
illegal and unauthorised detention under the warrant·
of the Regional Commissioner of Rajputana dated the
8th of May, 1949. The legality of the warrant and of
arrest thereunder was attacked on a number of grounds.
It was contended, first of all, that the applicant was
falsely implicated by the Nawab on account of enmity
which grew up between them for various reasons and
the allegations made were totally false. It was next
said that the District Magistrate of Naini Tai could
not take cognizance of the matter without the previous
S.C:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
583
sanction of the U. P. Government under section 197 'of
the Criminal Procedure Code and that the sanction of
the Rajpramukh of the United State of Rajasthan was
also necessary before any proceeding could be initiated.
The third and the main contention was that the alleged offences being said to have been committed in
the State of Tonk, the case would be governed by the
provisions of the Extradition Treaty entered into between the British Government and the Tonk State on
28th of January, 1869, and as neither "extortion" nor
"cheating" was mentioned in the list of offences for
which extradition was permissible under that Treaty,
the warrant .of arrest issued under sectio~ 7 of the
Extradition Act was wholly illegal and unauthorised.
It is admitted that these offences are specified in the
Schedule to the Inclan Extradition Act of 1903, but
it was said that section 18 of the Extradition Act
expressly made the Act inapplicable when its provisions "derogated" from those of a Treaty. Lastly, it
was urged that the extradition warrant was a mala fide
step taken by the Nawab of Tonk with the help of his
friend the Regional Commissioner of Rajasthan for
ulterior purposes and that it constituted a fraud upon
the Statute and an abuse of the processes of law.
The application was hea~d by Harish Chandra, J.
sitting singly, and by a judgment dated 11th of
November, 1949, which fully and elaborately discussed
the different points raised in the case, the learned
Judge rejected the application of the petitioner. No
certificate was given by the High Court u_nder section 205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and
the present appeal has been, brought to this Court on
the strength of special leave granted by it.
Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar, who appeared in
support of the appeal, has very properly not press~d
before us all the points that were canvassed on behalf
of his client in the Court below. His contention, in
substance, is that the rights of extradition in the
present case should be regulated exclusively by the provisions of the Extradition Treaty that was entered into
between the 1'onk State and the British · Government
1950
Dt. Babu Ram
S~oa
v.
Tire State
Mulr.her:ita},
584
1950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
on 28th of January, 1869, and was subsequently
modified by a supplementary Treaty in the year 1887.
-Or. Babu Ram Sahma
This
Treaty, it is argued, has not been abrogated or
v.
rendered
ineffective in any way by reason of the
The Stau
merger of the Tonk State in the United State of
Muk/ie,j.a J.
Rajasthan, and the decision of the High "Court
on this point is erroneous. According to the provisions of this Treaty, no extradition is permissible in · respect to offences of "extortion" and
"cheating" with which the appellant is charged and
the warrant of arrest issued by the Political Agent is
consequently illegal and ultra vires. It is conceded
by Sir Alladi that if section 7 of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903, is held to be applicable to the facts of
the present case, the warrant of arrest issued bv the
Political Agent of Rajasthan could not be assaifed as
invalid or inoperative; but his contention is that section 18 of the Extradition Act makes an express
reservation in cases where Treaty rights exist and to
the extent that the provisions of Chapter III of the
Extradition Act derogate from those of any Treaty
relating to extradition of offenders, the Treaty is
entitled to prevail.
To appreciate the merits of this contention, it may be
convenient to refer at this stage to a few sections of
the Indian Extradition Act of 1903 as well as to the
material provisions of the Extradition Treaty between
the Toni( State and the British Government which
have a bearing upon the present question.
Chapter III of the Indian Extradition Act deals
with surrender of fugitive criminals in case of States
other than foreign States and section 7, with which
this chapter opens, provides as follows :
" (I) Where an extradition offence has been committed or is supposed to have been committed by a
·person, not being a European British subject, in the
territories of any State not being a foreign State, and
such person escapes into or is in British India, and
the Political Agent in or for such State issues a warrant, addressed to the District Magistrate of any
district in which such person is believed to be, (or if
such person is believed to be in any Presidency town
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
585
to the Chief J>residency Magistrate of such town), for
his arrest and delivery at a place and to a person for
authority indicated in the W'iffitllt such Magistrate
shall act in pursuance of such warrant and may give
directions accordingly."
•
•
•
•
The expression "extradition offence" has be.::n
defined in section 2(b) and means "any such offence
as is described in the First Scheme to the Act." The
First Schedule gives a catalogue of offences described
with reference co specific sections of the Indian Penal
Code and it includes offences punishable under sections 383 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code prima
facie, it seems therefore that all the conditions laid
down in section 7 of the Extradition Act are fulfilled
in the present case. The warrant has been issued by
the Political Agent of a State which is not a "foreign
State" as defined by the Act and the offences with
which the appellant is charged are "extradition offences" as specified in Schedule I. Sir Alladi's contention, as stated above, is that section 7, which is
in Chapter III of the Extradition Act, is controlled by
section 18 which lays down that "nothing in this
chapter shall derogate from the provisions of any
treaty for the extradition of offenders, and the procedure provided by any such treaty shall be followed
in any case to which it applies, and the provisions of
this Act shall be modified accordingly."
Turning now to the Extradition Treaty between the
Tonk State and the British Government, it will be
seen that the First Article of the Treaty provides for
extradition, where a British subject or a foreign subject commits a "heinous" offence in British territory
an<l seeks shelter within the limits of the Tonk State.
The Second Article deals with an offender who is a
subject of the Tonk State and having committed a
"heinous" offence within the State seeks asylum in
British territory; while the Third Article relates to a
person other than a Tonk subject who commits a
"heinous" offence within the limits of the Tonk State
a!lc seeks asylum in British territory. The conditions
1950
Dr. BabulRam
Saksma
v.
The State•
Mukherjea J.
586
1950
Dr.BU..R,,,,.
Sobtta
v.
T/w SloU.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
under which extradition could be . had in all such cases
and the procedure to be followed ate· laid down in
article 4. Article 5 then gives a list of offences which
would be deemed as coming within the category of "heinous" offences. It is not disputed that neithe{ "cheating" nor "extortion" are mentioned in this list. The
whole controversy, therefore, centers round the point as
to whether in view of the provisions of the Extradition
Treaty mentioned above, extradition could legally be
made or demanded in respect of offences coming under
sections 383 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code which
are mentioned in the list of offences ·speci1ied in Schedule I to the Extradition Act but do not find a place
in article 5 of the Treaty. Could it be said that the
provisions of the Extradition. ,:\ct, derogate in this
respect from the Treaty between the Tonk State and
the British Government and consequently, the terms of
the Treaty would override the statute as indicated in
section 18 of the Extr:iR,ition Act?
The learned Attorney-General, whc appeared £01
the Goverhment of India, put forward a two-fold
argument in reply to the contention of Sir Alladi. He
argued in the first place, that section 18 of the Indian
Extradition Act has no application to the present case
inasmuch as the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk
State and the British Government, upon which the
appellant relies, does not subsist and cannot be
enforced, at the present day. The other contention is
that even if the Treaty still subsists, there is nothing
in its terms which prohibits extradition for offences
other than those described as heinous offences in
article 5. It is argued that "to derogate~· ~
"to .detract" or "to take away" and the Schedule to
the Extradition Act by mentioning certain offences,
which do not occur in the list of "heinous offences" as
given in the Treaty, cannot be said to have derogated
from the terms of the Treaty. Both these points were
fully argued on both sides and it is clear that if on
either of these points a decision is reached adverse · to
the appellant, the appeal is bound to fail.
S.C:R.
SUPREl\1E COURT REPORTS
587
-.
1~
'
,
So far as the first point is concerned, Mr. Setalvad
t950
has drawn our attention to various political changes
--,.
that have come over the Tonk State since the con- Dr.s~'t' R•m
clusion of the Extradition Treaty in 1869. In 1869
:'.no
Tonk was one ·of the Native States in India with a -Tl.. Stat•.
"separate'' political existence of its own and the Treaty
that was entered _into. in that year was meant to Mukhorje• J.
regulate exclusively the rights and obligations in
matters of extradition of offenders as between the
Tonk State on the one hand and the British Government on the other. In 1887 there was a modification
of the Treaty but it is not disputed that the modifica- ·
tion made certain alterations in the procedure which
are not material for our present purpose.
The major political change with regard to _all Indian
States which vitally affected their existing Treaties
with the British Government occurred on th" 15th of
August, 1947, when India became an Independent
Dominion. Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act
provided inter alia that :
", (1) As from the appointed day· (b) The suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian
States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements
in force at the date of the passing of this Act between
His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States..........
As a result of this provisiOn, the Extraqition Treaty
between Tonk and the British Government must be
deemed to have lapsed with effect\ from the 15th of
August, 1947.. If matters stood there, obviously there
would be nothing left upon which section 18 of the
Indian Extradition Act could possibly operate. There
was,howevei:, a Standstill Agreement entered into by
the Indian Dominion with the Indian States, the first
·article of which runs as follows :
"l. (1) Until new agreements in this behalf are
made, all agreements and administrative arrangements
as to matters of common concern now existing between
the Crown and any Indian State shall, in so far as may
be appropriate, continue as between the Dominion of
"
588
1950
Dr. Ba/Ju Ram
Sahma
v.
n. si.,,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19501
India or, as the case may be, the part thereof, and the
State.
(2) In particular, and witfi2ut derogation from
the generality of sub-clause (1) of this clause the
matters referred to above shall include the matters
specified in the Schedule to this agreement."
The Schedule does mention "extradition" as one
of the matters to which the Standstill Agreement is
applicable. This was certainly intended to be a
temporary arrangement and Mr. Setalvad argues that
as there was no Treaty in the proper sense of the term.
but only a substitute for it in the shape of a temporary
arrangement, section 18 of the Extradition Act which
expressly mentions a Treaty cannot be applicable.
While conceding that prima facie there is force in the
contention, I think that this would be taking a too
narrow view of the matter
and I should assume for
the purposes of this case that under the Standstill
Agreement the provisions of the Treaty of 1869 still
continued to regulate matters of extradition of
criminals as between the Tonk State on the one hand
and the Indian Dominion on the other till any new
agreement was arrived at between them.
Though the Standstill Agreement was to take effect
after the establishment of the Indian Dominion, the
Instrument was actually signed on 8th of August,
1947. On the 16th of August, 1947, Tonk acceded
to the Dominion of India and one of the terms.
in the Instrument of Accession is that the "Ruler
accepts the pos1t1on that with regard to matters
specified in the Schedule to the Instrument, the·
Dominion Legislature would be entitled to make laws
for the State". "Extradition including the surrender of
criminals and accused persons to parts of His Majesty's
Dominion outside India" is one of the matters specified
in the Schedule. Thus the State gave up and surrendered in favour of the Dominion Legislature its right to
legislate in respect to extradition after the date of
accession. Whether the existing Extradition Treaty
was ipso facto abrogated by this Instrument of Acces-sion is not so clear. Obviously, the Indian Dominion:
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
589
could pass any legislation it liked regarding matters
of extradition between the Tonk State, and any other
State, either Indian or Foreign. No such law
was, however, passed by the Indian Legislature
except that very recently under an Adaptation
Order the Extradition Act of 1903 has been
made applicable to States under Group B in the
Indian Constitution in which Rajasthan is included.
It is to be noted that the Extradition Act itself, which
is made applicable to the United State of Rajasthan,
contains an ~xpress provision m section 18 which
safeguards ex1stmg treaty rights. It 1s somewhat
unusual that an Extradition Treaty would be subsisting even after the State had acceded to India but we
have no materials before us upon which we could
definitely hold that the Treaty has been expressly
superseded or abrogated by the Indian Legislature.
The next important thing is that in April, 1948,
there was a Covenant entered into by the Rulers of
nine States including Tonk, by which it was agreed
by and between the covenanting parties that the
territories of these nine States should be integrated
into one State by the name of the United State of
Rajasthan. This was done with the concurrence of
the Dominion of India. Later on, on 12th of May,
1949, Mewar also became a party to this Covenant
and the United State of Rajasthan was reconstituted
by the integration of the territories of all the ten States.
By the Covenant of merger, the Covenanting States
aweed to unite and integrate their territories in one
State known as the United State of Rajasthan and to
have a common executive, legislature and judiciary.
The Rulers of all the States became members of the
Council of Rulers and the President was designated
as the Raj Pramukh of the United State. Article VI
of the Covenant of Merger runs as follows :
"(I) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall,
as soon as practicable and in any event not later than
the first day of May, 1948, make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramu~h; and thereupon-
1950
Dr. Bab11 Rarrr
Sakseno.
Y.
The Stau.
Mukher.fea].
590
1950
Dr. Babu Ram
Saksoia
v.
Mu.t,.,,j.a ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
(a) all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging
to the Ruler which appertain or are incidental to the
Government of the Covenanting State shall vest in
the United State and shall hereafter be exercisable
only as provided by this Covenant or by the Constitution to be framed thereunder ;
(b) all duties and obligations of the Ruler
pertaining or incidental to the Government of the
Covenanting State shall devolve on the United Sta~
and shall be discharged by it ; and
( c) all the assets and liabilities of the Covenanting
State shall be the assets and liabilities of the United
State."
The question now is how far was the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and the
British Government affected by reason of the merger of the State into the United State of Rajasthan.
When a State relinquishes its life as such through
incorporation into or absorption by another State either
voluntarily or as a result of conquest or annexation,
the general opinion of International Jurists is that the
treaties of the former are automatically terminated.
The result is said to be produced by reason of complete
loss of personality consequent on extinction of State
life('). The cases discussed in this connection are
generally cases where independent States have ceased
to be such through constrained or voluntary absorption
by another with attendant extinction of the former's
treaties with other States. Thus the forceable incorporation of Hanover into the Prussain Kingdom
· destroyed the previous treaties of Hanover. The
admission of Texas into the United States of America
by joint resolution extinguished the. Treaties of thr
Independent Republic of Texas('). The position is
the same when Korea merged into . Japan. According
to Oppenheim, whose opinion has been relied upon by
Sir Alladi, no succession of rights and duties ordinarily
takes place in such cases, and as political and personal
treaties presuppose the existence of a contracting State,
(1) Vide Hyde on International Law, Vol. III, p. 1529.
( 1 ) Vidt Hyde on International Law, Vol. Ill, p. 1531,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
591
th~y
are altogether extinguisheJ. It is a debatable
pomt whether succession takes place in cases of treaties
relating to commerce or extradition but here again the
· majority of writers are of opinion that they do not
survive merger or annexation (1 ).
The remarks quoted above do not, however, seem
quite appropriate to a · case of the present description.
Here there was no absorption of one State by another
which would put an end to the State life of the former
and extinguish its personality. What happened here
was that several States voluntarily united together and
integrated their territories so as to form a larger and
composite State of which every one of the covenanting
parties was a component part. There was to be one
common executive, legislature and judiciary and the
Council of Rulers would consist of the Rulers of all the
Covenanting States. It may not be said, therefore,
that the Covenanting States lost their personality
altogether and it is to be noted that for purposes of
succession of Ru!ership and for counting votes on the
strength of population and other purposes the Covenant
of Merger recognises a quasi-separation between the
territories of the different States. But although such
separation exists for some purposes between one State
territory and another. it is clear that the inhabitants
of all the different States became. from the date of
merger, the subjects of the United State of Rajasthan
and they could not be described as subjects of any
particular State. There is no such thing as subject of
the Tonk. State existing at the present day and the
Ruler of Tonk cannot independently and in his own
right exercise any form of sovereignty or control over
the Tonk territory. The Government, which exercises
sovereign powers, is only one, even though the different
Rulers may have a voice in it. It seems to us that in
those altered circumstances the Extradition Treaty of
1869 has become entirelv incaoable of execution. It is
not possible for the T~nk St;te, which is one of the
contracting parties to act m accordance with the terms
of the treaty, for it has no longer any independent
(') Oppenhein on International Law. Vol. I, p. 152.
1950
Dr. Babu Ram
Saksma
v.
The Stale.
Mulclrerjea]
592
1950
Dr. Babu Ra,.
Salrs.na
v.
Tl14 Stat"
srJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
authority or sovereign rights over the Tonk territory
and can neither make nor demand extradition. When
as a result of amalgamation or merger, a State loses
its full and independent power of action over the
subject-matter of a treaty previously concluded, the
treaty must necessarily lapse( 1 ). It cannot be
said that the sovereignty of the Tonk State in this
respect is now vested in the United State of Rajasthan.
The authority, so far as extradition was concerned, was
already surrendered by the Tonk State in favour of
the Dominion Government by the Instrument of
Accession. But even assuming that these treaty rights
could devolve upon the United State of Rajasthan by
reason of article 6 of the Covenant of Merger, the
latter, it seems to me, could be totally incapable of
giving effect to the terms of the treaty. As has been
said· already, there could be no such thing as a subject
of the Tonk State at the present moment
and article
2 of the Treaty which provides for extradition of Tonk
subjects accused of having committed heinous offences
within Tonk territory and seeking asylum elsewhere
would be wholly infructuous. The United State of
Rajasthan could not possibly demand extradition on
the basis of this article, and if reciprocity, which 1s
the essence of an Extradition Agreement, is gone, the
Treaty must be deemed to be void and inoperative.
The decision in Terlinden v. Ames(•) which was relied
upon by Sir Alladi in course of his arguments, rather
fortifies the view that I have taken. The question
there was whether an Extradition Treaty between
Prussia and the U nitcd States of America, wJ1ich was
entered into in 1852, could be given effect to after the
incorporation of Prussia into the German Empire.
The question was answered in the affirmative. It was
pointed out inter alia that the Constitution of the
German Empire left sufficient independent power and
sovereignty to the States composing the confederation
to enable them to act upon these treaties and il was
observed by Chief Justice Fuller, who delivered the
opinion of the Court, that where sovereignty in respect
(1) VUle Hyde on International Law, VoL III, p. 153.'1.
(') 184 u. s. 270.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
593
to the execution of treaties is not extinguished and
the power to execute remains unimpaired, outstanding
treaties cannot be regarded as void. This is the real
criterion and as obviously ·the power of the Tonk
State to execute the treaty is altogether gone after the
Covenant of Merger, the treaty cannot but be regarded
as void.
1950
Dr. Babu Ram
Saluma
v.
Till Stak.
The other case cited by Sir Alladi, viz., that of
Lazard Brothers v. Midland Bank Ltd.(1) has absolutely
no bea,ring on this point. It laid down the well accepted proposition of International Law that a change in
the form of government of a contracting State does not
put an end to its treaties. The treaty entered into by
the Czarist Russia could be given effect to after the
Revolution, once · the new government was recognised
as a person in International Law.
My conclusion, therefore, is that the Extradition
Treaty between the Tonk State and the Btitish
Government in 1869 is nc,>t capable of being given effect
to in the present day in view of the merger of the Tonk
State in the United State of Rajasthan. As no treaty
rights exist, section 18 of the Indian Extradition Act
has no application and s~ction 7 of the Act has been
complied with, there is no ground upon which we can
interfere.
In view of my decision on the first point, the second
point does not require determination and I refrain
from expressing any opinion upon it.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
OAS J.-1 substantially agree
with the reasonings
given in the judgment just delivered by my learned
brother Mukherjea and concur in dismissing this
application.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the resp~ndent : P. A. Mehta.
(') (1933) A. C. 289.
DM].
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