NANALAL ZAVER AND ANOTHER versus BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD. AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 4 May 1950 | [1950] 1 S.C.R. 391 | 1950 INSC 7
Key facts
- Decided
- 4 May 1950
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS
- Bench size
- 4
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 69/1949
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1950] 1 S.C.R. 391
- Neutral citation
- 1950 INSC 7
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
NANALAL ZAVER AND ANOTHER
1950
v.
May 4.
BOMBAY LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.
AND OTHERS.
[SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA and DAS,
JJ.]
Indian Companies Act (VII of 1913), s. _105-C-CompanyOutsidet· trying to get control of management by p11rchasing shores
-Issue of further shares-Offer of new shares to es;isting shareholders-Validity of resolution and offer-Company in need of
funds-Additional motit1e to pret1ent outsidet· getting control-Bona
fides of resolution-Scope of s. 105-C.
A company was incorporated with a capital divided into 10,000
shares. After 5,404 shares had been subscribed, the directors of
the company, finding that a businessman. who had several other
businesses and who was likely to use the funds of this company
for his own businesses, was trying to get control of this company
by purchasing its shares, resolved to issue the remaining 4,596
shares and qffered . these shares to the existing shareholders in the
proportion of four new shares for every five she.res held by them.
Two of the shareholders of the company instituted .a suit age.inst
the company and the directors for the following reliefs: (i) a. declaration that the resolution of the directors and the offer of shares
contravened the provisions of section 105·.c of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and was therefore ultra vires and illegal; (ii) a.
declaration that the. offer of she.res was not made bona fide or in
the interests of the company and was therefore illegal ; a.nd (iii) to
restre.in the defenda.nts from allotting any shares in pursue.nee of
their offer :
Held per KANIA C.J., MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAB JJ.that inasmuch as the sh!Lres resolved to be issued were offered to
the existing shareholders only, and not to any outsider a.nd these
shares were also offered to the existing shareholders in proportion
to the she.res held by each member without making any discriminatior.<,, between them the two requirements of section 105-C were
complied with and the resolution e.nd offer did not contravene tba.t
section even though 272 shares remained undistributed as a. result
of the offer of four new shares for every five shares.
392
1950
N anal al Zaver
And A1wther
v.
Bo1nba y Life
Assurance Co,
A.nd Others
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Held also per KANIA C.J.,
(1950]
MAHAJAN, Mux1rnRJEA and
DAS JJ.-that the fact that one of the motives of the directors
in issuing further shares was to prevent an outsider who ha.d
not yet become a shareholder, from getting control of the
company did not render the resolution or the offer illegal inasmuch
as such a motive could not in itself be said to be not in the
inherests of the company and even assuming that such a. motive
was bad this n.dditional motive could not render the resolution
and offer illegal as the company was in fact in need of further
funds and it was necessary in the interests of the company to
issue further shares.
J.,dgment of th• Bombay High Co!f.rt affirmed.
APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay: (Civil Appeal No. LXIX of 1949).
This was an appeal from the judgment and decree
of thE: High Court of Bombay dated 1 lth March, 1949,
(Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in Appeal No. 85 of
1947, confirming a "decree of the said High Court in its
Original Jurisdiction dated 10th November, 1947. The
facts of the case and arguments of the counsel are set
out in the judgment.
N. P. Engineer (M. !JI. Desai and H.]. Umrigar
with him) for the appellants. l\f. C. Setalvad (G. N. Joshi with him) for respondents Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 and 9.
1950. May 4.
Judgments:
I<an;a C. J.
The Court delivered the following
KANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from the decision
of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The
respondent company was incorporated in 1908 with an
authorised capital of Rs. IO lakhs divided into 10,000
shares of Rs. 100 each. By 1945, 5,404 .shares were
subscribed and Rs. 25 per share were called on each of
them. Four thousand five hundred and ninetysix
shares out of the authorised capital thus remained
unissued. From about July, 1944, Mr. Padampat
Singhania, a businessman interested in many
companies, began to purchase shares of the company
from the holders thereof on a large scale. This naturally •
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
1950
put up the price of the shares considerably. On the
18th September, 1944, at a board meeting of the direc- Nanalal Zaver
tors the chairman drew attention of his co-directors to ,tfld Anothe 1 .
the attempt thus made by an outsider to corner the
v.
shares of the company. In pursuance of a resolution Bombay Life
passed at the meeting, the chairman issued a circular to Assurance Co.
the existing shareholders acquainting them of the true And Others
. position and suggesting that if they wanted to part Kanta C.J.
with the shares they might get in touch with the
chairman. A circular was accordingly issued with the
result that two rival groups were thus offering to buy
shares from those who were desirous of selling them.
The shares on which about Rs. 12 or 14 were paid per
annum as dividend began to be quoted in the market
at about Rs. 2,000 per share in March, 1945. Mr.
,Singhania had not submitted to the company for
registration of the transfers to his name the shares
purchased by him. In the meantime on the 8th January, 1945, an application was submitted by the
company to the Examiner of Capital Issues for sanction
of a fresh issue of capital. Several reasons were mentioned in that application to show why the company
iequired additional capital. Such application had
become necessary owing to war regulations. The
Government granted the sanction on the 16th February,
1945, and the communication was received by the
company on the 20th of February. On the next day a
board meeting was held at which the directors decided
to issue the remaining 4,596 shares at a premium
of Rs. 75 per share and to call Rs. 25 per share on them.
Pursuant to this resolution a circular was issued to
the shareholders on the same day with copies of the form
of application . and renunciation referred to in the
resolution and in the circular. The shares were offered
to the shareholders shown on the register of members
in the proportion of four further shares for every five
shares held by them .. · The last date for submission of
the application and payment was 10th March, 1945.
The Uirectors and their friends in the next few days
applied and were allotted 1,648 shares. By the 6th of
March, 1945, 2,204 shares were allotted to shareholders
who had applied for the same.
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950j
The appellants are two shareholders of the company.
They filed the suit, out of which this present
N an.alal Z ave,.
appeal
has arisen, " for themselves and all other
And Another
aggrieved shareholders of the company." The defenv.
Boin.bay Life
dants are the company and eight directors. It is
Assurance Co.
contended in the plaint that the whole issue of these
And Others
further shares and the idea of increasing the capital of
the
company was mala fide and with the object of
l{ania C. J.
retaining the control and management of the company
in the hands of defendants 2 to 9. It is further contended that the resolution of the directors and the offer
of shares contained in the circuluar letter were in
contravention of section 105-C of the Indian Companies
Act. There were further prayers restraining the
company and directors from proceeding with the
allotment of shares. It was contended that the com. pany was not in need of capital and the issue of further·
shares was not made bona fide for the benefit or in the
interest of the company but had been made " merely
with the object of retaining or securing the second
defendant and his friends the control of the first
defendant company."
Considerable evidence was led in the trial Court
on rhe question of bona fides. The trial Court held
that the issue of new shares was bona fide and the
appellate Court has also come to the conclusion that
the object of the directors in issuing the new shares was
not merely with the object of retaining or securing to
the second defendant and his friends the control of the
first defendant company. They held that the company was in need of capital. The suit was consequently
dismissed and that decision was affirmed by the High
Court on appeal.
The decision of the appellate Court has been
challenged before us on both grounds. The learned
counsel appearing for the appellants did not contest
the concurrent finding of fact of both the lower Courts
to the effect that the company was in need of ctlpital.
It was however urged on their behalf that as the issue
of these shares, although not admitted in the written
1950
f
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
395
statement but admitted in the course of evidence, was
for the purpose of preventing the control of the
company going in the hands of Mr: Singhania, the
directors had not acted bona' fide and solely in the
interest of the company. I have read the judgment
prepared by Das J. and I agree with his conclusion
·and line of reasoning on this part of the case. In my
opinion, the contention of the appellants on this point
was rightly rejected by both the lower Courts and that
contention must fail.
That leaves the question whether the issue of these
shares was in contravention of section 105-C of the
Indian Companies Act. That section rnns as follows:" Where the directors decide to increase the
capital of the company by the issue of further shares
such shares shall be offered to the members in propor.
tion to the existing shares held by each member
(irrespective of class) and such offer shall be made by
notice specifying the number of shares fo which the
member is entitled and 1imiting a time within which
the offer if not accepted, Will be deemed to be declined ;
and after the expiration of such time, or on receipt of
an intimation from the member to whom, such notice
is given1hat he declines to accept the shares offered,
the directors may dispose of the same in such manner
as they think most beneficial to the company."
On behalf of the respondents three answers were
submitted. The first was that the section deals with
the -case of increase of capital by the directors beyond
the authorised limit and as in the present case the new
shares were issued within the authorized limit of capital, ·the section has no application. The second was
that the terms of the section should be construed in a
practical way .and. there was no. difference between
Regulation 42 in Table A of the Companies Act and
section 105-C in respect of the scheme to offer the
proportion_ of shares to the existing shareholders. It
was iifgued that so long as they were offered " as nearly
as circumstances admit " the directors had complied
the requirements of the section and therefore
with
,_
their action was not illegal. The third answer was
that in fact the directors had not committed any
50
19;;0
N a1Urlal Z aver
A11d Aflother
v.
Bomb" y I;ife
Assurance Ca..
;\ nd Others
/(ania C. J.
396
1950
Nanalal Za1•cr
And Another
v.
Bo1nba y L(fe
·Assuran:c Co.
A1td Others
J(auia C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950}
breach of the terms of section 105-C up to now and
therefore their action cannot be held to be illegal. In
view of my conclusion on the third point it is not
necessary to express any opinion on the first two
answers. submitted on behalf of the respondents. It
seems to me that section 105-C, interpreted strictly as
contended by the appellants, casts on the directors
two obligations. They have to offer the shares issued
to the shareholders on the register of the company and
not to anyone else, and secondly, the offer must be '
in the same proportion to all the shareholders and
there should be no discrimination amongst them. It
is not contended that by the offer made by the directors fo the shareholders there has been any discrimination amongst the shareholders on the register of the
company. It was contended on behalf of the appellant
that the directors had failed to offer all the shares
resolved to be issued by them to the existing shareholders and therefore the requirements of the section
had not been complied with. It was argued that the
directors having resolved to issue 4,596 shares, they
had to offer that whole lot at once to the shareholders
on the register and the result of the offer made by them
was to retain in their hands 272-4/5 shares. In my
opinion, this contention is unsound. By their resolution of the 21st February, 1945, the directors.resolved
to issue.4,596 shares out of the authorized capital of
the company. They have offered shares to the existing
shareholders in the proportion of four new shares to five
shares held by them. Inasmuch as the offer does not
absorb the whole lot of 4,596 shares I am unable to
construe the offer as an offer of the whole fot at once
to the existing shareholders. Unless the whole lot
of shares in pursuance of the offer could be accepted
and taken up I am unable to consider the offer contained in the circular as an offer of the 4,596 shares.
That however does not establish the contention of
the appellai:its. I find not~in? in the section to justify
the conclusion that the directors must offer all the
shares resolved to be issued in one lot to the shareholders. I can conceive of numerous cases where a _;
limited company with a growing business does not
S.C.R.
SUP~EME COURT REPORTS
397
require its capital to be called up at once. For instance,
soon aftel a company is formed it may issue shares of,
say a lakh of rupees required for the construction of
the buildings, and after . a year when it requires
ft'.lrther capital for payment of machinery etc. it can
issue further shares. I do not think the section as
worded prevents the directors from issuing shares to
existing shar~holders from time to time in that way. As
noticed before, the object of the section is to prevent
discrimination amongst shareholders and prevent
the djrectors from offering shares to outsiders before
they are offered to the shareholders. So long as these
two requirements are complied with, the action
of the directors in selecting the time when they will
issue the shares as also the proportion in which they
should be issued is a matter left to their discretion and
it is not the province ;of the Court to interfere with the
exercise of that discretion. This is of course subject
to the general exception that the directors are not to
act against the interest of the company or mala · fide.
No such question arises in this case and therefore it
is unnecessary to discuss that aspect of the situation.
In my opinion tp.erefore on this. third ground this contentio~. of the appellants should be rej~cted.
The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with
costs.
'~
MAHAJAN J .-This is an appeal by special leave
from the judgment and decree of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. arid Tendolkar J.)
dated 11th March, 1948, confirming the judgment of
the said High Court in its Original Jurisdiction
(Bhagwati J.) dated IGth Nov~mber, 1947.
The two · questions canvassed in this appeal are:
(1) whether the issue of further shares by the directors
was in contravention of the provisions of section
105-C of the Indian Companies Act, and (2) whether
this issue was not made bona fide. Both these questions 'were answered in favour of the respondents by
the High Court.
The Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd., the first
c;iefendant in the case, was incorporated in the year
1950
N analal Z avu
And Another
v.
Bombay Llfe
Assu,.an -:e Co-.
And Ot/lus
[(a11ia C. J,
M11T1ajm1 J
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
1950
1908 as a limited company with an authorized capital
of
ten lakhs. Five thousand four hundred and four
Jo.i~a11al11l Zl1't't'I"
shares had been issued till the year 1945 and they
And A11otlter
v.
were paid up to Rs. 25 each. The second defendant
Bo111hay l.rje
is the chairman of the board. of directors which is
Ass11ranc.! Co,
of defendants 2 to 9. The company has a
comprised
And Others
life fund of Rs. 230 lakhs.
In the year 1944 Sir Padampat Singhania, an
industrialist of Kanpur, attracted by the soundness
of this concern, began purchasing the shares of the
company with a view to acquiring a controlling interest in its management. Soon after competition
started for the purchase of the shares of the company
between the Singhania group and the Maneklal Premchand group who were in management of this company.
The result of this competition was that shares which
.were ordinarily quoted at 250 went up as much as to
2,000 in March, 1945. A circular was issued by the
directors to the shareholders apprising them of the
activities of the Singhania party and suggesting that
those who wanted to sell their shares should sell them
in the first instance to the chairman. This circular
does not seem to have had much effect as the shareholders wanted to reap the maximum benefit which
would come to them as a result of this competition
between two rich parties. By the end of December,
1944, the Singhania group had purchased 2,517 shares
as against 2,397 held by Maneklal Premchand's party.
The Singhania group had thus acquired a majority of
the shares in the company though these had not yet
been transferred in their name. On 8th January, 1945,
the chairman at his own instance and after consulting
some of the directors made an application to the
Examiner of Capital Issues for permission for a fresh
issue of capital. This was allowed on 20th February,
1945. As soon as sanction of the Examiner of Capital
Issues was obtained for increasing the capital of the
company, a meeting of the directors was held OJ} 21st
February, 1945, and it adopted the following resolution:-1. That the capital of the company be increased
from Rs. 5,40,400 to Rs. 10,00,000 by the issue of the
/
'
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
399
remaining 4,596 ordinary shares of Rs. 100 each at a
premium of Rs. 75 per share.
2. That as on the existing shares of Rs. 100 each
Rs. 25 is paid up, to call Rs. 22 per, share on these
new shares also.
3. That these new shares shall rank pari passu
in all respects with the existing shares ofthecompany,
but they shall be entitled to rank for dividend as
from 1st April, 1945.
4. ·That these new shares shall be offered in the
first instance by a circular to the shareholders of the
~ompany as shown on the register of members on 20th
February, 1945, in the proportion of four new shares
to every five shares held by them in the capital of the
company on that date.
5. That in the case of any shareholder holding
less than five shares, or whose holding of shares shall
not be complete multiples of five shares, then fractional certificates shall be issued to such shareholders
in respect of their rights for fraction of a share, each
fractional certificate representing one-fifth of a share.
6. That a sum of Rs. 100 per share (Rs. 25
towards capital and Rs. 75 for premium) shall be payable along with application for these new shares.
7. That all applications for shares in accordance
with this offer (including applications for shares made
in respect of and accompanied by fracticmal certificates and applications for shares accompanied by
a renunciation) must be presented to and payment
made at the registered office of the company in Bombay
on or before the 10th March, 1945. . Any shareholder
or person in whose favour a renunciation has been signed
not applyin,g Qil or before the 10th March, 1945, in
terms of tlie{(Tfer shall be· deemed to have declined to
participate in tliis new issue and all fractional certificates not presented as required on or before 10th March,
1945, will c~ase to have any validity and will not entitle
the hC\Jder to any rights.
~· That any balance of the shares remaining out
·Of this issue not applied for by the: 10th March, 1945,
shall be disposed of by the directors as they may consider best in the interests of the company.
1950
Nanalal Zaver
And Another
v.
Bomhay Life
Assurance Co.
A11tl Others
.UahajanJ.
400
1950
Nanalal Zavcr
And Another
Y,
&tubay Life
Assurance Co,
And Others
J\lahajanJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950J
· 9. That the draft circular to the shareholders
with the enclosures (form A being the form of
application, form B form of renunciation and form of
fractional certificates with application form) placed
on the table by the manager and actuary be approved
and initialled by the chairman.
10. That the manager and actuary be and is
hereby directed to issue forthwith the necessary circulars to the shareholders.
11. That a committee consisting of the chairman and any one of the directors or the chairman
and any two of the directors be and are hereby appointed to scrutinise the application for the new shares
which may be received and to make allotment of these
new shares.
* * * * ."
It is the validity of this resolution that is the subject matter of the present dispute; The plaintiffs, who
are two shareholders of the company owing allegiance
to the Singhania group, filed the suit out of which this
appeal arises challenging this issue of further shares,
principally on two grounds, viz. (1) that. the new
issue contravenes the provisions of section 105-C of the
Indian Companies Act, and (2) that the issue of shares
was not bona fide made in the interests or for the benefit of the first defendant company, but was resolved
upon merely with the object of retaining or securing
to the second defendant and his friends control of the
first defendant company. As already stated, both
these contentions were negatived by the trial Judge
and the suit was dismissed and this decision was
affirmed on appeal.
The answer to the first question pepends on the
meaning to be given to the words used in section
105-C of the Indian Companies Act as to its scope.
The section was introduced in the Indian Companies
Act in the year 1936. Antecedent to this period the
question of issue of new shares by the directors was
dealt with by article 42 of the Articles of Assqciation
given in the schedule to the Indian Companies Act,
1913. The article was in these terms:" Subject to any directions to the contrary that· ' '
may be given by the resolution sanctioning the ..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
401
increase of share capital, allnew shares shall, before
issue, be offered to such persons as at the date of the
offer are entitled to receive notice from the company
of general meetings in proportion, as nearly as the
drcumstances admit, to the amount of the existing
shares to which they are entitled."
As its language indicates, the article only applied
to cases where the capital of the company was increased by a resolution of the company·. It had no
application to cases where the directors issued further
shares within the authorised limits. The new section
introduced in 1936 is in these terms:-.
"Where the directors decide to increase the capi.,
tal of the company by the issue of further shares such
shares shall be offered to the members in proportion to
·the existing shares held by each member (irrespective
·of class) and such offer shall be made by notice specifying the number of shares · to which the member is
entitled, and limiting a time within which the offer, if
not accepted will be deemed to be declined, and .after
the expiration of such time or on receipt of an intimatiou from the member to whom such notice is given
that he declines to accept the shares offered, the directors may dispose of the same in such manner as they
think most beneficial to the company."
It qualifies the discretion of the directors in the
matter of issue .of capital by enjoining on them that if
they decide to ·issue further shares, the existing shareholders should be given the first option to buy them.
The language employed in th~ section admits of. three
possible interpretations : ( 1) that its scope is limited tQ
cases where there is an increase in the capital of the
-company according to the provisions of section 50; (2)
that the section covers within its ambit all issue of
further qi.pital whether made by increasing the nominal capital or by. issuing further shares with.in the
authorised capital ; (3) that the section has appllcation
only to ,cases where the directors issue· further shares
within the authorized limit.
\
· The learned counsel for the respondents contended
that the whole int(lnt and purpose of the section was to
limit the discretion 'of directors in' regard fo the· issue
1950
Nana/al Zavcr
And 111zotlla
\',
Bombay Ufe
A ssurancc Co.
A>ul Others
ltlalinja"l·
402
1950
Nanalal Zaver
And Anotlu·1·
v.
Boiirba y Life
Asst'1·ance Co.
And Others
Mahajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950]
of further shares in those cases alone where there was
an increase in the nominal capital of the company by
recourse to the provisions of section 50 of the Indian
Companies Act. It was argued that the phrase "increase
of capital" has been employed by the legislature in
section 50 and some other sections preceding section
105-C with reference only to the nominal capital of a
company and' that this expression had not been used
with reference to the subscribed capital anywhere in
the Act and therefore the scope of section 105-C should
be limited to cases where the increase in the capital is
brought about under section 50 of the Act and new
shares are created and issued by the directors. In
Sircar and Sen's Indian Companies Act, 1937 Edn. at
page 309 the learned authors observe as follows : " The words •further shares' must be read in conjunction with the words 'decide to increase the capital
of the company.' They must mean shares which are
issued for the purpose of increasing the capital beyond
the authorized capital."
.
Mr. Ghosh on Indian Company Law, 8th Edn. at
page 263 has stated as follows :" The object of this new section appears to be to
make the salient provisions of Regulation 42 in Table A
compulsory. The section as drafted is liable to the construction that whenever· the directors !lecide to increase the capital of the company by the issue of further shares, even if it be a part of the authorized
capital, the new shares must be first offered to the
existing shareholders. But this section should be read
in conjunction with clause (a) of section 50 under subsection (2) of which the directors have no power to increase the share capital of the company. Therefore it
seems that the words •further shares' mean shares
beyond the authorized capital of the company."
Whatever might be the opinion expressed by these
commentators, the matter has to be decided on the
language of the Act itself. As already pointtd out,.
the learned counsel for the respondents contended that
the above was the correct view as to the scope of the ,
section. The learned counsel for the appellants how- '
ever urged that on a proper interpretation of the
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
1950
section its scope could not be limited only to cases of
issue of further shares by creation of new shares by in- Nana/al Zat'el"
creasing the nominal capital of the company, but that And Another
the language employed in the section also included
v.
within its ambit cases where there was a further issue Bombay Life
C<>..
of shares by the directors, within the authorized Assurance
A11tl Others
capital. The learned counsel laid considerable emphasis
on the expression " further shares " used in the section Mahaja1'].
and suggested that these words have been used advisedly instead of the expression "new shares " in order
to bring within the scope of the section increases in the
capital of a company whether within the authorised
limit or outside it.
The third interpretation of the section finds support from the language employed by the legislature in
the opening part of the section, wherein it is said :
" Where the directors decide to increase the capital of
the company by the issue of further shares ....... " The
directors can only decide to increase the capital at their
own initiative when they issue further shares out of
the authorised capital. In no other case can the directors themselves decide as to the increase in the capital
ot a company. Under section 50 the capital can only be
increased by a resolution of the company. Once the
company has increased the nominal capital, then the
directors can issue shares within the new limit. Therefore the authority of the directors, strictly speaking,
in respect to the increase of capital is limited to an
increase within the authorised limit. They cannot by
their own decision increase the nominal cap-ital of the
company. In view of this language the third interpretation of the section seems more plausible.
The expression "capital of a company " is an ambiguous phrase and may mean either issued capital or
authorized capital according to the context. It has
been used in different senses in various parts of the
· Act. In what sense it has been used in this section is
by no means an easy matter to decide, particularly in
view of the fact that in spite of the introduction of this
·~ction in the Indian Companies Act in the year 1936r
article 42 still remains as one of the articles to be
adopted by companies if they do not choose otherwise
51
404
!950
Na1ialal Zavcr
And Another
v.
Boml1a y Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
Mahajan/,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
and this refers to cases of increase in the nominal capital of a company. In my opinion, for the purpose of
deciding the present case it is not necessary to pronounce on the question as to the precise scope of the
section because I consider that on any interpretation of
it the appellants' contention has to be negatived. If the
interpretation suggested by the learned counsel for the
respondents is accepted, then the plaintiffs' contention
on the first question fails, because here there has been
no increase in the capital of the company under
section 50. Conceding however for the sake of argument (but not deciding) that the scope of the section
is as it has been contended for by Sir Noshirwan, the
question still remains " To what extent has there been
a contravention of its provisions by the directors in
the present case." So far as I have been able to see,
the resolution passed by the directors is in accordance
with the provisions of the section and does not
injuriously affect the shareholders or the company,
and they cannot be said to have any cause of grievance
against it. In other words, in my opinion, the resolution substantially complies with the provisions of
section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act. The
directors offered all the new shares to the shareholders
in the ratio of 4 to 5, as the shares of the company
were held in multiples of five to a larger extent than in
any other multiple. The result of fixing this ratio is
that 272 shares remain outside the offer. In whatever
other proportion the shares were offered, still a few
shares were.bound to remain unoffered. If a liberal interpretation is placed on the section, then it has to be held
that the directors' resolution substantially complies
with its provisions. On the other hand, if a technical and
literal interpretation is placed on the section, then the
directors were bound to offer the shares in the ratio of
4596/5404 in spite of the practical difficulties that might
result in the actual working out of such a proportion,
and irrespective also of whatever absurdities or anomalies might thus result. I am of the opinion that the
section has to be given a workable construction and a.
construction that is businesslike in preference to a literal
construction which might lead to a deadlock. In each .
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
405
1950
case it should be seen whether the directors have substantially complied with the provisions of the section or not. N analal Z aver
The basic idea underlying the section is that And Another
whatever is given, is given to all the existing sharev.
holders and is distributed equally and equitably be- Bombay Ufe
-;e Co-.
tween them. It cannot be denied that all the share- Assurn1t
And Others.
holders were offered the further shares arid that they
were offered equally and equitably. Whatever is the M alwjan J.
balance remains with the company with the result that
the capital remains unincreased to this extent. In such
a situation it is difficult to hold that the resolution
passed by the directors has contravened the provisions
of section 105-C and has caused any detriment or injury either, to the company or to the shareholders. Even
if the resolution passed by the directors is held to be
in technical breach of the section, as it has caused no
injury to anybody, the resolution cannot be held to be
void. Under the law as it existed prior to 1936, if a
company iecorporated in its Articles of Association
article 42 mentioned in the schedule to the Indian
Companies Act, then in the case of issua of new shares
the directors' discretion was curtailed inasmuch as
they were bound to offer these shares in the first instance in proportion as nearly as the circumstances admitted to the amount of the existing shares to the existing shareholders but in all other cases their discretion
remained unfettered. It was open to a company not to
adopt article 42 and thus fetter the discretion of the
directors even in the case of the issue of new capital.
After 1936. it has been made obligatory on the directors
to give the first option to buy further shares to the
existjng shareholders and without any favour to anyone. That being the intent and purpose of the section,
it has been fully carried out by the directors in the
present instance and has been carried out in a businesslike way because the ratio in which they offered the
shares is the ratio which works to the convenience of
the largest number of shareholders as the shares of the
company are held mostly in multiples of five. If the
~shares were issued in any other ratio, that would have
created some difficulty in the way of shareholders who
held shares in multiples of five and who owned 2, 110
406
] 950
Nanalal Zaver
And Another
v.
Bo11iba y Life
Ass11ran ;e Co.
And Others
Mahajan}.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
shares. They would have been obliged to collect fractions before they could claim a whole share and thus
make an application within the time allowed to exercise the option. Where the language of a statute in its
ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads
to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of
the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity,
hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a
construction may be put upon it which modifies the
meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. In my opinion, the section when it says "such.
shares shall be offered to the members " should be
construed liberally and not literally, as such an interpretation would make th~ section workable and
would not in any way affect its intent and purpose,
the phrase "such. shares" meaning those shares which
admit of being so offered in a businesslike way.
It was argued that a liberal interpretatibn of the
section would result in the directors allottii:ig the balance of shares remaining out of the further shares
unoffered to their own friends and relations and it
would operate to the detriment of the other shareholders. In this connection reference was made to
para 8 of the resolution above mentioned. In my
opinion this paragraph does not bear out the contention of the appellants because it has reference only 'to
shares not applied for, obviously shares not offered
and which could not be taken up by the shareholders
cannot fall under that description. That paragraph
applies only to cases where the shares could be applied
for and then no application was made in respect of
them. It was not disputed that the directors in., the
present case had not sold these shares to any one and
that these have remained unissued. It was urged
strongly by the learned counsel for the appellants that
the section being imperative and its language being
unambiguous, the Court was bound to place a literal
interpretation on it and 'the argument of. hardship or
inconvenience should not weigh with it. It was further
suggested that the directors could always give effect to.,
the provisions of the section by increasing the capital
in a manner and to the extent that the further shares
..
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
407
1950
<:ould be offered to the shareholders in such a proportion that
the shares offered could be taken up by N analal Z aver
them. In other words, it was contended that the section A11d Another
not only fetters the powers of the directors in the mattv.
·er of sale of shares but it also restricts their discretion Bombay Life
in the matter of increase of capital and as to the Assurance Co.
number of further shares. This contention, if accepted, A".d Others
would mean that the legislature by enacting section lYlahajan J.
105-C indirectly enjoined on the directors that when·ever they decide to increase capital by issue of further
shares they should make the increase only to such an
·extent and in a manner as to enable the existing
shareholders to take the whole of it. If that was the
inten~ion of the section, there was nothing easier for
the legislature to say so. The section, on the other
1
hand, recognizes that the directors have a discretion in
the matter of the increase of capital when it says,
"'' when the directors decide to increase the capital of
a company." It means that it is within their absolute
discretion to take the decision whether to increase the
·capital or not. It is also within their discretion to say
to what limit and to what extent they will increase the
-capital. It is also for them to decide how many shares
and of what value ±h.ey will issue. Once they have
taken their decision, it is then and then only that. section 10s~c comes into operation. At that stage they
have to offer the new shares to the shareholders and at
that stage they can offer them i.J;i a businesslike manner
io all of them equitably and equally and if out of the
shares offered some cannot be taken up by the shareholders as they do not fit in the ratio in which th~
·Offer ha:; been made, the only result isthat those shares
Temain unoffered and thus unissued. I am therefore
-0f the opinion that the learned Judges of the Court of
appeal were right when they held that under section
105-C the shares have to be offered to the existing
shareholde1s as nearly as the circumstances would
admit and that the section has to be given a businesslike construction and should be construed liberally and
i. that the charge of contravention of section 105-C cannot be levelled against the directors -so long as they
.ha,ve not disposed of the unoffered balance contrary tb
all
408
1950
N anal al Z aver
And Another
v.
Bo111!Jay Life
Assrv-t11icc Co.
And Others
MaliajanJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
the provisions of the section. The result . is that the
first contention of the learned counsel stands negatived.
The next question whether the action of the directors in passing the resolution was not bona fide seems
to be concluded by concurrent findings of fact of the
Courts below to the effect that the resolution was
passed because the company needed additional funds
at the moment when the new issue was decided upon
and that the issue of shares was not due solely to the
desire on the part of the directors to keep themselves
in the saddle.
It is not the practice of this Court ordinarily to
interfere with concurrent conclusions on questions of
fact reached in the Courts below unless those conclusions have been reached on extraneous considerations
or by violating rules of procedure or by committing
any breach of some provision of law : vide Srirnati
Bibhabati Devi v. K urnar Rarnendra Narayan Roy ( 1 ).
The learned counsel for the appellants while conceding
that it was not open to him to challenge concurrent
findings of fact of the Courts below, urged that the
whole case has been looked at by them from an erroneous angle. It was contended that the Courts below
had misdirected themselves in their approach to the·
decision of the issue of bonafides. In this connection
emphasis was laid on the following observations in the·
judgment of the learned Chief Justice and on similar
observations occurring elsewhere : "In this particular case it is urged and urged with
considerable force that the reason whiCh actuated the
directors on the 21st February, 1945, in resolving to
issue new shares was the fear that the Singhania group
would capture the company and oust the present directors from their vantage point and take control of the
company itself. It may be that one of the factors that
weighed with the directors was that consideration. It
may even be that it weighed with them a great deal.
It may also be that the directors selected this particular time viz. the 21st February, 1945, for the issue of •
these shares because of the impending danger of the
(1)
73 I.A. H6.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT l<.EPORTS
409
1950
majority of shares going into the hands of the Singhania group with the necessary consequences. If, with N analal Z er-Jet
all that, it is established before the Court that in fact And Another
on the 21st February, 1945, the company was in need
v.
- of funds, that the funds were required for the working Bombay Life
of the company, then the Court will not interfere with Assurance Co.
-the discretion exercised by the directors, because the And Others
principle is obvious that if the new shares have been MahajauJ.
issued because the company needs funds, then it cannot be said that the discretion vested in the directors
has been exercised not in the interests of the company
or for the purpo$e of the company. It is only when
that discretion is exercised solely for the personal ends
-of directors, for their personal aggrandisement, for
keeping themselves in power, then undoubtedly that
discretion cannot be said to have been exercised for
-the purpose of or in the interests of the company."
Reference was also made to the concluding part of
the same judgment which runs thus :"Undoubtedly this is a case of high finance and.
we have been given a glimpse of what high finance can
be and there is great justification in what Mr. Amin
.has said as tq the manner in which some of the things
were done with regard to the affairs of this company.
:But ultimately we must come down to the one short
and simple question, was the company in need of funds
at the time when the directors decided upon the issue
of new shares, and in my opinion there can be no doubt
on the evidence led this case that the answer to that
question must be in the affirmative. If that be the
position all other consideratio_ns can be of no avail or
-Of very little avail as against this central fact in this
~ase and as I am satisfied as to the central fact, I
would agree with the learned judge who took the same
view and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs
have failed to discharge the burden which lily upon
theni of establishing that the issue of new shares was
not bona fide and not in the interests of and for the
benefit of the compan:y."
It was argued that the learned Judges were not
-right in thinking that all other considerations were of
410
1950
Nanalal Zaver
;.lnd Anotlii.:r
v.
Bo1111'ay l~zfe
Assurance Co.
And Others
r.talu1ja11 J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950J
no avail and shoqlg be practically kept out of consideration once it was-established that the company needed
funds. It was said that it having been found that at
the time of the aforesaid resolution the directors were ·
considerably influenced by the consideration of keep- ing out the Singhania group from capturing the company, and by the consideration of keeping themselves
in the saddle, it should have been held that they were
acting with an ulterior motive, and that their decision
as to the need of the company for further funds was.
vitiated by reason of the ulterior motive.
It is convenient here to state what the true approach should be to a question of this nature when it
arises in a case. It is well settled that in exercisingtheir powers whether general or special, the directors·
must always bear in mind that they hold a fiduciary
position and must exercise their powers for the benefit
of the company and for that alone and that the Court
can intervene to prevent the abuse of a power whenever such abuse is held proved, but it is equally settled
that where directors have a discretion and are bona fate'
acting in the exercise of it, it is not the habit of the
Court to interfere with them. When the company is
in no need of further capital, directors are not entitled
to use their power of issuing shares merely for thepurpose of maintaining themselves and their friends in
management over the affairs of the company, or merely
for the purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing
majority of shareholders.
It appears to me that the learned Judges in the
Court below approached the decision of this question
in the light of the principles stated above and thecontention of the learned counsel therefore does not
seem right. Where the directors are not chargeable·
for breach of trust so far as the company is concerned
and where their action is for the benefit of the company, then merely because in promoting the interests
of the company they also prom~te their own interests
it cannot be held that they have not acted bona fide.
As it has been said in Hirsche v. Sims (1 ), if the true
effect of the whole evidence is that the defendants truly
(1) (189') A.C. 65•.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
and reasonably believed at the time that what they
did was for the interest of the company, they are not
chargeable with dolus malus or breach of trust merely
because in promoting the interest of the company they
were also promoting their own, or because they afterwards sold shares at prices which gave them large
profits.
Both the Courts below have found as a fact that
to a certain extent in resolving to issue new shares the
directors were actuated by a fear that the Singhania
group would capture the company and oust the present
directors from their vantage point and take control
of the company itself. It was argued that this
motive was an ulterior motive and the exercise of
power by the directors to achieve this objective by the
issue of further shares was an exercise of power for
the purp.::>se for which it was not conferred. This argument would have had force if this was the main purpose of the directors in issuing the further shares, but
this is not the case here. As found by the High Court,
the central fact working in the mind of the directors
was the necessity of further funds for the company at
the moment they passed the resolution. That being so,
it seems to me that the existence of the other motive
does not make the action of the directors in respect of
the issue of further shares mala fide.
Moreover, in the present case it seems to me that
the directors were on the defensive. They felt that
the attempt of the Singhanias to capture the controlling interest in the company by paying high prices for
its shares must have been with a purpose, i.e., to make
use of the funds of the company in their own concerns.
Some evidence of this exists on the record. They
thought that it was their duty as directors to protect
the company from such an attack and they felt that it
was beneficial to the company to protect it from such
an attack. They did not keep the matter in secret but
informed all the shareholders about it. They first
attemptea to enter into the field of competition with
the Singhanias but it seems that they were not wholly
successful in their objective. They then decided to
issue further capital 'by taking into consideration the
53
1950
/Ii.. a1u1lal Za'f)r•'"
A11d Another
v.
Bombay Life
Assurance Co..
A11d Others
Mahajan/.
412
1950
.Nana/al Zav11r
1-111d AnothiJr
v.
Bonzba y Life
.Assurtu1ce Co,
And Otltcrs
Mal1ajanJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
interest and the needs of the company and its requirements in respect of capital at the moment. They also
thought that by this · action they would also be
able to keep out the Singhanias from capturing the
company. They were under no obligation to Singhanias
who had not yet even been entered as shareholders on
the register of shareholders. There was no dolus malus
in their mind as directors of the company, as affecting the company or its shareholders. On the other
hand, they honestly considered it to be in the best
interests of the company to meet such an attack.
The result therefore is that it cannot be held that this
is one of those unusual cases where this Court should
not give weight to the concurrent findings of fact by
the Courts below, or that it is a case where it can be
held that the High Court in arriving at its findings has
committed a breach of any rule of procedure or law
and that there is no evidence to support the findings
that have been arrived at.
The result therefore is that this appeal fails and is
dismissed with costs.
DasJ.
DAS J.-1 agree that this appeal must be dismissed. As, however, my decision rests on slightly
different reasons, I desire to state them in my
judgment.
For the purpose of appreciating the questions
involved in this appeal which has been brought
by the plaintiffs it will suffice to set out the following
facts.
The Bombay Life Assurance Company, Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as " the company ") was
incorporated in 1908 with an authorised capital of
Rs. 10,00,000 divided into 10,000 shares of Rs. 100
each. By 1945, 5,404 shares in all were subscribed,
and Rs. 25 per share had been paid on them. This
left 4,596 shares out of the total authorised capital yet
to be issued. The plaintiffs are two of the shareholders
of the company. Respondents 2 to 9 are the.directors
of the company of whom respondent 2 is the chairman of the board of directors. It appears that
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
413
!950
from July, 1944, shares in the company began to be
purchased from the holders thereof by ·or in the Naualal Zat £~r
interest of SrFPadampat Singhania. This attempt to AIJd An-0tlter
buy up the shares on a large scale naturally resulted
v.
in a sudden rise in the price of tP.e shares. This Bombay Life
abnormal rise in the price could not but attract the AsSt11·a1tce C0r.
Aud Others
attention of the board of directors. On September 18,
1944, a board meeting was held at which the chairman
Das/.
drew the attention of his co-directors to the serious
implications of the attempt of an outsider group to
corner the shares of the company. It was decided at
that meeting that a circular should be issued to the
· shareholders acquainting them of the tru«;l position and
the chairman was authorised to sign the circular.
Accordingly, on September 19, 1944, a circular was
issued to the shareholders drawing their attention to
what was happening and exhorting them, in · case they
wanted to dispose of their holdings, to offer them to
· the chairman. The result of the chairman and other
directors entering the arena was a race for purchase of
shares of the company which inevitably led to a pheno- ·
menarrise in the price of the shares. · The shares
which in 1944 were quoted at Rs. 250 per share went
up to Rs. 2,000 per share in March, 1945. I.t may be
noted here that the shares purchased by the Singhania
group were not submitted for registration of the transfers with the result that their names have not yet been
entered on the register of members. In the meantime,
on January 8, 1945, an applic;,i.tion was submitted by
the company to the Examiner of Capital Issues for
sanction for a. fresh issue of capital, setting forth several
reasons for whieh such . capital was required by the
company. The required sanction dated :February 16,
1945, was received by the company on February 20,
1945, and on the next day (February 21, 1945) a
board meeting was held at which the directors decided·
to issue the remaining 4,596 shares at a premium of
Rs. 75 per share and to call-up Rs. 25 per share on
them. The minutes of the board meeting (Ex. 0) are
printed at pages 301-2 of the Paper Book. Pursuant
to this resolution of the board a circular (Ex. Q) was
issued to the shareholders on the same day with copies
1
414
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
of the form of application and form of renunciation
referred to in the resolution and in the circular. These
Na1tt1lal Zaver
further
shares, were offered to the shareholders shown
And Another
on
the.register
of members in the proportion of four
v.
further shares to every five shares then held .by them.
Bo1nba y Lift
Assurance Co.
The last date for submission of the applications and
Arid Others
necessary payments for the shares so offered was fixed
for
March IO, 1945. It is said that on the very next
DasJ.
day after the board meeting 1,648 shares were allotted
and that between February 22, and March 6, 1945,
2,204 shares were allotted to the shareholders who had
applied for the same. The suit out of which the
present appeal has arisen was filed on March 5, 1945.
The plaintiffs are two of the members of the
company suing " for themselves and all other aggrieved
shareholders" of the company. The defendants are
the company and the eight directors. The reliefs
prayed for are as follows, inter alia :
(a) That it may be declared that the resolution
of the directors and the offer referred to in para 6
hereof contravenes the provisions of section 105-C of
Indian Companies Act and was and is ultra vires, and
illegal ;
(b) That it may be declared that the said offer
of shares referred to in para 6 hereof is not bona fide
or in the interest of the defendant company and is
ultra vires and illegal ;
(c) That the defendants 2 to 9 may be restrained by an injunction from allotting any shares or doing
any further act in pursuance of the said offer."
It will be noticed that none of the shareholders
other than the directors to whom further shares had
been allotted before the filing of the suit has been
made a party to the suit. Further, even as against
the defendants 2 to 9 the consequential relief by way
of cancellation of the allotments of further shares to
them and the rectification of the register in respect
thereof has not been prayed for by the plaintiffs.
The contentions of the plaintiffs as set forth in
the plaint on which the above prayers were founded
may be summarised shortly as follows :
1950
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
(i) the company was not in need of capital,
(ii) the issue of further shares was not made
bona fide for the benefit or in the interest of the company but had been made " merely with the object of
retaining or secqring to the second defendant and his
friends the control of the first defendant company,"
and
(iii) the issue and · offer of farther shares are
illegal and void for contravention of the provisions of
section 105-C of the Indian Companies Act. It is
necessary to examine each of these contentions and to
ascertain their effect.
Re (i): Both the Courts below.have found it as a
fact that at the time the directors resolved upon the
issue of further shares the company was in need of
capital for the purposes mentioned in the company's
application to the Examiner of Capital Issues referred
to above. This concurrent finding of fact has not been
contested before us and the next contention of the
appellants will have to be examined in that light.
Re (ii) : It is not disputed that the company's
need for funds standing by itself will afford a good
motive to the directors to issue further shares. The
contention, however, is that if that motive was not the
sole motive but was mixed up with any other motive, it
was an abuse of the powers of the directors to issue further shares. This plea is clearly a departure from
the case made in the plaint. There the case was that
there was no need for funds at all and the sole motive
of the directors was merely to retain their own control
over the affairs of the company. It will, however, be
a hypertechnicality to shut out this piea altogether.
The plea of mixed motive raises three questions,
namely(a) whether apart from the motive of finding
further capital for the company, there was any, and,
if so, what_ other motive,
(b) was that other motive vitiated by bad faith,
and (c) if it was so vitiated, whether the presence of
it nullified the good motive and rendered the issue of
further shares illegal and void.
1950
N analal Z ave1'
And Another
'I•
BombP:V Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
Das.].
416
1950
N analal Zaver
And Another
v.
Bo1nbay Life
Assurance Co,
And Others
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950J
The contention of the plaintiffs before Bhagwati
J. as before us, was that the company was not in need
of any further capital in February, 1945, and that the
directors of the company decided to issue the further
capital merely with a view to retain control of the
management of the company in their hands. On the evidence before him, Bhagwati J. found that the motive of
the directors was rather to keep the Singhania group out
of the control of the company than to retain their own
control. The race for the purpose of purchasing the
shares was not merely for the purpose of increasing their
holdings for holdings' sake but was really with a view to
prevent the Singhania group from obtainirig a majority
of shares which would give them the control of the
management of the company and enable them to utilise
the life funds of the company for the purposes of the
various industrial concerns of the Singhania group.
The result of keeping out the Singhania group might
well be_ to strengthen the position of the directors and
to keep them in the saddle, but the proximate motive
was to exclude the Singhanias. The distinction is real
and quite understandable. The appeal Court does not
appear to have dissented from this view of the matter
.and I do not see any reason to take a different view.
It follows, therefore, that apart from the rrtotive of
raising fresh capital for the purposes and benefit of the
company, the directors also had another motive,
namely, to prevent the Singhania group, who are
strangers to the company, from intruding into its
affaii:s so as to be able to assume a controlling hand
in its management for their own purposes rather than
for the benefit of the company.
On the evidence on
· record the existence of this motive side by side with
the motive of raising further capital cannot be denied.
The question then arises whether in acting up to
it the directors were actuated by bad faith. In coming to a conclusion on this point it has to be borne
in mind_ that the Singhania group had only purchased some shares from various existing shareholders
but did not submit the transfers of registration so q.s to
get their names put upon the register of members: It
is· clear that until the Singhania group get their names
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
1950
entered in the register of members, they are not shareholders but are complete strangers to the company. Nana/al Zavc1
It has been held in Percival v. Wright( 1 ) that ordinari- And Another
ly the directors are not trustees for individual sharev.
holders. Even if the· directors owe some duty to the Bombay Life
Co.
existing shareholders on the footing of there being Assura11.ci!
A1'd Others
some fiduciary relationship between them as stated in
some cases [see for example In re Greshain Life AssurDasJ.
ance Society] ( 2 ), I see no cogent reason for extending this principle and imputing any kind of fiduciary
relationship between the directors and persons who are
complete strangers to the company. In my judgment,
therefore, the conduct of the respondents 2 to 9 cannot
be judged on the basis of any assumed fiduciary relationship existing between them and the Singhania
group. In my opinion, the respondents 2 to 9 owed
no duty to the Singhania group and, therefore, the
motive to exclude them cannot be said to be 1nala fide .
per se. In North-West Transportation Company, Ltd.
v. Beatty (3 ) the Judicial Committee observed at
p. 601:
" But the constitution of the company enabled the
defendant J.H. Beatty to acquire this voting power;
there was no limit upon the number of shares which a
shareholder might hold, and for every share so held he
was entitled to vote, tbe charter itself recognised the
defendant as a holder of 200 shares, one-third of the
aggregate number; he had a perfect right to acquire
further shares, and to exercise his voting power in such
.a manner as to secure the election of directors whose
views upon policy agreed with his own, and to support
those views at any shareholders' meeting."
Beatty referred to in the above passage was a
director. It follows therefore, that the fact of the
directors entering into a competition with the Singhania
group in purchasing the shares of the company was
quite legitimate and was not mala fide. It was urged,
however, that the issuing of further shares, although
the company required further capital, was, in the circumstances, evidence of bad faith. Bhagwati J. dealt
(I) L.R. (1902) 2 Ch. ,21.
· (2) L.R. S Ch. App. 4'6 at p. ~~9.
(3) L.R. 12 A.O. 589.
418
!950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
with the various acts of the directors relied upon by
the plaintiffs as indicating bad faith on the part of the
N analal Zaver
directors and on a consideration of all of them was
A11d Another
" unable to come to the conclusion that the issue of
v.
B0111ba y Life · new shares was decided upon by the directors not bona
Assurance Co.
fide in the interests of the company and merely with a
Aud Others
view to keep the control of the affairs of the company
in
their hands." The learned Judge, therefore, came
Das}.
to the conclusion that the :issue of further shares and
the offer thereof made on the 21st February, 1945, was.
not ultra vires and illegal. Some of these facts on
which the charge of mala fide was sought to be founded
were urged before the appeal Court by learned counsel
for the appellants. The learned Chief Justice discussed
the matters and concluded by saying that he agreed
with the trial Judge that the plaintiffs had failed to
discharge the burden which lay upon them of establishing that the issue of new shares was not bona fide and
not in the interests, and for the benefit, of the company_
I do not see any cogent reason for taking a different
view on the facts. The position, shortly put, was that
the Singhania group, who were outsiders and to whom
the directors owed no duty, were out to corner the·
shares of the company for their own ends. To thwart
that object of the Singhania group by making it more
and more difficult for them to acquire more shares the
directors took advantage of the existing needs of the
company for further capital and decided µpon to issue
further shares. The issue of further shares served tw<>
purposes, namely, the purpose of finding the necessary
finance, and to exclude the interlopers, both of which
purposes, according to the directors, were for the benefit of the company. Rightly or wrongly, the directors
felt that it was not in the interests of the company t<>
allow the Singhania group a controlling hand in the
management of the affairs of the company. Their apprehension evidently was that the Singhania group, ~f
and when they became shareholders, would use their
voting power in their own interests and to the detriment of the company by utilising the life fund of the
company for the purposes of their various other industrial concerns. I find nothing in the evidence on
S.C.R.
1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
419
record to doubt the honesty of the directors in holding
this view and, that being so, I see nothing improper if
the directors in the interests of the company and the
existing shareholders tried to prevent what, according
to them, would be a catastrophe. Indeed, if the directors
honestly held that view-and as already stated I have
no reason to think that they did not-·they would, in
my opinion, have been guilty of dereliction of duty to
the company and to the existing shareholders if they
did not exert themselves to prevent such evil. In my
judgment the motive to prevent the Singhania group,
who \Vere outsiders, from acquiring a control over the
company cannot, as between the directors and the
company and the existing shareholders, be stigmatised
as mala fide.
.
At two places in his judgment the learned Acting
Chief Justice expressed the view that if it were established before the Court that the company needed further capital, all other considerations could be of no
avail or of very little avail as against that central fact.
Tendolkar J. did not consider it necessary to deal with
tht various acts of the directors relied upon as evidence of their mala fules, because he was of the view
that assuming that the directors did all those acts
with the object of keeping the Singhania group out of
control of the company, the moment it was established that the company was in need of further capital
for legitimate purposes, the fact that the directors utilised such need for the purpose of establishing themselves more firmly in the saddle did not render the
issue of further capital either ultra vires or invalid.
Learned counsel for the plaintiffs contends that the
learned Judges in the Courts below entirely overlooked
the point that the presence of such bad motive would
nullify the good motive of finding capital necessary
for the company and this mixture of motives would
render the issue of further shares illegal and void. This
leads me to a consideration of the third sub-head on
the assumption that what I have called the additional
motive was a bad motive.
It is well established that directors of a company
are in a fiduciary pJsition vis-a-vis the company and
53
1950
N analal Zavc·y
And Another
v.
Bombay Li/•
Assurance Co..
And Others
DasJ.
•
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950]
1910
must exercise their power for the benefit of the company. If the power to issue further shares is exercised
Nana/al Zaver
by
the directors not for the benefit of the company
Ancl Another
but
simply and solely for their personal aggrandisement
v.
and to the detriment of the company, the Court ·will
Bo1nba y Life
.Assiirance Co.
interfere and prevent the directors from doing so. The
And Others
very basis of the Court's interference in such a case is
the existence of the relationship of a trustee and of
Das J,
ces(ui que trust as between the directors and the
company.
The first case to be referred to is that of Fraser
v. Whalley('). In that case a new company was incorporated in 1859 by an Act of Parliament. By that
Act also certain existing railway companies were authorised "to acquire, take and hold shares in the
undertaking of the company, and for such purpose to
create new shares in their undertakings." The existiQg companies in 1861 passed resolutions authorising
their directors to exercise this power. The resolutions
were, however, not acted upon and the existing companies did not iEsue n ~w shares in their undertakings
for the purpose of taking up any share in the new
company and all the shares of the new company were
issued to persons other than the existing companies.
In short, the shares which it was contemplated would
be taken up by the existing companies were no longer
available. Subsequently, in 1862, another Act of
Parliament was passed authorising the new company
to make a branch line and for that purpose to raise
fresh capital by the creation and issue of new shares.
But this new Act gave no fresh power to the existing
companies to toke up any of these new shares to be
issued by the new company. One Savin held the
majority of shares in the existing companies and there
was dispute between him and the directors. The general meeting of the company was shortly going to be
held and the directors knew that at the ensuing general
meeting their policy would be repudiated by the
majority of shareholders and they would be turned out.
from their office. It was in these circumstances thaf
the directors purporting to act on the resolutiens of
(1) (186l) 2 H. & M. 10.
'\,
~
('
'\-
i
-
.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
1950
1861, resolved to issue new shares. Suit was filed on
behalf of the shareholders to restrain the directors from
Zav<:I'
issuing any new shares. On a motion for injunction Na11a/al
And Another
Wood V. C. granted an interlocutory injunction. In
v.
Bombay Life
course of his judgment the learned Judge observed:
" The directors are informed that at the next Assttra11cc COi..
general meeting they are likely to be removed, and, 1lnd Others
. therefore, on the very verge of a general meeting, they,
Das/.
without giving notice to anyone, with this indecent
haste and scramble which is shewn by the times at
which the meetings were held, resolve that shares are,
on the faith of this obsolete power entrusted to them
for a different purpose, to be· issued for the very purpose of controlling the ensuing general meeting.
I have no doubt that the Court will interfere to
prevent so gross a breach of trust. I say nothing on
the question whether the policy advocated by the
directors, or that which I am told is to be pursued by
Savin, is the more for the interest of the company.
That is a matter wholly for the shareholders. I fully
concur in the principle laid down in Foss v. Harbottle
(2 Hare, 461) as to that, but if the directors can clandestinely and at the last moment use a stale resolution
for the express purpose of preventing the free action .of
the shareholders, this Court will take care that, when
the company cannot interfere, the Court will do so."
It will be noticed that· this decision proceeds
entirely on the grounds tha~ the resolutions of 1861 on
which the directors purported to act were obsolete, for
they had not so long been acted upon and also because
the shares contemplated by that resolution were not
availaHc, and that even if the resolutions were still
effective and gave authority to the directors to issue
new shares, the directors could only do so for the purpose of acquiririg shares in the new company and not
for the purpose of controlling the ensuing general
meeting and preventing the free action of the shareholders. There was no evidence whatever in that case
that the issue of shares was at all for the benefit of the
company. The issue of shares in that case was not
for the purpose of taking up shares in the new company
for which purpose alone the power conld be. exercised,
422
1950
Nana/al Zavcr
And Another
v.
Bo11zba y Lif~
Assuran::e Co
An,I Others
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
but that it was being exercised, wholly and solely for
quite a different purpose, namely, of maintaining themselves in office.
Punt v. Symons & Co. Limited ( 1 ) was a motion
for an interim injunction to restrain the holding of a
meeting of the defendant company for confirming the
resolution for issue of shares. On the evidence it was
quite clear " that these shares were not issued bona
fide for the general advantage of the company, but
that they were issued with the immediate object of
controlling the holders of the greater number of shares
in the company, and of obtaining the necessary statutory majority for passing a special resolution while, at
the same time, not conferring upon the minority the
power to demand a poll." Byrne]. granted an injunction restraining the defendant from holding the confirmatory meeting and observed :
" I am quite satisfied that the meaning, object,
and intention of the issue of these shares was to enable
the shareholders holding the smaller amount of shares
to control the holders of a very considerable majority.
A power of the kind exercised by the directors in this
case, is one which must be exercised for the benefit of
the company ; primarily it is given them for the purpose of enabling them to raise capital when required
for the purposes of the company. There may be occasions when the directors may fairly and properly issue
shares in the case of a company constituted like the
present for other reasons. For instance, it would not
be at all an unreasonable thing to create a sufficient
number of shareholders to enable sta,tutory powers to
be exercised, but when I find a limited issue of shares
to persons who are obviously meant and intended
to secure the necessary statutory majority in a particular interest, I do not think that is a fair and bona
fal,P exercise of the power."
The learned Judge concluded with the following
words:
" If I find as I do that shares have been issued
under the general and fiduciary power of the directors
for the express purpose of acquiring an unfair majority
(I) L.R. (1903] 2 Ch. 506.
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'123
1950
for the purpose of altering the rights of parties under
the articles, I think I ought to interfere."
a11alal Z avc1"
Piercy v. S. Mills & Co. Ltd. ( 1 ) was a witness N ;ind
Anotlrcr
action before Peterson J. It was indeed a gross case.
v.
On the evidence Peterson .J. found that it was manifest Bombay Life
" that the shares were allotted simply and solely for Assurance Co.
A1'd Others
the purpose of retaining control in the hands of the
existing directors." After stating the facts, the learned
Das J.
Judge said:
" The question is whether the directors were
justified in acting as they did, or whether their conduct
was a breach of the fiduciary powers which they possessed under the articles. What they did in fact was
to override the wishes of the holders of the majority of
the shares of the company for the time being by the
issue of fresh shares issued solely for that purpose."
Then after referring.to Fraser v. Whalley and Pmit
v. Symons & Co. Ltd. (supra), the learned Judge
concluded:
"The basis of both cases is, as I understand, that
directors are not entitled to use their powers of issuing
shares merely for the purpose of maintaining their
control or the control of themselves and their friends
-0ver the affairs of the company, or merely for the
purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing
majority of shareholders. That is, however, exactly
what has happened in the present case. With the
merits of the dispute as between the directors and the
plaintiff I have no concern whatever. The plaintiff and
· his friends held a majo;rity of the shares of the company,
·and they were entitled, so long as that majority
remained, to have their views prevail in accordance
with th{)regulations of the company, and it was not,
in· my opinion, open to the directors, for the purpose of
-conyerting a minority into a majority, and solely for the
,purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing majority,
to issue the shares which are in dispute in the present
,action;"
In the result, the shares allotted to the defendants
were declared void.
(1) L.R. (ltiOJ 1 Ch. 77.
424
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950)
It will oe noticed that in each of the: three cases
the
act
of the directors was not only not of advantage
N analal Z aver
to
the
company
but was in essence to its detriment in
Ana Another
that
it
was
calculated
to reduce the existing majority
v.
Bot1WaJ' Life
into minority and to prevent the majority of the existing
Assurance Co.
shareholders from exercising their discretion. with resAnd Others
pect to what they conceived to be in the best interests of
the company. Those cases w~e not cases of mixed motiDas/.
ves at all. The only motive operating in those cases in
the minds of the directors was detrimental to the interests of existing shareholders and, therefore, to the company itself. Our attention was drawn to .Palmer's Company Law, 18th Edition, p. 183, where it is stated that
"in exercising their powers, whether general or special,
directors must always bear in mind that they are in a
fiduciary position, and must exercise their powers for
the benefit of the company, and for that alone." Relying on the words "and for that alone," it is urged
that the power to issue shares must be exercised
wholly and solely for the benefit of the company, that
there must not be any other motive whether or not
that other motive is injurious to the company and
that if that power is exercised for that purpose and
also for some other purpose then irrespective of the
nature of that other purpose the directors would be
guilty of an abuse of their power. I am not prepared
to read the passage in the way urged by learned
counsel for the plaintiffs. None of the cases cited on
that point in Palmer's Company Law was concerned
with mixed motives at all. In none of th.em was there
any motive beneficial to the company or to the existing
shareholders. In my view what that passage means
is that the power must be exercised for the benefit of
the company and that as between the directors and
the company there must be no other motive which
may operate to the detriment of the company. If the
directors exercise the power for the benefit of the company and at the same time they have a subsidiary
motive which in no way affects the company or its
interests or the existing shareholders then the very basis
of interference of the Court is absent, for, as I have
pointed out, the Court of equity only intervenes in order
1950
Ir
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
to prevent a breach of trust on the part of the directors
.and to protect the cesliti que trust, namely the company and possibly the existing shareholders. If as
between the directors and the company and the
existing shareholders there is no breach of trust or bad
faith there can be no occasion for the exercise of the
equitable jurisdiction of the Court. I find support for
my views in the following observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Hirsche v. Sims( 1 ):
"If the true effect of the whole evidence is, that
the defendants truly and reasonably believed at the
time that what they did was for the interest of the
company, they are not chargeable with dolus nialus or
breach of trust merely because in promoting the
interest of the company they were also promoting their
own, or because they afterwards sold shares at priCes
which gave them large profits."
Ori the facts of this case the concurrent finding is
that the company was in need of funds and, therefore,
the issue of further shares was clearly necessary and
is referable to such need. The further motive of keeping out the Singhania group, who are not yet shareholders but are strangers, does not prejudicially affect
the company or the existing shareholders and the
presence of such further moti\'e cannot vitiate the
good motive of finding the necessary funds for the
company. In my judgment it is impossible to hold
that the issue of fresh shares was, in the circumstances,
illegal or v0id.
Re (iii) :-Learned counsel for the plaintiffs
contends that both the Courts below were in error in
holding that there has been no contravention of the
provisions of section 105-C of the Indian Companies
Act. That section is in the following terms:" vVhere the directors decide to increase the capital
of the company by the issue of further shares snch
shares shall be offered to the memlwrs in proportion
to the existing shares held by each member (irrespective of class) and such offer shall be made by notice
specifying the number of shares to which the member is
entitled, and limiting a time within which the offer, if
(1) (1894] A.C. 654, at pp. 660.GGl.
1950
Nana/al Zat't'r
And Anotlic•
v.
Bombay L1je
Assurance Co.
And Others
DasJ.
426
1950
N analal Z aver·
And Another
v.
Bombay Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950l
not accepted, will be deemed to be declined ; and after
the expiration of such time, or on receipt of an
intimation from the merober to whom such notice. is
given that he declines to accept the shares offered, the
directors may dispose of the same in such manner as
they think most beneficial to the company."
This section was added to the Indian Companies.
Act in 1936.
The first question is whether the section contemplates increase of capital above the authorised limit,
or only below the authorised limit. Learned Attorney~
General appearing for the company urges that the words
"further shares" must be read in conjunction with
the words " decide to increase the capital of the
company " and, so read, must mean shares which are·
issued for the purpose of increasing the capital beyond
the authorised capital. He contends that section
)05-C has no application to this case. Section 50 deals
with, among other things, alteration of the conditions
of the Memorandum of Association of the company by
increasing its share capital by the issue of new shares.
The very idea of alteration of the memorandum by the
issue of new shares clearly indicates that it contemplates an increase of the share capital above the authorised capital with which the company got itself registered. This increase can only be done by the company
in a general meeting as provided in sub-section (2)
of section 50. This increase above foe authorised
limit cannot possibly be done by the directors on
their own responsibility. Section 105-C, however,
speaks of increase of capital by the issue of further
shares. The words used are capital and not share capital
and further shares and not new shares. It speaks of
increase by the directors.· Therefore, the section only
contemplates such increase of capital as is within the
competence of the directors to decide upon. It clearly
follows from this that the section is intended to cover
a case where the directors decide to increase the
capital by issuing further shares within the authorised
limit, for it is only within that limit that the directors
can decide to issue further shares, unless they are
precluded from doing even that by the regulations of
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
the company. It is said that section 105-C becomes
applicable after the company in a general meeting has
decided upon altering its memorandum by increasing its . share capital by issuing new shares.
If the company at a general meeting has decided
upon the increase of its share capital by the
issue of new shares, then it is wholly inappropriate
to talk of the directors deciding to increase
capital, because the increase has already been
decided 'upon by the company itself. Further, after
the company has at a general meeting decided to
increase its share capital by the issue of new shares,
the increased capital becomes its authorised capital
and then if the directors under section 105-C decide to
increase the capital by the issue of further shares,
then this decision is nothing more than a decision to
raise capital within the newly authorised limit.
Finally, if section 105-C were to be held applicable to
the case of an increase of capital above the authorised
limit then such construction will lead to anomalous
results so far as the companies which have adopted
Table A, for the section is not consonant with Regulaticn 42 of Table A which, as will be shown hereafter,
applies to increase of capital beyond the authorised limit. If the Legislature intended that sedion 105-C should
apply to all companies in the matter of increase of
capital above the authorised limit, then the simplest
thing would have been to make Regulation 42 a
compulsory regulation, instead of introducing a section
which in its terms differs from Regulation 42 an<l
which therefore makes the position of companies which
have adopted Table A anomalous. It appears to me,
tbc.:rdore, for reasons stated above, that section 105-C
becomes applicable only when the directors decide to
~ncrease capital \Vithin the authorised limit by the
issue of further shares. In this view of the matter that
section is clearly applicable to the facts of this case.
The next question is whether the directors have,
in t11e matter of issuing and offering further shares in
the pre::ent case, been guilty of any contravention
of the provisions of this section. Learned counsel for
5(
1950
N analal Zave,.
And Another
v,
Bombay Life
A.~surance C<A
And Others
Das}.
428
1950
Nana/al Ztroer
And Another
v.
Bombay Life
.Asstwance C:o.
And Others
Das}.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
the plaintiffs contends tpat they have, because they
have not offered the whole lot of shares to the shareholders in proportion to the existing shares held by
them. It is pointed out that although the directors
decided to issue 4,596 further shares they have only
offered four shares to every five shares held by the
shareholders which works out at 4,323~ shares which
leaves 272i shares in the hands of the directors
which they have reserved power unto themselves ti;>
dispose of in such manner as they think fit. Learned
Attorney-General appearing for the company submits:
(a) That section 105-C should be construed in
the light of Regulation 42 in Table A of the Indian
Companies Act, 1913 ;
(b) That in order to prevent absurdity and to
give business efficacy to the section, the words " as
nearly as circumstances admit " should be read into
the section ; and
(c) That in any event the directors have not contravened the provisions of the section even if the same
be literally construed.
Each of these points requires serious consideration.
As to the first point it should be remembered that
section 105-C was introduced in thi: .Act only in 1936.
There is no counterpart of it in the English Act even
now. Prior to 1936 there was no check on the powers
of the directors to issue blocks of shares, within the
authorised limit, to themselves or to their nominees,
unless their powers were circumscribed by the Articles
of Association. One of the mischiefs of the managing
agency system which prevails in this country was that
the managing agents, who usually dominated the
board of directors, could, to secure their own position,
induce the board to issue blocks of preference shares to
the managing agents or their nominees. To check this
mischief section 105-C was introduced in the Indian
Act in 1936. As regards the increase of capital beyond
S.C.R.
j
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
the authorised limit it could only be done by the
coµJ.pa.ri.y. The shareholders could, while sanctioning
such increase, protect themselves · by giving special
directions to the directors as to the mode of disposal
of the new shares. In the model Regulations set forth
in Table A of the 1882 Act under the heading '' Increase
of Capital" are grouped three Regulations 26 to 28.
Regulation 27 was in. the following terms :
"(27) Subject to any directions to the contrary
that may be given by the meeting that sanctions the
increase of capital, all new shares shall be offered to
the members in proportion to the existing shares held
by them, and such offer shall be made by notice specifying the number of shares to which the member is
entitled, and limiting a time within which the offer, if
not accepted; will be deemed to be declined, and after
the expiration of such time, or on the receipt of an
intimation from the member to whom such notice is
given that he declines to accept the shares offered, the
directors may dispose of the same in such manner as
they think most beneficial to the company."
In Table A of our present Act under the heading
"Alteration of Capital " are to be found three corresponding Regulations 41 to 43. Regulation 42 is as
follows:" (42) Subject to any direction to the contrary
that may be given by the resolution sanctioning the
increase of share capital, all new shares shall, before
issue, be offered to such persons as at the date of the
offer are entitled to receive notices from the company
of general meetings in proportion, as nearly as the circu.mstances admit, to the amount of the existing shares
tO Wpich they are entitled. The offer shall be made
by n0tice specifying the number of shares offered, and
limiting a time within which the offer, if not accepted,
will be deemed to be declined, and after the expiration
of that time, or on the receipt of an intimation from
the person to }Vhom the offer is made that he declines
to accept the shares offered, the directors may dispose
1~50
Nana/al Z<nnr
And Anuthi:r
v.
Bombay Lift
.Assurance Co,
A"d Oth•rs
Das].
430
1950
Narzalul Znt•.:r
And Aiiotl1cr
Bo111b11 ~v Life
Ass11ra11~e Co.
·And Others
DosJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
of the same in such manner as they think most beneficial to the company. The directors may likewise so
dispose of any new shares which (by reason of the ratio
which the new shares bear to shares held by persons
entitled to an offer of new shares) cannot, in the opinion
of the directors, be conveniently offered under this
article."
The words underlined are new and are not to be
found in Regulation 27 of Table A of the 1882 Act.
The scheme of the 1882 Act, as of our present Act, and
the language used in the two regulations quoted above
clearly indicate, to my mind, that they deal with that
kind of increase of share capital which involves an
alteration of the conditions of the memorandum which
the company alone can do by issuing new shares.
These Regulations do not purport to deal with increase
of capital which is within the competency of the directors to decide upon. In that kind of increase of capital
beyond the authorised limits these regulations give the
directors certain latitude, subject, of course, to any
directions to the contrary that may be given by the
resolution of the shareholders in general meeting sanctioning such increase. The only difference between
Regulation 27 of 1882 and Regulation 42 of our present
Act is that under the last mentioned Regulation, in the
absence of any direction to the contrary, the discretion
of the directors has been widened by the introduction
of the words underlined above. This company was
incorporated in 1908 under the Act of 1882. It did
not adopt the Regulations of Table A of the 1882 Act
but article 45 of" its Articles of Association proceeds
more or less on the lines of Regulation 27 of Table A
of the 1882 Act. The discretion given to the directors
under article 45 is, therefore, obviously narrower than
that left to the directors under Regulation 42 of Table
A of the present Act. Then came section 105-C in
1936. As already pointed out, that section deals with
. increase of capital within the authorised limit · which
the directors can decide upon without reference to the
. shareholders in a general meeting of the company. :;i.:he
legislature had before it both Regulation 27 of Table
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
431
1950
A of 1882 and Regulation 42 of Table A of the Act of
1913. It chose to adopt the language of Regulation 27
a11alal Zavcr'
in preference to that of Regulation 42. The absence N,fotl
Another
in section 105-C of the words I have underlined in Rev.
gulation 42 cannot but be regarded as deliberate. And Bombay Life
I can conceive of very good reasons for this departure. ,i:\ssura1tce Co.
Anti Others
In the case of increase beyond the authorised limit,
that can be done only by the company in general meetDasJ.
ing and the shareholders can protect themselves by
giving directions to the contrary and, therefore, subject
to such directions a wider latitude may safely be given
to the directors. But in the case of increase of capital
within the authorised limit which the directors may do
without reference to the shareholders the legislature
did not think it safe to leave an uncontrolled discretion
to the directors. The mischief sought to be remedied required this curtailing of the directors' discretion. In
my judgment it is impossible to construe section 105-C /
in the light of Regulation 42 for several reasons.
Regulation 42 and section 105-C do not cover the same
field and cannot be said to be in pari materia. The
omission of the underlined words was obviQusly deliberate. The difference in the language of the two provisions in the same statute cannot be overlooked as
merely accidental. And lastly the reading of these
words of Regulation 42 in section 105-C will frustrate
what I conceive to be the undertying reason for the
introduction of the section. In my judgment the first
point urged by the learned Attorney-General which
found favour with the Courts below cannot be accepted.
The second point urged by the learned Attorney·General is founded on the supposed necessity of introducing the words "as nearly as the circumstances
admit" to avoid the absurdity which may flow from
a literal construction of section 105-C. It must be
remembered that the cardinal rule of interpretation of
statutes is to construe its provisions literally and grammatically giving the words their ordinary and natural
meaning. It is only when such a construction leads
to an obvious absurdity which the legislature cannot
be supposed to have intended that the Court in
432
1950
Nanulal Zawr
And Another
v.
Bo1nbay Life
Asslfran:e: Co.
AndOt~rs
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
interpreting the section may introduce words to give
effect to what it conceives to be the true intention of the
'legislature. It ·is not any and every inconvenience
that justifies adoption of this extreme rule of construction. The section literally construed is quite intelligible and may easily be applied to many cases where
the further shares issued bear a uniform and round
proportion. Merely because a literal construction of
the section leads to inconvenient result in a particular
case cannot, in my opinion, justify the application of
such a drastic rule of construction as is urged by the
Attorney-General. Even in this case there would have
been no inconvenience if the directors decided for the
issue of 4,053 shares which could have been offered in
the proportion of three shares to every four shares held
by each shareholder. It is true that ordinarily it is for
the directors to judge as to the exact amount of capital
needed by the company but in arriving at their decision
they cannot overlook the limitations put upon their
power by the section with respect to the proportion in
which the further shares are to be offered by them to
the shareholders. Further, the supposed inconvenience
can be easily avoided by a reference to the shareholders in a general meeting by asking them to increase the share capital beyond the authorised limit to
such an amount as would permit proportionate disposal of the further and new shares. In my opinion
there is not sufficient force in the contention which
should induce the Court to depart from the ordinary
and golden rule of interpretation I have mentioned
above.
The last point urged by the Jearned AttorneyGeneral appears to me to be of substance. On a strictly
literal construction of the section the directors must
perforce offer all the further shares to the shareholder&
in proportion to their respective holdings. Section
105-C comes into operation after the directors have
decided to issue further shares. The section does not
in terms provide that such offer must be made all at
once or at any particular point of time and I see no
reason to import any such requirement in .the section.
S.C.R.
SUPH.EME COURT REPORTS
433
The underlying object of the section is to effect equitable distribution of the further shares. Here the
shares have been offered in the proportion of four shares
to every five shares. There can be no suggestion of
favouritism in this offer. Every shareholder will get his
proportion if he so desires. The majority will ren.ain
the majority if every one takes up the shares offered
to him. It is true that 272-4/5 shares remain in hand.
At best although issued they have not been offered to
anyone. I do not agree that under clause 8 of the
directors' resolution the directors can dispose of those
272-4/5 shares i.n any manner they please before offering them proportionately to the existing shareholders.
That clause, on a true construction of the resolution as
a whole, covers only those shares which have been
actually issued but have not been applied for. In point
of fact the directors have not yet allotted any of these
272-4/5 shares. If and when the directors allot these
shares otherwise than in due course of law, i.e., without offering them to the shareholders, the shareholders will then have cause for complaint and may
then come to Court for redress. It is said that 272-4/5
shares cannot in.future be offered to so many shareholders in a reasonable proportion. If it cannot be
done, these odd shares will remain in hand until
the company at a general meeting decides to increase
the share capital by issuing new shares and then these
odd shares together with new shares will be easily
capable of being offered to the shareholders proportionately. These special considerations which arise in
the case of this company by reason of its own peculiar
-circumstances cannot, in my opinion, affect or alter
the meaning and effect of the section. From all that
I can see, up to the present time, there has been no
contravention of the provisions of section 105-C. In
my view the directors have substantially complied
with the requirements of the section and the plaintiffs
can have no grievance. They rushed to Court prematurely.
For the reasons stated above, I am clearly of
-0pinion that the conclusions of the Courts below were
1950
Nana/al Z,1~·cr
And Another
v.
Bombay Life
t1.<1s1iraucc Co .
.-1nd Others
DasJ.
434
1950
N anal al Z avct'
And Anotl1cr
v.
Bonibay Life
Assurance Co.
And Others
Muklierjca J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950]
i:ight and no ground has been made out for interfering
with the same. The result, therefore, is that this
appeal is dismissed with costs.
MuKHERJEA J.-.I agree that this appeal should be
dismissed and I concur substantially in the reasons
which have been given by my learned brother Mr.
Justice Das in his judgment.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the Appellants: 5. P. Varma.
Agent for the Respondents: Rajinder Narain.
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