COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY versus AHMEDBHAI UMARBHAI & CO., BOMBAY.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 4 May 1950 | [1950] 1 S.C.R. 335 | 1950 INSC 6
Key facts
- Decided
- 4 May 1950
- Bench
- HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA*, M. PATANJALI SASTRI*, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN*, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA*, SUDHI RANJAN DAS*, SIR SYED FAZL ALI*
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 68/1949
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1950] 1 S.C.R. 335
- Neutral citation
- 1950 INSC 6
Text of the judgment
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
335
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY
195fl
v.
May 4
AHMEDBHAI UMARBHAI & CO., BOMBAY.
[SHRI HARILAL KANIA G~ SAIYID F AZL ALI,
PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MUKHERJEA and DAS
JJ.]
E.vcess Prnjits Tax Act (XV of 1940), s. 5, Third Pt·ovisoIndian Incom$-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 42 (8)-Article manufactttred
otttside British India-Sale in British India-Whethu whole profits
accriie or arise in British India-Liability to excess pt·ofits taxManufacturing operations, whether "part of !msiness " - Aprortionment of profits between place of mamifact11re and place of salePermissibility-Applicability r>f s. 42 (8}.
Section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, provided that "the
Act shall apply to awry business of which any part of the profits
made during the chargeable accounting period was chargeable to
income-tax." There was also a proviso to the effect that "the Act
shall not apply to any business, the whoie of the profits of which
accrued or arose in an Indian State and that where the profits of a
part of a business aoorued or arose in an Indian State, such part
shall for the purpose of this provision be deemed to be a separate
business, the whole of the profits of which accrued or arose in an
Indian State, and the other part of the business shall be deemed to
be a separate business."
A firm which was resident in British India and carried on the
business of manufacturing and selling groundnut oil, owned some
oil mills within British India and a mill in Raichur in the
Hyderabad State where oil was manufactured. The oil manufac·
tured in Raichur was sold partly within the State of Hyderabad
and partly in Bombay :
Helil,. lnJ the Fitll Com·t (KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI,
FAZL ALI, MEHR CHAND MAHA.JAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.)The expression "part of a business" in the provieo to section 5 does
not necessarily mean a separate composite unit of all the constituent
activities of the business or a complete cross·section of the entire
business operations but is wide enough to mean one or more of the
operations of the business, and that the manufacturing operations
which the firm carried on at Raichur were "a part of tho business" of
the assessees within the meaning of the proviso. to section 5 of the
Act.
Held also pe1· K~NIA C ..J., FAZL ALI, :\IEHH CHAND l\LULUAN,
l\11.."KHEHJEA and DAS J.J.-that the profits of that part of the
business, namely, the manufacture of oil at the mill in Raichur
accrued or arose in Haichur within the meaning of the said proviso,
even though Lhe manufactured oil was sold in Bombay and the price
was received there, and accordingly, that part of the profits derived
from sales in Bombay which was attributable to the manufacture
of the oil in Haichur was exempt from excess profits tax nnder
the proviso to section 5 of the Act.
~2-A
336
1950
Co111111issio1tcr
of /Jtco1uc-tax,
Bo111fJay
v.
Aluucdbhai
U111arbhai & Co.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
Per P.\TANJALI SAS TRI J.-The first part of sub-section (1) of
section 42 of the Income-tax A.ct was applicable to the assessees,
the expressions "business connection in British India" and '"asset
or source of income in British India'' being wide enough to cover
their selling organisation at Bombay ; and as a xesult, the profits
received in Bombay from the sale of the oil manufactured in
Haichur had to be apportioned under sub-section (3) of section 42
bet\veen the two operations of manufacture and sale, and only such
portion of the profits as was attributable to the sale in Bombay
should he deemed to have accrued or arisen in British India. It
followed as a corollary that the rest of the profits attributable to
the 1nanufacture at Raicbur rnust he regarded as accruing or arising
in the Hyderabad State and w~s therefore exempt under the proviso
to s. 5 of the Act.
Q~tae9·e: \Vhether it is in consonance with business principles
or prA.ctice in the absence of any statutory requirement to that
effect to cut business operations arbitrarily into two or more por ..
tions and to 11pportion as between the1n the pro5Js resulting frorn
one continuous process ending in a sale and \vhether Kirk's case is
applicable to assessments under the Indian Acts as laying down any
general principle of apportionment.
Per MAHAJAN J.-Though profits may not be realised until a
manufactured article is sold, profits are not wholly made by the
act of sale and do not necessarity accrue a.t the place of sale a.nd to
the extent profits are attributable to the manufacturing operations,
profits accrue at the place where the operations are carried on.
Per :i\fUKHERJEA J.-\Vhere raw material is worked up into
a new prorluct by process of manufacture, it obviously increases
in value and this increase in value represents the income or profit
which is the result of the 1nanufacture, and a.s this profit accrues by
rea.son of the tnanufacture it cannot but be locn.ted at the place
\Vhere the inanufacturing process is gone through. It is im1naterial
that the manufactured goods are sold later on at various places.
If tho manufacturer is himself the seller, it might be that he receives
the entire profits including that of the manufacture only at the
tin1e of sale; but in an inchoate shape a portion of the profits does
accrue at the pln.ce of manufacture, the exact a1nount of which is
only n.scertrdned after the Sale takes place. For purposes of com·
pntation the two parts of the business may be conceived of e.s being
carried on by two different sets of persons.
APPEAL [Civil Appeal No. LXVIII of 1949] from
a Judgment of the High Court of Bombay dated 18th
l\Iarch 1948 (Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in a Reference under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940.
JYI. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (B. Sen
with him) for the appellant.
ICM. JY!unshi (S. K. Aiyar and N. K. Gamadia
with him) for the respondents.
1950. )lay 4. The Court delivered the following
Judgments:-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
KANIA C.J .-This is an appeal from
337
a decision of
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal,
Bombay, under section 66 ( 1) of the Indian Incometax Act. The respondent firm, the assessees, carried
on business of manufacturing and dealing in oil during
the relevant accounting periods. They are a registered
' firm under the Income-tax Act and are residents in
Bombay. They own three mills at Bombay and one
at Raichur for manufacturing oil from groundnuts.
The oil produced at Raichur is sold partly at Raichur
and partly in Bombay. Their liability to pay incometax in respect of their whole profits is not disputed
under the Incom~-tax Act. The question is in respect
of their liability under the Excess Profits Tax Act for
the oil manufactured at Raichur, but sold in Bombay.
The assessees contend that in respect of such oil a
portion of the profits earned by them is o.ttributable to
theipbusiness of manufacturing oil at Raicbur and
that portion of the profits should not be assessed to tax
under the Excess Profits Tax Act. The taxing authorities rejected the contention of the assessees. The
Income-tax Tribunal agreed with them. On a reference
the High Court disagreed with the view of the Tribunal and held that the assessees' contention was correct.
The Commissioner of Income-tax has come in appeal
from that decision. In the Excess Profits Tax Act,
section 2 (5) defines "business" as follows :"'Business' includes any trade, commerce or
manufacture or any adventure in the nature of trade,
commerce or manufacture ..... .
Provided further that all businesses to which this
Act applies carried on by the same person shall be
treated as one business for the purposes of this Act."
Section 5 of the Act runs as follows :- ·
"5. This Act shall apply to every business of which
any part of the profits made during the chargeable
accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by virtue
of the provisions of sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of
clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 4 of the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, or of clause (c) of that subsection:
Provided that this Act shall not apply to any
business the whole of the profits of which accrue or
1950
Co1n1nissioncf'
of Inconie-tax
Bombay
1
v.
All11iedbhai
V111arbliai & Co.
:cania C. J.
338
]950
Co111111 issio1£cr
of lncotne-tax,
Bo111bay
,..
Altuzedbl1ai
Umarb/iai & Co.
l(ania CJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950]
arise without British India where such business is
carried on by or on behalf of a person who is resident
but not ordinarily resident in British India unless the
business is controlled in India :
Provided further that where the profits of a part
only of a business carried on by a person who is not
resident in British India or not ordinarily so resident ,
accrue or arise in British India or are deemed under
the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, so to accrue or arise,
then except where the business being the business of a
person who is resident but not ordinarily resident in
British India is controlled in India, this Act shall apply
on! y to such part of the business, and such part shall
for all the purposes of this Act be deemed to be a
separate business :
Provided further that this Act shall not apply to
any business the whole of the profits of which accrue or
arise in an Indian State ; and where the profits of a
part of a business accrue or arise in an Indian State,
such part shall, for the purposes of this provision, be
deemed to be a separate business the whole of the
profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State, and
the other part of the business shall for all the purposes
of this Act, be deemed to be a separate. business."
Section 21 of the Act, which was not referred to
in the course of the arguments before us, runs as
follows:" 21. The provisions of sections 4-A, 4-B, 10, 13,
24-B, 29, 36 to 44-C (inclusive), 45 to 48 (inclusive),
49-E, 49-F, 50, 54, 61 to 63 (inclusive), 65 to 67-A
(inclusive) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, shall
apply with such modifications, if any, as may be
prescribed as if the said provisions were provisions of
this Act and referred to excess profits tax instead of to
income-tax, and every officer exercising powers under
the said provisions in regard to income-tax may
exercise the like powers under this Act in regard to
excess profits tax in respect of cases assigned to him
under sub.section (3) of section 3 as he exercises in
relation to income-tax under the said Act :
Provided that references in the said provisions to
the assessee shall be construed as references to a person
to whose business this Act applies."
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
339
The relevant portion of section 42 of the Indian
Income-tax Act is in these terms :" 42. (1) All income, profits or gains accruing or
arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or
from any business connection in - British India,
or through or from any property in British India,
or through or from any asset or source of income
in British India, or through or from any money lent at
interest and brought into British India in cash or in
kind, shall be deemed to be income accruing or arising
within British India, and where the person entitled to
the income, profits or gains is not resident in British
India, shall be chargeable to income-tax either in his
name or in the name of his agent ....
(2) Where a person not resident or not ordinarily
resident in British India, carries on business with a
person resident in British India, and it appears to the
Income-tax Officer that owing to the close connection
between such persons the course of business is so
arranged that the business done by the resident person
with the person not resident or not ordinarily resident
produces to ,fhe resident either no profits or less than
the ordinary profits which might be expected to arise
in that business, the profits derived therefrom or which
may reasonably be deemed to have been derived
therefrom, shall be chargeable to income-tax in the
name of the resident _.Jerson who shall be deemed to be,
,for all the purposes of this Act, the assessee in respect
of such income-tax.
(3) In the case of a business of which _all the
operations are not carried out in British India, the
profits and gains of the business deemed under this
section to accrue or arise in British India shall.be only
such profits and gains as are reasonably attributable
to that part of the operations carried out in British
India."
On behalf of the appellant · it - was contended that in order to _get exemption from the
Exce::s Profits Tax -Act the assessee has to show
that his case is covered by section 5 proviso 3.
It \vas argued on behalf of the appellant that in the
'
1950
Co111111issio11cr
of /11co111c-tax,
Bo111l1ay
v.
Al1111cdblitri
Untarb/Jai [ .. Ca.
ff ania C. J.
340
1950
Co11iu1issioner
.of lnco111c-f11x,
Bo111!1ay
v.
Ah1111·dl1hai
{/11tafbl1ai & Co.
]{ a1tia C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950J
present case the business of the assessee consisted of
manufacturing and selling oil and unless each of those
operations took place at Raichur, "a part of the business" of the assessee was not at Raichur in the Hyderabad State and therefore he was not entitled to the exemption claimed by him. It was secondly contended
that even assuming that this was not correct the profits of that part of the business, which was carried on
at Raichur, did not accrue or arise in the Hyderabad
State because the profits arose on the sale of the oil in
Bombay and therefore the assessee's contention was incorrect. Proviso 3 to section 5 of the Excess Profits
Tax Act requires the assessee to fulfil three conditions
to secure the exemption. They are (I) there should be
a part of a business ; (2) that must be in an Indian
State ; and (3) profits in respect of which exemption is
claimed must accrue or arise .from that part of the
business. The appellant's contention is that the part
of the business must be a complete unit or as described
on his behalf a complete cross-section of the business.
It is argued that inasmuch as the sale of the oil in
question took place in Bombay the cross-section composed of manufacture and sale did not take place at
Raichur in the Hyderabad State and therefore the as·
sessee's contention must fail. In my opinion this conten~
tion is unsound. The definition of business in the Excess Profits Tax Act clearly envisages manufacture as a
business by itself. It is not necessary that a manufacturer must be a trader in the commodity he manufac- ·
tures. Similarly because he is a manufacturer and a
trader it does not follow that the two activities necessarily become one indissoluble business of which the
profits c:rnnot be separately ascertained. Because a man
is a mannfacturer, a trader and even an exporter it is
not correct to say that unless all the three activities
take place in an Indian State he is not entitled to the
benefit of the proviso because a part of his busi- ·
ness is not in the Indian State. The argument of the
appellant is that there should not be only a separate
composite unit of the assessee's business in an Indian
State but that each operation making up the assessee's
business must take place in an Indian State. I find no
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
341
justification for putting such construction on proviso 3 to section 5. No authority is cited to support
such interpretation of the proviso. It is not contended
in the present case that the activities of the assessee
as a manufacturer are so spread out as to be- incapable of being ascertained as one unit of business
in an Indian State. For instance, difficulties may
arise if a manufacturer buys groundnuts in one place,
has a crushing mill in another place, has a refinery in
the third place and packing etc. in a fourth place. .Jt
is not disputed here that the assessee's activities as a
manufacturer are all in Raichur and ;f so, that set of
activities under the definition of " business " in the
Excess Profits Tax Act is a complete unit. I have no
doubt that on the facts of the present case the manufacturing operations of the assessee are "a part of his
business in an Indian State.'.' Those conditions of the
proviso are therefore fulfilled.
On behalf of the appellant it was pointed out that
under section 42 (3) of the Indian Income-tax Act the
legislature had made a provision for allocation of
profits in respect of different operations of a business,
but there was no such corresponding provision in the
Excess Profits Tax Act. This contention overlooks
section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act which expressly
makes, amongst others, section 42 (3) a part of the
Excess Profits Tax Act for assessing the profits of an
assessee. If, therefore, profits can be allocated to the
manufacture of oil in Raichur it seems to me clear
that the manufacturing activity will be a part of the
assessee's business in an Indian State.
The next contention of the appellant was that
even if a part of the business was in an Indian State
the profits accrued or arose only on the sale of the oil
in Bombay and no part of the profits of manufacture
therefore arose in an Indian State. In my opinion this
argument is also unsound. On the sale of goods the
assessee receives money. While the receipt of the price
is thus in B01µbay it is an entirely different thing to
say that therefore the whole profits of the manufacture
and sale arose in Bombay. This argument sverlooks
the distinction between accruing ·or arising on the one
1950
Cmn111issio11er
Of Income-tax;
Bombay
v.
AJ1medbhai
Vmarbhai & Ci>.
Kania C.J.
342
1950
Co111111i.-1sioner
<8f Inco11i:!-fax1
Bo111'1ay
v.
Ah11i:•dl1hai
U111arbltai & Co.
J{auia C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
hand and receipt on the other. Again, the question
of profits has to be determined not on receipt of the
price of each lot sold by the assessee but the result of
all the operations in connection with the manufacture
and sale of oil during the accounting year. An individual transaction may result in profit but that will not
make the assessce liable if the result of his accounting
year's activities is a loss. · It is therefore improper in a
case of this kind to consider the sale of oil as the
deciding factor either to ascertain profits or to determine the place of the accrual of profits. Several cases
were cited at the.Bar dealing with a trader's business
where he bought and sold goods. In my opinion those
are not relevant to determine the question before us
because in the present case the business is of a different
nature. In The Commissioner of Taxation v. Kirk ( 1 ),
Lord Davey distinguished Sulley v. Attorney-General (2 )
and Grai?l-ger & Son v. Gough(") on this ground.
The place of.sale was not considered the test when the
business was of manufacturing and sale. Similarly
cases which deal with the liability of the assessee
under the Indian Income-tax Act because the profits
were received (and not only accrued or arose) in India
are also unhelpful. The Judges of the High Court
strongly relied on The Commissioner of Taxation v.
Kirk ( ') for their conclusion in favour of the assessee.
It was a case of mining operations where the mines
were in one colony and the sale of the ore in another.
Under the Taxing Act in that case, it was observed
that it was wholly immaterial whether the person to be
taxed resided in the colony or not. Nor was it material
whether the income was received in the colony or not,
if it was earned outside the colony. The Board attached no importance to the word " derived " which was
treated as synonymous with arising or accruing. The
real question was what income was arising or accruing
to the assessee from the business op~rations carried
on by him in the colony. This was considered a question of fact. Under the New South Wales Act the
liability to tax has to be decided on the existence of
the source of the income in the particular colony and
(!) (1900] A.C. 588.
(2) (1860] 5 H. & N; 711.
(3) (1896] A.C. 325.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS·
343
1950
to that extent the liability to tax is based on a different basis. While accepting this distinction, I am how- CoH1111isstoner
.ever unable to accept the contention that the source of of l11co111e-tax,
income can never be the place where the income accrues
Bombay
v.
or arises. In my opinion there is nothing to prevent
All 111ctlhlia i
income accruing or arising at the place of the source.
Tf!e question where the income accrued has to be U111arMuri & Co.
determined on the facts of each case. The income may l\a11ia C. ].
accrue or arise at the place of the source or may accrue
or arise elsewhere, but it does not follow that the income cannot accrue or arise at the place where the
source exists. · Therefore it is necessary to ascertain
whether that part of the business which is capable of
being treated as one separate unit in the Hyderabad
State has given rise to the income or profit sought by
the assessee to be exempted from taxation in the.
present case. On behalf of the respondents our attention
was drawn to the International Harvester Company of
Canada v. The Provincial Tax Commissioner ( 1 ). In
that case the question was of the liability to tax of a
resident outside the province of S, under the Incometax Act of S, in respect of profits arising from the sale
in that province of agricultural implements which were
manufactured outside the province. Under the relevant
Act the tax was leviable on a person residing outside
S who was carrying on business in S on the net profit
or gain arising from the business of such person in S.
The Board held that although t~e profits were all
received in S, where the goods were sold, the profits
liable to taxation were only the net profits arising from
the business in S and therefore the manufacturing profits should be excluded from the assessment. They
referred to sections 23 and 24 of the Taxing Act, under
which a non-resident person was charged to tax on an
apportioned part of profit, which although it might be
received outside the province of S cou1d fairly be regarded as having been partially earned inside that
province. In my opinion that case substantially helps
the contention of the respondents and negatives the
appellant's contention. It shows that when the manufacturing portion of the activity of the assessee is in
(1) [19,9) A.C. 39.
344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
one province and the sale is in another province, the
whole profits are not necessarily considered as arising
Co1n111issioner
the sale or at the place of sale although they may
from
of Inco1nc-ta:i:,
be
treated
as received on sale of the products. SecondBmnbay
v.
ly, it shows that profits could be apportioned between
Ah1n<>db/lai
the manufacturing and trading activities, particularly
U11urrbhai & Co.
when the assessee carried on the business of a manufai:turer
and trader together. This decision was sought
/( auia C. J.
to be distinguished by the Attorney-General on the
ground that sections 23 and 24 of the Taxing Act of
that colony made it a completely different scheme of
taxation. I do not think that is a good point of
distinction, because pro\·iso 2 to section 5 of the Indian
Excess Profits Tax Act, read with section 21, prescribes
also a scheme in respect of a non-resident although
not in the same details or with the same results under
•the Indian Act. The expression "part of a business"
must in my opinion be read with the same meaning
and implication in provisos (2) and (3) to section S of
the Excess Profits Tax Act. I am also unable to
accept the contention of the. Attorney-General that
under our Act there is no scheme of apportionment.
-That overlooks, as pointed out above, the provisions of
section 21 of the Act, which incorporates by reference
amongst others section 42 (3) of the Indian Income-tax
Act. In my opinion, therefore, proceeding on the footing that there can arise or accrue profits of the manufacturing activity of the assessee, profits ha Ye accrued
to the assessee of a part of the business in an Indian
State and they having accrued out of such business
carried on in such State are exempted under the third
proviso to section S of the Excess Profits Tax Act.
For these reasons, in my opinion, the conclusion of the.
High Court is correct and the appeal is dismissed with
costs.
1950
Paz( Ali J.
>atanjali sastri J.
FAZL Au .J.-I agree fully with the judgment of
Mahajan J.
PATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an appeal from a
judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay
upon a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
345
Tribunal, Bombay, under section 66 (1) of the Indian
1950
Income-tax Act, 1922, read with section 21 of the Co·11-u1iission-er
Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940.
of bu:ome-t"x,
The respondent firm (herei~after referred to as the
Bombay
"assessees ") are carrying on the business of manufacv.
turing ana dep.ling in oil at Raichur in the Hyderabad Ahmedbhai
State and at Bombay which, during the relevant Umarbhai & Co.
period, was part of what was then known as British Patanj~astri J.
India. The assessees are resident in Bombay and are
registered for income-tax purposes, under section 26-A
of the Income-tax Act, under the name of Ahmedbhai
Umarbhai & Co., while their branch at Raichur is run
under the name of Ahmed & Sons. They own three
mills at Bombay and one at Raichur for manufacturing oil from groundnuts, and they sell the oil partly af
Raichur and partly at Bombay. For the chargeable
.accounting period commencing from 31st October, 1940,
.and ending on 20th October, 1941, the assessees were
assessed to excess profits tax in a sum of Rs. 1,61,807
on their business income of Rs. 6,08,761, including
a sum of Rs. 2,49,615 which was said to have
accrued or arisen from· sales in Bombay of oil manufactured at Raichur. Part of such oil was also
sold at Raichur, but the profits derived from such
sales were not included in the assessment, and
no question now arises in regard to such profits. For
the succeeding period commencing from 21st October,
1941, and ending on 8th November, 1942, a tax of
Rs- 2,55,485-1-0 computed on the same basis, was also
imposed . on the assessees. The assessees contended
that a part of the profits derived from sales in British
India of the oil manufactured at Raichur was attributable to the manufacturing operations at H.aichur
which are an essential part of their business, and that
such profits must be excluded from the assessment,
under the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess
Profits Tax Act, as having accrued or arisen in the
Hyderabad State. The contention was rejected and
the whole of the profits arising out of the sales in
British India of the oil produced in Raichur were
included in the assessments.
After unsuccessful appeals to the Appellate
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950}
Assistant Commissioner, Bombay, the assessees carried
the
matter to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal,
Conunissioner
of Income-tax,
Bombay, but with no better result. The assessees
Bomhay
thereupon applied to the Tribunal requiring them to
•·
draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the
Ahmcdbl•ai
High Court at Bombay for decision of the question of
U:aarbT1ai & Co. l
·
d , and t h e Tnbunal
'
_
aw mvolve
according1y stated t h e
Patanja!i sastri J. case and referred the following question: "v\'hether
on the facts stated above income accruing or arising
to the assessees on sales made in British India of
goods manufactured in Raichur situated outside
British India has been rightly held by the Tribunal
as income accruing or arising in British India and
was liable to excess profits tax." In the letter of
reference they indicated their view on the question
referred by stating that the manufactured article
received or brought into British India did not include
any income, profits or gains, and that such profits and
gains, having accrued only after the sale had taken
place, accrued or arose in British India.
The reference was heard by Chagla C.J. and
Tendolkar J. and they were of opinion that the
question as framed by the Tribunal " did not really
bring out the controversy between the parties." The·
learned Judges, after stating the facts of the case,.
framed the question thus : " Whether on the facts
stated above the profits of a part of the business of the
assessees accrued or arose in an Indian State." The·
question as reframed is also open to similar criticism,
for, it assumes that the manufacture of oil at Raic:hur
is " a part of the business" of the assessees, whereas
the Commissioner of Income-tax has been seriously
contesting that position as the judgment under appeal
itself shows.
Excess profits tax is a charge on the profits arising out of a business in excess of its normal or
standard profits, a business being regarded as the unit of
assessment. . " Business" is defined in section 2 (5) of
the Excess Profits Tax Act as inclucling, among other
things, "11ianufacture," and a proviso to the clause
s;iys that "all businesses to which this Act applies
1950
s.c.R.
I~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
1950
carried out by the same person shall be treated as one
business for the purposes of this Act." Section 4 C01111nissio11er
provides for the charge of tax in respect of any busi- of Iuco111e-tax~
ness to which the Act applies on the amount by which
Bombay
the profits during any chargeable accounting period
v. ·
exceed the standard profits. Section 5, on the true Alzmcdb/Jai
·
U111arbhtri & Co~
interpretation of which the question for determination
in this appeal turns, runs thus :
Patanjali Sastri J.
"5. This Act shall apply to every business of
which any part of the profits made during the chargeable accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by
virtue of the provisions of sub-clause (i) or sub-clause
(ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the
Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or of clause (c) of that
sub-section:
Provided that this Act shall not apply to any
business the whole of the profits of which accrue or
arise without British India where such business is
carried on by or on behalf of a person who is resident
but not ordinarily resident in British India unless the
business is controlled in British India :
Provided further that where the profits of a part
only of a business carried on by a person who is not
resident in British India or not ordinarily so resident
accrue or arise in British India or are deemed under
the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, so to accrue or arise,
then, except where the business, being the business of
a person who is resident but not ordinarily resident in
British India is controlled in India, this Act shall apply
only to such part of the business, and such part shall,
for all the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a
separate business :
Provided further that this Act shall not apply
to any business the whole of the profits of which
accrue or arise in an Indian State, and where the
profits of a part of business accrue or arise in an
Indian State, such part shall, for the purposes of this
provision, be deemed to be a separate business the
whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an
Indian State, and the other part of the busilless shall,
for all the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a
separate business.''
348
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950]
As the assessees are resident in British India and
the profits of their business in the Hyderabad State
Commi<sfo""
made during the relevant periods were charged to
<lf liico111e~ta:c,
B~m'wy
income-tax under section 4 (I) (b) (ii) of the Income,..
tax Act, that business was brought under charge to
Ahmc.tMai
excess profits tax by section 5 of the Excess Profits
VmarMai l' Ca. Tax Act, and the duty would be leviable on the
Patanjali Sastri J. pro fitds dofh the said. busf·inhessA unless h probvis? (3)
exc1u e t e applicat10n o t e ct to t at usmess,
in which case the proviso to section 2 (5) which operates to consolidate only those businesses to which
the Act applies would also not take effect. It appears
to have been conceded by the taxing authority that
no excess profits tax was leviable on the profits derived
from the sales in the Hyderabad' State as they were
profits of a part of the assessees' business accruing or
arising in an Indian State and as such were exempted
under proviso (3) to section 5, for these profits, as
already stated, were not subjected to tax for the two
chargeable accounting periods in question. But it was ·
contended on their behalf by the Attorney-General
that the proviso had no such operation in respect of
the profits made by sales of the oil in British India,
and that for two reasons: Firstly, because the manufacturing operations carried on in the Hyderabad State
did not constitute a " part " of the assessees' business
within the meaning of the proviso, and, secondly,
because even if such operations could be regarded as
a part of the business, the profits derived from the
sales of the oil in Bombay could not be said to have
accrued or arisen in that State. Both these propositions were held to be untenable by the learned Judges
of the High Court and were contested before us by
Mr. Munshi on behalf of the assessees.
On the first point, the Attorney-General insisted
that a " part " of a business meant a fraction of the
aggregate of all the constituent activities of the business or, as it has been put during the argument, a
" cross-section" of the entire business operations, and
not one or more of such operations, however essential
for the production of the resulting profits. It is
difficult to see how this construction will assist the
1950
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
349
1950
taxing authority in the present case, for, as already
stated, the assessees were selling at Raichur, part of C0111111issio1ter
the oil manufactured there, and there was thus at that of Inco"'"·ta:r,
place a complete cross-section of their business which
Bo111bay
consists of manufacturing and s'elling oil. Apart from
v.
this consideration, I can find nothing in the context of _Ahm,·dbluri
section 5 to exclude the ordinary meaning of the words ( marblrar & Co.
"part of a business" and to compel the somewhat Patmrj,;;,.~,stri J
strained and artificial interpretation sought to be put
upon them which, it may be observed in passing, seems
inconsistent with the view which left untaxed the
profits derived from the sales at Raichur. Furthermore,
section 5 is to be read with the provisions of section 42 of the Indian Income-tax Act which has
been made applicable, with 1 certain modifications not
material here, to excess profits tax by section
21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act " as if the said
provisions were provisions of this Act and refer
to excess profits tax instead of to income-tax."
That section has, in my opinion, an important bearing
on the issues involved in this appeal and deserves carefuJ consideration. So far as material here it reads thus :
"42. (1) All income, profits or gains accruing
or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or
from any business connection in British India, or
through or from any property in British India, or
throug~ or from any asset or source of income in
British India, or through or from any money lent at
interest and brought into British India in cash or in
kind, shall be deemed to be income accruing or arising
withinBritish.India, and where the person entitled to
the income, profits or gains is not resident in British
India, shall be chargeable to income-tax either in his
name or in the name of his agent, and in the latter case
such agent shall be deemed to be, for all the purposes
· of this Act, the assessee in respect of such income-tax:
Provided that where the person entitled to the
income, profits or gains is not resident in British India.
the income-tax so chargeable may be recoverei by
deduction under any of the provisions of section 18 ..... .
(3) In the case of a business of which all the
:>perations are not carried out in British India, the
350
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950}
profits and gains of the business deemed under this
section to accrue or arise in British India shall be only
such profits and gains as are reasonably attributable
to that part of the operations carried out in British
India."
·
Ahm_·dbluri
It will be seen that these provisions, read together,
Umarbhai & Co. lay down a rule of apportionment for ascertaining the
Pat,,,,1,-;;,.-;"'''' J. profits of a business. ~art only of whose "operations "
are earned out m Bnhsh India where such part could
be n!garded as either " a business connection in
British India " or " a source of income in British
India." They also provide machinery for facilitating
collection of the tax from the resident agent where the
person entitled to such income is a non-resident. :Now,
these provisions are obviously complementary to section
5 proviso (2) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, and unless
we read " part of a business " in that proviso as meaning one or more " operations " of the business referred
to in sub-section (3) of section 42, the machinery
provided in the latter section for collection of the tax
leviable on a non-resident person by virtue of proviso
(2) will not be applicable, and the scheme of charge and
collection in such cases wfll be rendered incoherent. A
harmonious interpretation of the scheme requires that
the words " part of a business " in proviso (2) must be
taken to signify one or more of the operations of the
business, and, if so, the same expression used in
proviso (3), with which we are here concerned, must
also have the same connotation. It follows that the
manufacture of oil in the mill at Raichur is a part of
the assessees' business.
The question next arises whether the profits
derived from such manufacture, other than those
arising from sales at Raichur which are not now in
question, accrued or arose in Raichur, so as to bring
the case within proviso (3). It is clear that the oil
manufactured at Raichur cannot itself be regarded as
income, profits or gains within the meaning of the
Indian Income-tax Act or the Excess Profits Tax Act
any more th<:1n the green coffee in Mathias' case (1)
which the Privy Council held could not be so regarded.
1950
Cmwui,,foncr
cf Incom:-tax,
Bom'>as
v.
Ill
l.l .R. (1939] Mad.178.
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
351
The oil is manufactured for purposes of sale in order
1950
that profits may be earned, and such profits are realised Commis.,,.011 ,.,
only when the commodity is sold and not before. But, of Income-tax,
as the test of non-liability under proviso (3) is the acBombay
cruing or the arising of the profits in an Indian State,
·v.
the question is whether the profits, when they do arise Alimet11~1,'.';
from the sales at Bombay of the product of the mill at Umar/Jhm t, Co.
Raichur, arose in whole or in part a.t Raichur? Asp tan· 7~astri J
pointed out by the Privy Council in Chunilal lvfehta's a ia'. .
.
1
case( ), the words "profits accruing or arising in" {a
country) require a place to be assigned as that at which
the trading operations come, whether gradually or suddenly, into existence, and they involve a notion difficult to apply;to particular transactions. The words "ac ..
crue or arise," too, have been variously interpreted, and
no conclusive or clear test of when or where income can
be said to accrue has been formulatetl in the decided
cases. The learned Judges in the Court below solved
the problem by invoking what they conceived to be the
general principle underlying the decision in Kirk's
case ( 2 ), namely, the principle of apportioning profits
r' as between the different processes employed in producing those profits and the different places where they
are employed. The learned Judges disagreed with the
view of the Calcutta High Court in Re Mohanpura Tea
Co. (s) that the profits accrue or arise only when the
goods are sold and at the place where they are sold, and
that the decision in Kirk's case ( 2 ) laid down no principle of general application but proceeded on the language of an Australian statute. The question in Kirk's .
case(~) related to the assessment of the profits of a
mining company which extracted ore and converted it
into a merchantable product in one colony and sold
it in another. Under1:he relevant statute, tax was leviable in respect, of income "arising or accruing from
any ..................... trade ........................ carried on" in the
colony or " derived from lands," or "arising or
accruing from any kind of property ................... or from
any other source whatsoever," in the colo11y, but no tax
was payable in respect of income "earned" outside the
(1) I.L.H.. (1938) Born. 752.
(3) [1937) I.L.R. 2 Cal. 201.
(2) [I £00] A.C. 588.
352
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
colony. The Board held that the profits, having been
produced by the combined operations of extraction,
manufacture and sale, were assessable to tax in the
colony either as derived from land by reason of the
extraction or as "arising or accruing, " if not ·from a
11111
A
cdbliai
"trade, " certainly from a "source, " by reason of
L'111arbhai & Co,
_
the manufacture in the colony, and were therefore
Patanjali s"stri J. " earned " in the colony, though the profits were
received outside the colony. While it may well be a
"fallacy," while in applying a taxing 'statute which
directs attention to the situation of the source of income as the test of chargeability, to ignore the initial
stages in the production of the income and fasten
attention on the last stage when it is realised in
money, it may be open to question whether it is in
consonance with business principles or practice, in the
absence of any statutory requirement to that effect,
to cut business operations arbitrarily into two or more
portions and to apportion, as between them, the profits
resulting from one continuous process ending in a
sale. It appears, however, unnecessary, in the present
case, to consider the applicability of the decision in
Kirk's case ( 1 ) to assessments arising under the
Indian Act which makes the place at. which the profits
accrue or arise the test of liability Oi' non-liability, as
the case may be, as I am of opinion that section 42 of
the Income-tax Act which, as. already stated, has been
incorporated in the Excess Profits Tax Act, is applicable here and sanctions such apportionment.
It is noteworthy that the first part of sub-section
(1) of section 42 providing that certain classes of income arP, to be deemed to accrue or arise in British
India is not confined in its application to non-residents,
but is in general terms so as to be applicable to both
residents and non-residents. Before its amendment in
1939 the sub-section began with the words "in the case
of any person residing out of British India" which
obviously restricted the application of the provision to
non-resident persons, but in its amended form the subsection has been recast into two distinct parts, the
first of which is not so restricted, and the second part
1950
Commissfoncr
of Income-tax,
Bombay
v.
(1) (1900] A.C. 588.
S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
alone, which begins with the words -'~and where the
1950
person entitled to the income, profits and gains is not Commission.,
resident in British India," is made applicable to of bzcome-ta.r,
non-resident persons, thereby showing that the former
Bombay
part applies to both residents and'non-residents. The
v.
-Opening words of the first proviso also point to the
Alwzedbhai
f or t hese word s would b e surp1usage U111arbll11i
'
same cone1us10n,
__ _ & Co.
if the sub-section as a whole applied only to non-resi- Patanjali sastri J.
dents. A contrary view has, no doubt, been expressed
by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in
Commissioner of Income-tax v. We~tern India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. ( t). Though reference was made in that
<.:ase to the alteration in the structure of sub-section (1)
its significance, as it seems to me, was not properly
appreciated. The facts that the marginal note to the
whole section refers to "non-residents" and that the
section itself finds a place in Chapter V headed
"Liability in Special Cases" were relied upon as
supporting the view that sub-section { 1) as a whole
applies only to non-residents. As pointed out by the
Privy Council in Ba/raj Kunwar v. Jagatpal Singh( 2 ),
marginal notes in an· Indian statute, as in an Act
of Parliament, cannot be referred to for the purpose of
construing the statute, and it may be mentioned in this
connection that the marginal note relied on has since
been replaced by the words " Income deemed to accrue
or arise within British India," which makes it clear
that the main object of sub-section (1) wa5 to define
that expression [see section 12 (a) of Act XXII of 1947].
Nor can the title of a chapter be legitimately used to
restrict the plain terms o( an enactment. I am therefore
of opinion that the first part of sub-section (1) is applicable to the assessees, the expressions " business connection in British India" and " asset or source of
income in British India " being wide enough to cover
their selling organisation at Bombay. The result is
that the profits received at Born bay from the sale of
the oil manufactured at Raichur have to be apportioned under sub-sect ion (3) between the two operations
of manufactnre and sale, and only such portion of the
profits as is reasonably attributable to the sale should
{I) [1945] 13 J.T.R. 405.
(2) LL.R. Z6 All. 393 at ~06.
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
be deemed to accrue or arise in British India. It
must
follow, as a corollary, that the rest of the profits,
Co1111nissi01wr
attributable
to the manufacture at Raichur, must be
of /nco111e4ax,
n0 ,,,1..,).
regarded as accruing or arising in the H yd erabad
v.
State. Therefore proviso (3) to;;ection 5 of the Excess
Ahmcdr.hm·
Profits Tax Act becomes applicable to the case and
Umar/~,: r- Co. exempts the manufacturing part of the assessees'
Patanjali sasfri .J. business from the operation of the Act.
On behalf of the respondent, Mr. Munshi called
attention to certain observations of the Privy Council
in Chunilal Mehta' s case ( 1 ) as supporting his contention that, although all the operations of a business
must be completed before profit is received, the accrual
of the profits begins with the first operation and continues cumulatively till the goods are finally sold, and
that, therefore, the expression "accruing or arising
in" a place must be applied distributively to the
different operations and the places where such operations are carried out. The observations relied on are
as follows : "But the legislature-has chosen a different
test and applied it to all kinds of profits accruing or
arising in British India. It may even have chosen it
as fairer because it can be applied distributively to the
profits of a single source " (p. 765), and again, "no
doubt if it can be held that under the Indian Act
profit in the case of a business must be taken so strictly
that it is not to be iinderstood distributively at all the
profit of the assessee's business would become an
ultimate and single figure irreducible and referable
only to Bombay, but such a high doctrine cannot be
read into the Indian statute without violence not only
to its language but to its scheme:" (p. 767). These
passages may, at first sight, appear to lend some
support to Mr. Munshi's thesis. But on closer examination in their context they do not, in my opinion,
warrant any such general theory. Their Lordships
were dealing with a case where the .assessee, resident
in Bombay, derived profits from speculative contracts
for purchase and sale of commodities carried out
through brokers in various foreign markets such as
Liverpool; London and New York. The assessee
1950
(I' I.L.R.. [1938] Bom. 752.
...
S.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
1950
contended that he was not liable to pay Indian
income-tax in respect of such profits, which were Co111111issioner
not received in British India, on the ground that of lncome·fa-<.
Bombay
they were not profits accruing or arising in British
India, and their Lordships upheld that contention.
v.
Jt is with reference to such transactions which c:marbhai
Alimcdbliai
l; Co.
individually contributed to the surplus arising in
the various places abroad, that their Lordships spoke Patrmjati sastri J.
of the profits accruing or arising distributively
and not in a single place. That they were not thinking
of the profits resulting from a single composite
process such as manufacture and sale, and their disintegration and apportionment as between the different
operations is shown by their further observation that
"profits are frequently, if not ordinarily, regarded as
arising from many transactions each of which has a
result not as if the profits need to be disintegrated
with difficulty but as if they were an aggregate of the
particular results:" (p. 767).
Reference was also made to a recent decision of the
same Tribunal in International Harvester Co. of Canada
v. The Provincial Tax Commission ( 1 ) • The case arose
out of the assessment of the profits of a non-resident
to income-tax, under a provincial Income-tax Act in
respect of the profits arising from the sale within
the province of goods manufactured outside the
province. The tax was leviable, in_ the case of a
non-resident person, on the "net profit or gain arising
from the business of such person in" the province. Their Lordships held that, although the profits
sought to be assessed were all received in the province
where the goods were sold, as the profits brought under
charge under the Act was only the net profit arising
from the business in the province, the manufacturing
profits should be excluded from the assessment. Their
Lordships referred to other provisions of the Act \vhich,
in the converse case, sought to charge a proportionate
part of any profit derived from sale outside the province of goods produced in the province as being
"earned" within the province, and inferred from those
provisions that the intention of the legislature in the
(I) (19•9) A.C. 36.
356
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950]
charging section was to bring within the ambit of taxation only an apportioned part of the profit. Such a
construction, they thought, would "result in a fair and
n0 ,,,,,,,Y
reasonable scheme of taxation in accordance with that
v.
comity which naturally prevails between one province
Ahmedhlwi
and another." Referring to Kirk's case(') their LordL'niarbhai
· remar ked "t h at at
1 hough t h e sections un d er con___ & Co. s h rps
PMtanjali sastri J. sideration in Kirk's case ( 1 ) differed in their language
from the provisions which their Lordships were considering, the reasoning which appears in the judgment in
that case was helpful to the appellants' contention in
the present case." This was, presumably, because chargeability in j:Joth cases depended not on the income
accruing or arising in the country, but, on the source
of the income being in the country. The decision was
based on the language of the statute and the scheme of
taxation disclosed thereby, and what I have said about
Kirk's case( 1 ) equally applies to it.
The other cases
cited by Mr. Munshi do not call for any special notice.
I agree with the conclusion reached by the High
Court, though on different grounds, and dismiss the
appeal with costs.
1950
Cou•uissioncr
of Income-tax,
Mahajan}.
MAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, from the judgment
of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a
case stated by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under
the provisions of section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922, and it raises a question as to the
liability of the respondent, Messrs. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co., for excess profits tax.
Excess profits tax is levied under section 4 of the
Excess Profits Tax Act, XV of 1940, "in respect of
any business to which the Act applies on the amount
by which the profit during any chargeable accounting
period exceeds the standard profits ........ " The respondent is a registered firm resident in British India and
owns three oil mills in Bombay and one oil mill in
Raichur in Hyderabad State and the question to be
decided in the appeal is whether the profits which were
received or realized by the respondent on the sale of
(!) [19CO] A.C. 588.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
1950
oil manufactured in Raichur and sold in British India
are liable to excess profits tax.
Cotn111.issipnc I'
By an order dated 27th March, 1944, the. Excess of
Income-tax,
Profits Tax Officer, Circle III, Bombay, assessed
Bombay
the respondent to excess profits tax in the sum of
v.
Rs. 1,61,807 for the chargeable accounting period Alimrdhhai
commencing from 31st October, 1940 and ending on 20th Umarbliai &- Co_
October, 1941 on the business income of Rs. 6,08,761, lifaliajan J.
which included a sum of Rs. 2,49,615, being profits
accruing or arising in British India in respect of the
respondent's branch at Raichur in Hyderabad State
and run in the name of Messrs. Ahmed & Sons. By
another order dated 28th March, 1944 the ~ame officer
assessed the firm to excess profits tax in a sum of
Rs. 2,55,485-1-0 for the chargeable accounting period
commencing from 21st October, 1941 and ending on
8th November, 1942 on the business income of Rs.
7,46,561, which included a sum of Rs. 2,34,785,
being the profits accruing or arising in British India
in respect of the Raichur branch. Both the assessment
orders were appealed against to the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner but without any success. The Incometax Appellate Tribunal on appeal drew up a statement
of case and referred the following question of law to
the High Court :"Whether on the facts as stated above income
accruing or arising to the assessee on sales made in
British India of goods manufactured in Raichur situated outside British India has been rightly held by the
Tribunal as income accruing and arising in British
India and was liable to excess profits tax? "
The High Court re-framed the question as
follows:"Whether on the facts as stated above profits of a
part of the business of the assessee accrued or arose in
an Indian State "
and answered it in the affirmative. It held that
the activity which the respondent carried on at
Raichur was a part of its business within the meaning of the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess
Profits Tax Act and that the profits of a part of the
business accrued or arose in an Indian State and that
358
J 950
Cn111111issioncr
()/ b~CIJ/llC-tax,
Bo111'1a y
v.
Al11u:dhl1ai
U111arbliai {;. Cv.
Jl111t11fa11 J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
the said profits were not assessable to excess profits tax.
This order of the High Court is being contested in the
present appeal and it has been urged that as regards
the oil manufactured in Raichur but sold in British
India, no profits accrued or arose in the Indian State,
but the profits accrued or arose in British India and
are subject to excess profits tax. It was further
contended that the construction put by the High Court
on the third proviso to section 5 and on the phrase
" part of a business " is erroneous and is not justified
on the language of the proviso and the context. It was
suggested that in order to constitute "a part of the
business" within the meaning of that proviso it must
be a complete cross-section of the whole business and
not merely one or more of the operations of that
business.
Section 5 of the Act on the true construction of
which depends the decision of the appeal is in these
terms:·
" This Act shall apply to every business of which
any part of the profits made during the chargeable
accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by
virtue of the provisions of sub-clause (i) or sub-clause
(ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the
Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or of clause (c) of that
sub-section."
In other words, the Act brings within its ambit all
income in the case of a person resident in British India
which accrues or arises or which is deemed to accrue or
arise to him in British India during the accounting
year, as also all income which accrues or arises to him
without British India during such year ; and if such
person is not resident in British India during that year,
then all income which accrues or arises or is deemed
to accrue or arise in British India during such year. If
section 5 of the Act stopped short at that stage, it is undoubted that in the case of the respondent who is a resident in British India all his income, no matter where it
arose, within British India or without British India,
would be chargeable to excess profits tax just in the
same way as it is chargeable to income-tax under the
Indian Income-tax Act. The whole of his income arising
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
359
1950
in Raichur has legitimately been·taxed under t.hat Act.
Section 5 however has three provisos which limit Co11unissioner
its scope and take certain incomes outside its ambit. of focome-tax,
The first proviso is to the following effect :
Bombay
"Provided that this Act shall not apply to any
v.
business the whole of the profits of which accrue or Ahmedbhai
arise without British India where such business is car- Umarbhai & Co.
ried on by or on behalf of a person who is resident but Mahajan}.
no.t ordinarily resident in _British India unless the
business.is controlled in British India."
This exception has no bearing to the facts of the
present case. The second proviso is in these t,erms : "Provided further that where the profits of a part
,only of a business carried on by a person who is not
resident in British India or. not ordinarily so resident
accrue or aristl in British India or are deemed under
-the Indian Income-tax Act; 1922, so to accrue or arise,
then, except where the business being the business of
a person who is resident but not ordinarily resident in
British India is controlled in India, this Act shall apply only to such part of the business, and such part shall
for all the purposes of this Act be deemed to be a separate business."
This proviso also concerns a person nof resident in
British India and does not touch the present case ..
· It however furnishes a clue to the meaning of the
following proviso inasmuch· as it attracts the application of section 42 of the Indian Income-tax Act
to the case of a non-resident and contemplates the.
apportionment of income between part of a business _
controlled in British India and a part not so controlled.
Sub-section (3) of section 42 of the Income-tax ·Act
enacts thus:
" In the case of a business of which all the operations are not carried out in British India,. the profits
and gains of the business deemed under this section to
accrue or arise in British. India shall be only such
profits and gains as are reasonably attributable to that
part of the operations carried out in British India."
· Under the second proviso by reason of the application of section 42 (3) of the Income-tax Act, if the
manufacturing business of the assessee was in British
360
1950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
India and all his sales took place in Raichur, then
excess
profits tax could only be chargeable on such
Co11111iissioncr
profits
as would really be attributable to his· manuof brco11ic-tax,
Bouibay
facturing operations in British India and the manuv.
facturing operations would be treated as part of the
Alunedbhai
business of the assessee under the proviso. It is the
U111arbhai & Co.
third proviso to which the controversy in the case is
limited and this proviso is in these terms :f.IallajanJ,
"Provided further that this Act shall not apply
to any business the whole of the profits of which
accrue or arise .in an Indian State, and where the
profits of a part of business accrue or arise in an Indian
State, such part shall, for the purposes of this provision, be deemed to be a separate business the whole of
the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State,
and the other part of the business shall, for all the
purposes of this Act, be deemed to be a separate
business."
We have firstly to determine the meaning of the
words "part of a business "in this proviso; does it mean,
as argued on behalf of the Commissioner, that the business must be a complete cross-section of the whole business and not merely one or more of the operations of that
business, or, does it mean, as contended by the learned
counsel for the respondent, a continued and severable
business activity of which the profits could be apportioned
or ascertained separately. Secondly, we are called
upon to determine at what place do the profits accrue
or arise in respect of the part of such business. Do
. they arise at the place where in the case of a manufacturer his goods are sold, or can they be said to accrue
or arise at the place of manufacture?
The word "business" has been defined by the Act
in section 2 (5) as follows :" 'Business' includes any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventme in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture or any profession or vocation .... "
It means any continued activity of a person
which yields profits and which is in the nature of
trade, commerce or manufacture. It may even be any
adventure in the nature of trade, commerce or
-
y
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
361
1950
manufacture. A proviso was added to this definition
in the year 1940 in these terms :-Co11uniss''l1t11r
"Provided further that all businesses to which of Inconw-tax,
Bombay
this Act applies carried on by the same person shall be
v.
treated as one business for the purposes of this Act."
Alimedbhai
The effect of the proviso is that if a man is carry- Umarbhai & Co.
ing on a number of activities, whether of the same or
Mahajau J.
of different natures, all these various businesses are
treated as one. The same person, if engaged in the
manufacture of hardware, oils, textiles, motor tyres,
bicycles and owning mills for his diverse activities in
different places and also trading in merchandise and
doing contract business, is deemed to carry on a single
business. All the businesses that he carries on are.
lumped together and treated as one business for the
purpose of levying the tax and calculating the profits.
The proviso has made an amalgam of all the businesses of one individual and it is in view of this amalgam that proviso 3 of section 5 has to be considered.
It seems to me that what has been amalgamated by
the definition has again been made separate by .the
proviso to section 5. If a number of businesses carried
on by a person are situate in different places, then the
effect_ of the proviso is to again treat them as separate
business under the description of the phrase "part of
a business." In other wor<ls, if a man is carrying
on manufacture in textiles in Bombay, a shop at Mysore, has a distillery in Allahabad and has an oil mill
in Gwalior, then for the purpose of section-Sall these
four trades are part of the business within the meaning of proviso 3 to section 5, one part situate in one
place and another part situate at another place and
if any of these parts produce profits at the place
of the business, that place being in an Indian
State, then proviso (3) would have application.
I think that the effect of the language of proviso (2) of
section 5 is to giy-e colour to proviso (3) as being complementary to it and providing for converse cases to those
arising under this proviso concerning non•residents.
Illustratively it may be said that proviso (2) would
cover the case if the manufacturing business of the
362
1950
Co1111nissioncr
of lnc01ne-tax,
Bonibay
v.
Ahniedbhai
Uniarbliai & Co
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950}
respondent was situate in Bombay and his sales
exclusively were made at Raichur provided he was a
non-resident. In that event excess profits duty would
be chargeable on a part of the profits attributable to the
part of the business in Bombay, or in other words, to
those business operations that were being carried on in
Bombay. The converse case where the manufacturing
operations are being carried on in Raichur by a resident
in India and the sales are made exclusively in Bombay
is apparently covered by proviso (3) because a part of
the business being situate in Raichur profits attributable to that part of the business out of the total sale
proceeds could only be said to accrue at the place of
manufacture.
The present assessee has three mills in British
India and a mill at Raichur. He has also a sales depot
at Bombay. In his case but for the proviso to the
definition of "business" it could be said that he was
carrying on five businesses, three of manufacture of oil
in India and one of manufacture of oil in Hyderabad
and a fifth businesi'l' as trader at Bombay. By reason
of the proviso to the definition, all these .businesses become a single business. But for the purposes of provisos (2) and (3) of section S all these are part of a business and have to be treated as separate bu.sinesses. The
theory of cross-section of a business con tended by the
appellant is not very intelligible. It was contended
that if a man is a manufacturer as well as a seller of
goods and also an importer of goods, then in his case
the term "part of a business " means the carrying on
of all the three activities together and that unle:os he
carries on all the three activities, it cannot constitute
" part of business" under the proviso. This contention
to my mind is untenable. The only construction which
in the context of the Act can be reasonably placed on
the proviso to section S and on the words " part of a
business" is the one suggested above. I am therefore
of the opinion that the learned Chief Justice was right
when he held that the activities which the assessee
carried on at Raichur are certainly a partof the business of the assessee. Mr. Justlce Tendolkar on thi~
part of the case observed as follows : -
S.C.R.
j
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
363
" The normal meaning of the word is a ' portion '
in whatever way carved out and I have no doubt in
my mind that any of the operations that go towards
a complete business are a part of that business.
The contention of the Advocate-General becomes
the more untenable when one looks at the second
proviso to section 2 (5) of the Excess Profits Tax
Act. ..... ..
Now, under this proviso you may have several
businesses of a totally different character carried on
by the same person and they, all together constitute
o~e business for the purposes of the Excess Profits
Tax Act, if the contention of the Advocate-General is
right, even if one of these different businesses in the
ordinary sense of the term was wholly carried out in a
Native State, it would still not ·be a part of the whole
business in the sense of being a cwss-section of all the
businesses which together constitute one business
under the Excess Profits Tax Act. I am, therefore, of
opinion that the manufacture of oil was part of the
business of the assessee firm."
I am in complete agreement with the observations
cited above.
The next question for consideration is whether
that part of the business situate in Hyderabad gives
any profits, in other words, whether any profits of the
manufacturing business of the assessee at Hyderabad
accrue or arise in that State.
On behalf of the Commissioner it was contended
that the place where the profits accrue or arise is not
ordinarily the place where the source that produces
the profits is situate and that the High Court had
erred in taking the view that in respect of sales of oil
in British India produced by the mill at Raichur any
profits accrued at· the pl<rce of manufacture. It was
said that profits in such a case only accrue at the
_place of sale and not at the place of manufacture. I
am unable to accede to this contention. It is true that
no profits are realized until the oil is sold but the act
of sale merely fixes .the time and place of. receipt of
profits, profits are not whoily made by the act of sale
and do not necessarily accrue at the place of rnle.
t6
1950
Co11uut'.s.'lio1ter
of I1rc01>1:•-tax,
Bo111hay
v.
Ali1ucdbhai
U111arb/1ai l; Ca..
Malirrjau J.
364
1950
Couullissioucr
of lncontc-tax,
Bo111'1ay
v
Ah11icd!JJ1ai
Untarbltai & Co.
.;faliajanJ,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950}
Act of sale is the culminating process in the earning of
profits but it goes without saying that the act of sale
could not be performed unless the goods were produced
at Raichur and it would be wrong from a business
point to say that all the profits resulted from that
operation. It was the operation of manufacture at
Raichur that enabled the assessee to sell oil and some
portion of the profits must necessarily be attributable
to the-manufacturing process. To the extent that the
profits are attributable to the manufacture of oil it is
not possible to say that,-they accrue or arise at any
place different from the place where the manufactured
article came into existence.
It was not denied that the business of manufacture at Raichur may produce profits or it may even
earn profits and it wa:s conceded that it may also be
said that profits are derived from that process of manufacture but it was strenuously argued that earning of
profits is not the same thing as the accrual of profits
and no profits could be said to accrue or arise at a
place where the profits may well have been earned or
produced and that the place of accrual of profits must
necessarily be the place where the sale proceeds are
received or realized. On behalf of the assessee it was
urged that the words "derived," "earn," "accrue"
or "arise" are synonymous and it is immaterial which
word is used indicating the result of the activities of
various business operations. The totality of profits
that accrues to a business or is earned by it may be
ascribed to a number of operations; though it is
.ascertained at the place where the produce is sold, it
accrues where it is earned. Whether the words
"derive" and "produce" are or are not synonymous
with the words "accrue" or "arise," it can be said
without hesitation that the words "accrue " or " arise "
though not defined in the Act are certainly synonymous
and are used in the sense of " bringing in as a natural
result." Strictly speaking, the word " accrue " is not
synonymous with "arise," the former connoting idea
of growth or accumulation and the latter of the growth
or accumulation with a tangible shape so as to be
receivable. There is a distinction in the dictionary
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
365
1950
meaning of these words, but throughout the Act they
seem to denote the same idea or ideas very similar and Co1n1nissioner
the difference only lies in this that one is more appro- of Income-tax.
priate when applied to a particular casi. In the case
Bombay
v.
of a composite business, i.e., in the case of a person
who is carrying ·on a number of- businesses, it is A/1m~dbhai
always difficult to decide as to the place of the accrual U111a,rb/zai & Co ..
of profits and their apportionment inter se. For Mahajan .f.
instance, where a person carries on manufacture, sale,
export and import, it is not possible to say that the
place where the profits accrue to him is the place of
safo. The profits received relate firstly to his business
as a manufacturer, secondly to his trading operations,
and thirdlv to his business of import and exp::irt.
Profit or foss has to be apportioned between these
businesses in a businesslike manner and according to
well-established principles of accountancy. In such
cases it will be doing no violeJ;J.ce to the meaning of the
words " accrue " or " arise " if the profits attributable
to the manufacturing business are said to arise or·
accrue at the place where the manufacture is being
done and the profits which arise by reason of the sale
are said to arise at the place where the sales are made
and the profits in respect of the import and export
business are said to arise at the place where the business is conducted. This apportionment of profits between a number of businesses which are carried on by the
same person at different places determines also the
place of ·the accrual of profits. To hold that though
a businessman has invested millions in establishing a
bm.iness of manufacture, whether in the nature of a
textile mill or in the nature of steel works, yet no
profits are attributable to this business or can accrue
or arise to the business of manufacture because the
produce of his mills is sold at a different place and
that it is only the act of sale by which profits accrue
and they arise only at that place is to confuse the idea
of receipt of inconte and realization of profits with the
idea of the accrual of profits. The act of sale is the
mode of realizing the profits. If the goods are sold
tv a third person at the mill premises no one could
have said that these profits arose merely by reason of
366
1950
Co1n11tissioner
of lnco;1t::-t,r:c,
Bo11i?ay
v.
A11111::.dbhai
V1narl1hai [;."Co.
i.IahajanJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
the sale. Profits would only be ascribed to the business of manufacture and would arise at the mill
premises. Merely because the mill owner has started
another business organization in the nature of a sales
depot or a shop, that cannot wholly deprive the business of manufacture of its profits, though there may
have to be apportionment in such a case between the
bu>iness of manufacture and business of shopkeeping.
In a number of cases such apportionment is made and
is also suggested by the provisions of section 42 of the
Indian Income-tax Act, reference to which •has also
been made in proviso (2) of section 5 of the Excess
Profits Tax Act.
In Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Maxse ( 1 ),
~faxse purchased a monthly magazine for £ 1,500-and
was the sole proprietor, editor and publisher thereof.
The earnings were derived from sales of the magazine,
from advertisements and from reprints of articles
mostly written by him. Before thi> war Maxse wrote
a large part of each number, and, though some of the
matter was contributed by others, the sales were
largely due to the popularity of his own writings.
When war broke out, he increased his personal contributions and did most of the wr'iting. At that time
he required practically no capital. Having been
assessed to excess profits duty for the year ending
May 31, 1915, he appealed to the General Income Tax
Commissioners and contended that the profits were
earned by reason of his personal qualifications, that
the capital expenditure was small in comparison with
the personal qualifications required to earn the profits,
and that he was exempt from duty by virtue of para.
(c) of section 39 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1915. Th~
General Commissioners having discharged the assessment, their decision was reversed by Sankey J. who
held that Maxse was carrying on a commercial business and not a profession within para. (c) and therefore he was liable to duty. The Coart of appeal held
that Maxse was carrying on the profession of a
journalist, author or man of letters, and also the business of publishing his own periodical. The publishing
(1) [1919] 1 K.B. 6,7.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
367
1950
business should be debited with a fair and reasonable
allowance in respect of Maxse's contributions, and Conituissfotter
.a proper sum for his remuneration as editor, and on of Income-tux,
that footing he would be liable to duty in respect of
Bombay
his business but exempt therefrom in respect of his
v.
Ahmedbhai
profession. This is a case of a combination of a
profession with a business. .Under the law no excess Umarbhai Ii- Co.
profits duty could be levied on his professional income
Ma/iajanJ,'
but his business income was liable to such duty and.
the duty was so levied by making the apportionment. The rule laid down in this tase, though it
has special reference to the scheme of the English
statute, can appositely be laid down for the
apportionment of profits qua parts of a business of
an ~ssessee.
A similar view was expressed by a
Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Killing Valley
Tea Cotttpany v. The Secretary of State for India( 1 ).
There the question arose whether the income from a
tea garden where tea was grown and made ready for
the market by mechanical process, was assessable. It
was held that the income was to be apportioned and
so much of it as was obtained by 'the manufacturing
process was assessable. The principle of Maxse' s case
and of other English cases was applied to the facts of
that particular case. In cases where a person is (4rrying on composite businesses which for purposes of section 5 are regarded as one business and for purposes
of the proviso as several parts of a business, it may be
said that there are two stages in the production. of the
net profit, ( 1) the manufacture of the article, and (2)
the sale of the article and that part of the net profit
should be attributed to each stage, the part. attributed
to the earlier stage being described as a manufacturing profit. Reference in this connection may be made
to the case of International Harvester Co. of Canada
Ltd. v. Provincial TfJ,x Commission ( 2 ). In that case
it was argiled that when money was received by the
· appellant in Saskatchewan as a result of a sale in Saskatchewan the whole of the net profit on the sale arose
from the business of the appellant in Saskatchewan;
and no apportionment was necessary:. This contention
(1) I.L.R.
•s Ca!.161.
(2) A.I.R. 19•9 P.O. 72.
368
1950
Co1n11iissioner
of f11co111e-tax,
Ho1nbay
v.
Ahnt('dbliai
U11tarbhai & Co,
Afahajan J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
was described by their Lordships as fallacious and
untenable.
Their Lordships quoted with approval
the following observations from the minority judgment
of Sir Lyman Duff C. J. The quotation is in these
terms:"Nowhere does the statute authorise the Province
of Saskatchewan to tax' a manufacturing company,
situated as the appellant company is, in respect of the
whole of the profits received by the company in Saskatchewan. It is not the profits received in Saskatchewan that are taxable, it is the profits arising from its
business in Saskatchewan not the profits arising from
the company's manufacturing business in Ontario and
from the company's operations in Saskatchewan taken
together, but the profits arising from the company's
operations in Saskatchewan."
The question in the present case in whether in
respect of the manufacturing business of the assessee in
Raichur profits accure or arise a.nd if so, ·at what place.
My answer unhesitatingly is that the manufacturin~
profits arise at the place of manufacture. They could
arise nowhere els~. The sale profits arise at the ,place
of sale and apport10nment has to be made between the
two, though the place of receiptg and realization of
the profits is the place where the sales are made. The
manufacturing profits could not be said to have
accrued or arisen at that place because there was
nothing done from which they could accrue or
arise as natural accrual or as an increase. The increase
only took place at the place of manufacture and if
there was any accrual over the production cost, that
accrual was at the place of the production itself.
Mr. Seta:lvad for the Commissioner placed reliance
on a number of cases, inter alia, The Board of Revenue
v. The Madras Export Company('), ]iwan Das v.
Income-tax Commissioner, Lahore(~). In re Port Said
Salt Association Limited (3 ), and Sudalaimani Nadar
v. Income-tax Commissioner (4 ). All these cases fall
in one category: These are cases where-raw materials
(l) I.L.R. 46 Mad. 36~.
(3i I.LR. 59 Cal. 12~6.
(21I.L.R.10 Lah. 657.
(<)A.LR. 19U Mad. 229.
S.C.R.
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
369
were purchased at one place and sold at another and it
was held that in such cases it was.the act of sale from
which the profits accrued or arose. In most of these
~ses the goods as purchased were sold without going
through any manufacturing process. It was observed
that mere act of purchase produces no profit. This
proposition has been doubted in a later case. But it
is unnecessary to go into this matter. In the case of a
trading business, like purchase and sale, it may be said
that the business of a person is one operation and the
nature and character of the business is such that the
profits arise at the place of sale and that in such a case
it is not possible to ascribe any profits to the
act of purchase and it is still more difficult to
apportion them. These cases are no guide for the
·decision of cases of manufacturing business or business of a like nature. Observations made in these
cases must be limited to the facts of each particular
case. A number of cases were cited for the proposition
that under the Indian Act. it is not the place where
a person carries on business (as it is under the
English law) whe're necessarily profits can be said
to arise, because the Indian Act takes notice only of the
place of accrual of profits and not of the place where
the business is carried on or where the source which
produces profit is situate. The matter was discussed
by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Chitnilal B. Mehta ( 1 ).
The assessee in that case was carrying on buying and
selling operations in commodities in various foreign
markets. No delivery was ever given or taken and
the profits of such forward contracts were not received
in fact in British India, and it was held that the contracts having been neither· ftamed nor carried out in
British India, the profits derived from the contracts
did not accrue or arise in British India within the
meaning of section 4, sub-section (1) of the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922. The contention raised in that
case on behalf of the Commissioner was that these profits resulted from the exercise of skill and judgment in
Bombay by the assessee and by the giving of directions
(1) 65 I.A. 33f.
1950
Co1111nissionf.!r
of Jnconic-tax.
B01uba y
v.
Alunedb!tai
U11zarbhai & Co.
Ma/zaja11 ].
370
1950
Coi11111issioncr
of /11co111c-fax,
1Jo111bay
v.
· Al11ncdbliai
l.h:za1·bl1ai & Co.
t\lahaja11 J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
from Bombay. This contention was negatived and it
was observed that to determine the place at which such
a profit arises not by reference to the transactions, or
to any feature of the transactions, but by reference to
a place in India at which the instructions therefor
were determined on and cabled to New York is, in
their Lordships' view, to proceed in a manner which
cannot be supported if the transactions are to be looked
at separately and the profits of each transaction considered by themselves. It was said that there is a
distinct paradox in the contention that the profits
resulting from an order placed in New York would
have accrued or arisen in the same place (Bombay) had
the order been sent to Liverpool with a like result, but
that had the assessee decided on and directed the
same New York transaction when in Hyderabad the
same profits would· have arisen in a different place
(Hyderabad). It may be observed that the business
of the forward contracts was not being conducted in
Bombay at all in this case. The whole argument was
.based on the ground that the assessee, a big business
magnate, was directing and controlling that business.
Such direction and control could hardly be said to be
the place of the accrual of profits on the transactions
done elsewhere. It was next argued in that case that
these foreign transactions were part of the profits of the
Bombay business carried on by the assessee and all
the profits of the business must be computed as a
whole. Their Lordships negatived this contention and
observed as follows :"But the legislature has chosen a different test,
and applied it to all kinds of profits-' accruing or
arising in British India.' It may even have chosen it
as fairer because it could be applied distributively to
the profits of a single source. However that may be,
the profits of each particular business are to be computed wherever and by whomsoever the business . is
carried on, but only on condition that they arc profits
' accrning or arising or received in British India,' etc.
What connection exists, if any, between place of
direction and place at which the profits arise is a
matter not touched by sections 4, 6 or 10. Not only
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
371
1950
do they lay no stress upon the place at which the
business is carried on, they make no mention of it. In Co1111nissio1ter
these circumstances it cannot be held that it is itself of luc:onie-tax.
the test of chargeability by virtue of a rule, not men.
Bo111fJay
v.
tion(!d either, that profits arise or accrue at the place
Al1111cdbl1ai
where the business is carried on."
Later in the same judgment it was observed that
there seemed to be no necessity arising out of the ~fahnjan j.
general conception of a business as an organization
that profits should arise only at one place, that profits
are frequently, if not ordinarily, regarded as arising
from many transactions, each of which have a resultnot as if the profits need to be disintegrated with
difficulty, but as if they were an aggregate of the
particular results. It was said that the assessment
order had discriminated between the Bombay and the
foreign business income and that to discriminate between all kinds of profits according to the place at
which they accrue or arise was a plain dictate of the
statute, other discrimination was involved in the
exemptions, and in such sections as section 42. In the
concluding part of the judgment their Lordships said
as follows :" These considerations lead their Lordships to the
conclusion that under the Indian Act a person resident .
in British India, carrying on business there and
controlling transactions abroad in the course of such
business, is not by these mere facts liable to tax on the
profits of such transactions. If such profits have
not been received in or brought into British India, it
becomes, or may become necessary to consider on the
facts of the case where they accrued or arose. Their
Lordships are not laying down any rule of general
application to all classes of foreign transactions, or
even with respect to the sale of goods. To do so would
be nearly impossible, and wholly unwise. They are not
saying that the place of formation of the contract prevails against everything else. In some circumstances
it may be so, but other matters-acts done under the
contract, for example-cannot be ruled out a priori.
In the case before the Board the contracts were
47
372
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
neither framed nor carried out in British India, the
High Court's conclusion that the profits accrued or
Co111111issio11cr
arose
outside British India is well founded."
·of lnco11ic-tax,
In my view this decision does not make us any
Bo11i!Jay
v.
the wiser for the decision of the present case. It is
Ahn1cdhhai
true that the Indian Act does not lay down that profits
V1narbha i & Co.
necessarily arise or accrue at the place where the
business is carried on or that they necessarily arise at
Maliajan J.
the place where the source which produces the profit
is situate but at the same time the Act does not lay
down that the profits nec<:ssarily accrue or arise at the
place where only one operation, namely of sale is performed. Place of accrual of profits cannot necessarily
be determined on the test of receivability. In certain
cases the place of origin of the profits may be the determining factor while in others the test of receivability may have application. Profits of a trade or business are what is gained by the business. The term
implies a comparison between the state of business at
two specific dates separated by an interval of an
year and the fundamental meaning is the amount of
gain made by the business during the year and can
only be ascertained by a comparison of the assets of
the business at the two dates, the increase shown at
a later date compared to the earlier date represents
the profits of the business. In this concept of the term
the place of business or the source from which they originate would in the case of certain businesses .be the
place where they can he said to accrue or arise. In this
situation t_he profits realized at sale have to be apportioned between the different business operations which
have produced them and those apportioned to the part
of business of manufacture at Raichur can only be said
to arise at the place of manufacture as no other activity
has produced those profits. No other place can be
suggested where this increase can be said to have
arisen. In the view that I have taken it is unnecessary
to refer to all the cases that were cited at the Bar, for
most of these cases concerned the interpretation of the
various sections of the Indian Income-tax Act and
none of them concerned the interpretation ploiced on
the Act with which we are concerned.
1950
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
373
The result therefore is that in my opinion the
High Court was right in answering the question. in
favour of the assessee and no grounds exist for reversing that decision in appeal, which is therefore dismissed with costs.
MUKHERJEA J.-I agree that this appeal should
be dismissed and I would indicate briefly the reasons
which have weighed with me in affirming the judgment of the High Court.
The question which was referred by the Incornetax Commissioner, Bombay, to the High Court under
the provision of section 66 (1) of the Indian Incometax Act, 1922 and which. the latter reframed for the
purpose of bringing out clearly the real controversy
between the parties, turns upon the applicability of the
third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax
Act (Act XV of 1940) to the facts of the present ·case.
The facts are not in controversy and may be shortly
stated as follows :
.
The respondents assessees are a firm, resident in
British India. and they are registered for income-tax
purposes under section 26A of the Income-tax Act.
Their business consists in manufacturing and selling
groundnut oil and they have three mills in Bombay
and one at Raichur in the Hyderabad State where oil
is manufactured. During the char~eable accounting
period, the oil that was manufactured at Raichur was
sold partly in Raichur itself and partly in Bombay, and what the Income-tax Officer did was
to ascertain the income arising to the assessees out of the Raichur business and apportion
the same on the basis of sales made in Raichur and
Bombay respectively. The profits arising out of sales
made in Bombay were held by the Income-tax Officer
to be assessable both to income-tax and excess profits
tax. There is no doubt as to the propriety of his decision so far as income-tax is concerned. The only
question that is 'raised relates to the liability of the
firm to pay excess profits tax in ·respect of income
arising out of the sales made in Bombay of the oil
manufactured at Raichur. The contention put forward
' 1950
Co1n1nissio1ter
of Inco11u?-tax.
Bombay
v.
Ahmcdhhai
Umarbhai & C<>,
374
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950}
by the assessees is that although the oil was sold in
Bombay,
it was manufactured at Raichur and a porCon1111issioner
tion
of
the
profits ultimately made must be allotted to
of lnco11w-tc1x,
the manufacturing process that was carried on at
Bo111bay
v.
Raichur. The manufacture of the oil, therefore, must
Al111tcdbl1ai
be regarded as a part of the business and as the profits
Vnzarb/Jai & Co,
of this part accrued at Raichur, it has to be treated as
a separate business for purposes of excess profits tax
Muklierjca J.
under the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess
Profits Tax Act. The High Court answered this question in favour of the assessees and the Commissioner of
Income-tax, Bombay, has come up on appeal to this
Court.
With a view to· appreciate the contentions that
have been raised by the learned counsel on both sides,
it will be convenient, first of all, to advert to the provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act which have a
bearing on the point. Section 2, sub-section (5), of the
Act defines "business" as including any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure in the nature
of trade, commerce or manufacture or any profession
or vocation but does not include a profession carried on
by an individual or by individuals in partnership if
the profits of the profession depend wholly or mainly
on his or their _personal qualifications ......... One of the
provisos attacl!ed to this definition provides that all
businesses to which this Act applies carried on by the
same person shall be treated as one business for the
purposes of this Act. Section 4 is the charging section
and under it any business to which this Act applies is
subject ,to payment of excess profits tax in the manner
and to the extent indicated in the section. Section 5
lays down to what businesses the Act will apply.
1950
" This Act shall apply " so runs the section, " to
every business of which any part of the profits made
during the chargeable accounting period is chargeable
to income-tax by virtue of the provisions of sub-clause
(i) or sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of
section 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or of
clause (c) of that sub-section."
There are three provisos attached to this section ;
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
375
1950
we are concerned fot our present purposes with the
third proviso which is worded as follows :
Co111111issionc r
" Provided further that this Act shall not apply of In.co111e-tax,
Bont!Jay
to any business the whole of the profits of which accrue
v.
or arise in an Indian State, and where the profits of AJ1111cdbhai
a part of a business accrue or arise in an Indian State, U111arbhai & Co.
such part shall, for the purposes of this provision, be
deemed to be a separate business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State, and the
·other part of the business shall, for all the purpo~es of
this Act, be deemed to be a separate business."
The point for consideration is whether on the facts
of this case which have been stated above, this third
proviso to section 5 can be invoked by the assessees
and it is open to them to claim that the work of manufacture of groundnut oil carried on by them at Raichur
should be treated as a separate business within the
meaning of this proviso. To succeed in their claim, it
is incumbent upon the assessees to show that there was
in fact a part of a business in the present case and
that profit accrued or arose to this part in an Indian
State. If both these elements are found to exist then
and then only the part of the business could be treated
as a separate business for purposes of the Act.
It is contended by the assessees that though they
carry on the business of manufacturing and selling oil,
the process of manufacture apart from the sale is itself
a business and can be treated as a separate part of the
trade that the assessees are carrying on. As the profits
of this part arose or accrued at Raichur, both the conditions of the proviso are fulfilled in the present case.
The learned Attorney-General appearing for the Commissioner of Income-tax has, on the other hand, argued
that the expression " part of a business " occurring ·in
the proviso does not refer to or contemplate one of the
many activities or processes that- are comprised in a
business. It can only mean a cross-section of the entire
business, complete in itself and including parts of each
of the processes that are comprised in the same. It is
next said that even assuming that the manufacturing
operation can be treated as a part of the business, the
376
!950
Co1n11iissio11cr
of btco111c-tax,
Bo1nbay
v.
AJ11nr:dbhai
ftlukhl'rj~·a
J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
profits of the same could and did accrue only at the
place of sale and hence the proviso could · not be
attracted to the facts of the present case.
As regards the first part of Mr. Setalvad's contention, I do not think that it can be accepted as sound.
"Business" is defined in the Act to include any trade,
commerce or manufacture. A man may carry on the
trade of a seller or purchaser of goods ; he may be a
manufacturer of goods' or an exporter or importer of the
same. Each of these would be a business within the
meaning of the Act. Suppose, for example, that he
combines all these activities and carries on a bu~iness
which includes manufacturing, selling.and also exporting and importing of goods. Can it not be said that
each one of these activities is a part of the business
which he carries on? I agree with Mr. Munshi that
if a particular process or activity of a continuous character can be distinguished from other processes and if
a separate profit can be ascertained and allotted in
respect to the same, there is no reason why it shopld
not be regarded as a part of the business which yields
income or profits.
The question has been raised in several cases in
English Courts regarding liability to excess profits
duty when a person carries on a trade or business liable to duty in connection with another business which
is not so liable. It has been held that if separation is
possible in such cases the proper course to follow is to
sever the profits of the two businesses and assess accordingly.
In the case of Commissioners of Inland Revenue
v. Ransom( 1 ) the respondents carried on the business
as manufacturing chemists and growers of medicinal
herbs; they owned a factory where the manufacture
and distillation of herbs were carried on and they also
occupied a farm on which they grew herbs for treatment in the factory. The respondents were assessed
to excess profits duty and on appeal against the assessment, the General Commissioners held that although
the respondents occupied the farm mainly for the purpose of the factory, which was excluded from excess
(I) [191~] 2 K.B. 709.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
377
1950
profits duty, as separation was possible, the profits
of the farm were excluded and they were only assessed Co1111n.;ssionet'
on the profits of the factory. This view of the Gene- of Incoffi -tax,
Bombay
ral Commissioners was upheld by Sankey J. on
v.
appeal.
Ahmcdbhai
The same question arose in Commissioners of In- U111arbluri & Co.
land Revenue v. 2\1axse( 1 ), where the Court of appeal
reversed the decision of Sankey J. In that case the M11khcrjea J.
appellant was the sole proprietor, editor and publisher
-0f the " National Review " and was a~sessed on the
profits of the publication. The General Commissioners
held that the appellant was exempt from duty as he
carried on the profession of a journalist, the profits of
which depended mainly upon his personal qualifications
within the meaning of the Finance Act. On appeal,
Sankey J. reversed the decision of the General Commissioners and held that the assessee was not in the
position of an ordinary journalist but derived his profits by the sale of a commodity, thereby carrying on an
-0rdinary commercial business. The Court of appeal
upset this decision of Sankey J. and held that the
.assessee was really carrying on two businesses, one
that of a journalist, author and a man of letters and
the other that of publishing his periodical. The result
was that the profits of the two businesses were directed
to be apportioned, though the process was by no
means an easy one. The same principle was applied
by the Calcutta High Court in a case where the growing of tea as an agricultural produce, which was not
liable to income-tax wq.s carried on along with the
business of manufacturing tea [vide Killing Valley Tea
Co. v. Secretary of State ( 2 )]. It is true that these are
cases where several businesses were amalgamated and
carried on together, or more of which were not liable
to tax or exc;ess profits duty ; but the principle of
apportionment upon which these cases were decided
-could, in my opinion, be applied with equal propriety
to cases where one part of the busine!"s is distinct and
separate from the other parts and is capable of earning
profits separately.
That profits could and should be allotted to and
.(1) [1919] 1. K.B. 6{7.
m I.L;R. .(8 Cal.161.
373,
1950
Co11111iissiu11er
of !11co111c-fax,
110111'1(!}'
v.
A/J111 ..:dbhai
U111arbhai (.:Co.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
apportioned between different parts of a business of a
composite character is fully illustrated by the decision
of the Privy Council in the Commissioner of Taxation
v. Kirk('). In that case the assessees were a mining
company who had mines in the colony of New South
Wales. The ore was extracted in New South V.'ales
and was converted there into merchantable product.
The product, however, was sold not in New South
\;I/ales but in Victoria. Under section 15 of the New
South \\Tales Land and Income Tax Assessment Act,
the following incomes were liable to be taxed : " Sub-section (1). Arising or accruing to any
person wheresoever residing from any profession, trade,
employment or vocation carried on in New South
\Vales, whether the same be carried on by such person
or on his behalf wholly or in part by any other person
...... (3) Derived from lands of the Crown held under
lease or licence issued by or on behalf of the Crown.
( 4) Arising or accruing to any person wheresoever residing from any kind of property except from land
subject to land tax as hereinafter specifically excepted,
or from any other source whatsoever in New South
Wales not included in the preceding sub-sections."
It was held by the New South Wales Court that
the assessee was not liable to tax under any of the
above provisions. This decision was reversed by the
Judicial Committee.
"It appears to their Lordships," so runs the judgment of the Judicial Committee, " that there are four
processes in the earning or production of this income( 1) the extraction of the ore from the soil ; (2) the conversion of the crude ore into a merchantable product,
which is a manufacturing process; (3) the sale of the
merchantable product; (4) the receipt of the moneys
arising from the sale. All these processes are necessary
stages which terminate in money, and the income is the
money resulting less the expenses attendant on all the
stages ...... The fallacy of the judgment of the Supreme
Court in this and in Tindal's case is in leaving out of
sight the initial stages, and fastening their attention
111 [1 DJQJ A.C. 588.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
379
exclusively on the final stage in the production of the
income."
Thus according to the Judicial Committee it was a
fallacy to regard the profits as arising solely at the
place of sale. It is to be noted that under the provisions
of the New South Wales Act referred to above, the
liability to tax depended not whether the income arose
or accrued in New South Wales but whether it accrued
from a source in New South Wales. This distinction is
undoubtedly important and the learned Chief Justice
of the Bombay High Court was not, it seems, right in
laying no stress upon it and in observing in course of
his judgment that income accrues or arisEs only at the
place where its source is situated. This aspect of the
case I will .discuss later on in connection with the
second point that arises for consideration in this case.
It is enough to state at the present stage that bn the
authority of Kirk's case it would be quite legitimate
to hold that a portion of the net profit that the
assessees in the present case made out of their total
business could and should be allotted to the manufacturing process that was carried on at Raichur. The
view is strengthened by two recent pronouncements of
the Judicial Committee, the earlier of which reported
in International Harvester Company of Canada v.
Provincial Tax Commission ( 1 ) discusses the point in
great details 'and was followed in its entirety in the
later decision in Provincial Treasurer of Manitoba v.
Wrigley Jr. Co. Ltd. ( 2 ). lri International Harvester
Co. of Canada v. Provincial Tax Commission (1 ), the
question for decision turned upon the construction of
section 21 (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1932 of Saskatchewan which after amendment was in the same terms as
section 23 of the later Act of 1936. The section
provides that " the income liable to taxation under
this Act · of every person residing outside of Saskatchewan who is carrying on business in Saskatchewan
either directly or through or in the name of any other
person shall be the net profit or gain arising from the
business of such person in Saskatchewan."
The
.appellant company had its Head Office in Hamilton,
(1)
4.S
(194.9) A.O. 36.
(21 (1950) A.I.R. 1950 P.O. 53.
1950
Cc.:1n1nissio11er
of Inco1ne-tax,
Bombay
v.
A/1medb/1ai
Umarbhai &- CA>.
Muklrcrjeaj.
380
1950
Co1J1111issioncr
'lJj lm.:01111.:.·fax,
Bo1u.'n1y
v.
AlitHr:clbliai
Vnurrbhai & Go.
..\luldh'rjca J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
· [1950}
Ontario, and was for income-tax purposes resident outside of Saskatchewan.
Its business was that of
manufacturing and selling agricultural implements, the
manufacturing operations being carried on entirely
outside the province of Saskatchewan and the selling
operations partly in that province and partly in other
provinces and countries.
The selling business in
Saskatchewan was carried on at Branch Offices, all
moneys received by the appellant in Saskatchewan
being deposited in separate bank accounts and
remitted in full to the Head Office which sent to the
Saskatchewan branches such moneys as were required
for operating and incidental expenses. It was held by
the Judicial Committee that any part of the appellant's
net profit which might fairly be attributed to its
manufacturing operations outside the.province of Saskatchewan was not profit arising from the business of
the appellant in Saskatchewan within the meaning of
section 21 (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1932, as amended, and must be excluded in ascertaining the income
of the appellant liable to taxation under that section.
The Judicial Committee in course of its judgment
referred to the following passage occurring in the
judgment of Duff C.•J. in the Supn: ne Court of
Canada.
"The profits of the company are derived from a
series of operations, including the purchase of raw
materials or partly manufactured articles, completely
manufacturing its products and transporting and
selling them, and receiving the proceeds of such sales.
The essence of its profit-making business is a series of
operations as a whole. That part of the proceeds of
sales in Saskatchewan which is profits is received in
Saskatchewan, but it does not follow, of course, that
the whole of such profit ' arises from ' that part of the
company's business which is carried on there within
contemplation of section 21 (a)."
Their Lordships agreed with the appellant that a
portion of the money received in Saskatchewan which
represents net profit should be sub-divided and part
of it should be treated as a ' manufacturing profit '
s.. c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
381
1950
arisirig from the manufacturing business of the
appellant outside Saskatchewan.
There was no · Com.missione,..
insuperable difficulty according to their Lordships in of 1"come-tax,
making this apportionment.
&mba;y
v.
This reasoning applies fully to the facts of the Ahmedbhai
present case, though here again I should point out Umarbhai & Co.
that the scheme of the Saskatchewan Act was to tax
profits arising from a business in a particular place and M11kl1e1jea J.
to that extent the language of the Indian Act is
undoubtedly different. Like the Kirk's case, it can,
however, be taken as an authority for the proposition
that in cases like the one we have before us, there
<:ould be apportionment of the net profits that accrue
to the business of the assessee and one portion of it
could be allotted to that part of the business which
relates to the manufacture of commodities which arc
ultimately sold in the market. TJ.i.e later decision of
the Judicial Committee referred to above simply
follows the International Harvester Company's case
without any further discussion.
Mr. Munshi in course of his arguments has referred
to the provisions of section 42 (3) of the Indian Incometax Act and he contends that the language of
this sub-section clearly indicates that in the contemplation of the legislature certain operatiot1s of a business could be regarded as a part of the business and
the principle. of apportionment which this sub-section
provides can very properly be made applicable to a case
coming under the third proviso to section 5 of the
Excess Profits Tax Act. Section 42, sub-section (1),
provides inter alia that the whole of the income and
profits accruing or arising whether directly or indirectly
through business connection in British India would be
deemed to be income accruing within British India
so as to be liable to tax in this country. The scope
of this provision is narrowed down by sub-rule (3)
which provides that where all the operations of the
business are not carried on in British India, the
pr6fits and gains of the business deemed to accrue or
arise in this country are limited to such profits or
gains as can reasonably be attributed to the part of the
382
1950
Co1J1111i.<;siont!r
of Inco11tc+tax,
Bon1!ury
v•
.Al111ie:ll1/111 i
Uniarbhai & Co.
.Uuli!terj<'n J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950)
operations carried on in this oountry. The Raichur
factory certainly has business connection in British
India for a part of the oil manufactured by it is sold
through the Bombay establishment of the assessees.
It is clear also that all the operations of the Raichur
business are not carried on in Bombay. Therefore, the
profits that would be deemed under this section. to
accrue or arise in Bombay will only be the profits which
may reasonably be attributed to that part of the operations carried on in Bombay, tnat is to say, to sale of
part of its oil in Bombay. As section 42 applies to an
assessee who is a resident in India, there is no reason
why this principle of apportionment should not apply
to a case falling within the third proviso to section 5
of the Excess Profits Tax Act. Mr. Setalvad points
out that section 42 contemplates income or profits not
actually arising or accruing in British India but only
deemed to arise or accrue in this country under the
circumstances specified in the section, and therefore no
such question can arise under proviso (3) to section 5
of the Excess Profits Tax Act. It appears, however,
that in enacting proviso (2) to section 5 of the Excess
Profits Tax Act which relates to business carried on by
a non-resident, the legislature had in mind the provision of section 42 of the Income-tax Act. The expression " part of a business " occurring in proviso (2)
to section 5 can, therefore, be taken legitimately to
mean such operations of the business to which separate
profits are attributable as laid down in sub-section (3)
of section 42. Although proviso (3) is applicable to a
different set of circumstances, the words " part of a
business " as used in that proviso must be taken to
have been used in the same sense as in the earlier proviso and to this extent, at any rate, it favours the
contention of the respondents that no cross-section of
the entire business was meant by that expression.
Again it is quite true that there is no express
direction as to apportionment in the third proviso to
section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act as there is in
sub-section (3) of section 42 of the Income-tax Act.
However, pr')fits can accrue in respect to a part of a
business only when apportionment is possible and it is
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
on this assumption that this proviso is based. If no
apportionment can be made in respect of the processes Cou11ui:>sio1Zcr
or activities of a particular business, they will not be of lncmm..·· t,1.-.:,
considered to be a part of the business at all and the
Bo:ubay
v.
proviso will not apply. The principle of apportionment, therefore, is implied in the third proviso to
V11larbllai & Co.
section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act.
I now come to the other question as to whether .1luklw"j,·a J.
the profits of the manufacturing part of the assessees'
business did arise or accrue at Raichur within the
Hyderabad State. The point is not altogether free
from difficulty and although a large number of decided
authorities have been placed before us in this connection by the learned counsel on both sides, none of
them seems to be directly in point. The cases cited
relate mostly to different provisions of the Income-tax
Act which make income taxable if it arises, accrues
or is received in British India or is deemed under the
provisions of law to arise, accrue or to be received in
British India. So far as the third provirn to section 5
of the Excess Profits Tax Act is concerned, it is to be
noted that it uses the expression "accrue" and" arise"
but not the word "received " and further there is no
provision here under which income could be deemed to
arise or accrue at a particular place even if it does
not actually do so. Profits of a business are undoubtedly not " received" till the commodities are sold and
they are ascertained only when the sale takes place,
but the question is that if a part of the business
which consists of manufacturing goods and is carried
on prior to the sale, yields profits, do these profits
accrue or arise only at the place where the manufactured goods are sold? We have been referred
to a number of decided authorities, where the assessee
carried on the business of buying and selling and
the goods and raw materials were purchased in
one place and sold in another and the question arose
whether for purposes of taxation portion of the profits
·could be held to aris~ at the place of buying also.
The decision of the Madras High Court in Secretary, Board of Revenue, .Madras v. lvfadras Export
384
1950
Com1nissionef'
of Income-tax,
Bo11ibay
v.
Afi1nr:dfJhai
U111arbliai & Co.
llfuklierjca J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950}
Company ( 1 ) is one of the leading pronouncements in
this line of authorities. The question for decision in
that case was whether the profits of a firm which had
its headquarters in Paris and purchased raw skins
through an Agent in Madras which were exported to
and sold .in Paris were taxable in British India under
section 33 (1) of the Income-tax Act of 1918 which
corresponded, though not identically, to section 42 of
the present Act. The question was answered in the
negative. The learned Judges held that section 33
was not a charging but a machinery section and relied
on the decision of the English Court i.n Greenwood v.
Smidth and Company('), which laid down thata trade
is exercised in the place where the business transactions
are closed ; and in the case of a selling business, that
place would be where the sales are effected and the
profits realised. The propriety of the Madras decision
was questioned by the Calcutta High Court in Rogers
Pyatt Shellac and Company v. Secretary of State for
India (•), and it was pointed out that the Judges of
the Madras Court wholly overlooked a vital distinction
between Indian and English Income Tax Law in so far
as the former lays down that certain profits, though
not actually arising or accruing in British India,
should be deemed to arise or accrue in this country.
Under the English law, the essential thing for purposes
of taxation was that profit should accrue from trade
exercised within the United Kingdom and there was
no provision there corresponding to that contained in
section 42 of the Indian Income-tax Act. The decision in the Secretary, Board of Revenue, Madras v.
Madras Export Company (1 ) was, however, followed
by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in jiwandas
v. Income-tax Commissioner, Lahore (4). In that case,
the question arose as to whether a person residing
and carrying on business in British India and purchasing goods there which were sold in Kashmir was
liable to assessment on the ground that a part of the
profits accrued within British India. The Full Bench
gave a negative answe;: to this question and the basis.
(I) l.L.R. 46 Mad. 36P.
(3) I.L.R. 52 Cal. I.
(2) [1922] I A.C. 417.
(4) I.L.R. 10 Lah. 657.
~
I
i
I
\
S.C.R.
SUPREME. CQ.cyT REPORTS
385
·1950
-of the decision was that mere purchase of goods
in British Indi~ had too remote a connection to Cot11111issioucr
justify the conclusion that a part o.f the pi;ofits should of l11co111e:t<1x,
be held to have "accrued" in this country. As the
Bombay_ '
v.
business was one of buying and selling, it was held that
the profits accrued or arose actually at the place where Ahmerlbli a i
the g?ods were sol~ and not at t,he place where they Vmarbhai &- Co.
were merely purchased for export. It should be noted ,U11kl1crjca J.
-that .this case was decided pr,or to 1939 and the
-changes that were introduced into section 42 ..of the
Income-tax Act by the Amending ' Act of 1939 were
not in existence at that time. The assessee was a
resident of British India and tbe only question for deci·sion in that case was Whether the profits''did actually
.arise or accrue in British India. It was held. that
they did not. Both these cases were followed with
.approval by a M~dras Special Bench in the subsequent
.case of S. V. P. Sudalainiani Nadar v. Commissioner
.of Income-tax, Madras( 1 ). That was also a case
where the assessee was a resident of British India and
·h::..viD;g-purchased animals in Briti$h India exported
them to foreign countries for sale. It was held that he
·was not assessable to income-tax, as ' the profits were
·not received or brought into British India. ,All these
cases were. reviewed by a Division B.ench of the Oriss':l
High COurt, consisting of Chief Justice Ray and
'Narasimham J. ij1 Rahim v. Commissioner oj Income.tax (le). Here tpe assessee used to buy hides, horns,
etc. in the Orissa State and sell them in British India
and the q'uestion was whether any part of the profits
.accrued or arose within an Indian State. The answer
given by the Court was in the· negative, though the
Chief Justice in a separate judgment observed that he
was not prepared to lay down as a proposition of law that in all businesses of buying and selling·, the entire
profits necessarµy accrue at the place where the sales
,take place. Each case would depend upon its own
circum$t~nces and there may be cases where the place
where tne commodities are purch~sed pas an im'portance
of its o\VJl. On the 'facts. of the ~ase which they were
actually deciding it was said that the act of buying
(1) A.LR. [19•11 Mad. 229.
('l)
A.I.R. 119,9) Ori~ GO.
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950J
was so negligible a part of the operation of the business.
as not to make any appreciable difference in the appor-·
Contmissiancr
tionment of the amount that accrued or arose in British.
of Inc01ne-tax,
India.
·
,
Bmnbay
It will .be seen that none of· these decisions are·
v.
Ahniedbhai
.really of any assistance to the appellant in the present
Umarbhai & Co.
case. All of them proceeded on the footing that no·
appreciable
profit resulted from the operation of buying
J.Iuklzerjc11 J.
when the goods were purchased at one place and exported in a raw state to another place for sale. In theOrissa case referred to above, Narasimham J. expressly
observed in course of his judgment that the position.
might be different ·if. the materials purchased underwent any manufacturing process_ before they. wereexported. If no profits really resulted - from· .the purchasing part of the business; obviously the question of
the place where~ such profits arise or accrue does not.
become material at all.
As against these cases, several authorities havebeen cited to us which have proceeded on the footing
that even purchase of raw materials could be an operation in connection with a business and if it was carried.
on in British India, it might make the profits attributable to such operation taxable under. section 42 of the Indian Income-tax Act. · The case of Rogers Pyatt
Shellac and Company v. Secretary ojState for India(')
is one of the leading decisions on this point. In that
case, a company incorporated in U.S. A. and having·
its Head Office in New York, and Branch Offices,
Agencies and factories in Calcutta, London, etc. pur~·
chased goods in India for sale in America. It had also·
_ a factory in l:he United Provinces where raw produce·
was bought locally and worked up into a form suitablefor exports to America. It was held that the company
was not exempt from- assessment. to income-tax or·
super-tax in· India. This case was decided under
section 33 of the'lncome-tax Act of 1918 and the judg-•
ment shows that the principle followed in the case·
was similar to that which was subsequently embodied ·
in section 42 (3) of the Income-tax Act of 1922. ·The• same line of reason~ng was adopted by the Rangoon.
1950
(1)
I.L.R. 52 Cal. 1.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
387
1950
High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v.
1
Messrs. Steel Brothers and Company ( ). Among recent Co111111issioner
cases, on this point, which were decided under of Inco111e-tax,
section 42 of the Income-tax Act of 1922, can be
B0111bay
v.
mentioned the case of Motor Union Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax. Bombay (2 ) and Al1111cdf>11ai
that of Webb Sons and Company v. Commissioner of U111arbhai & Co.
Income-tax, East Punjab (a). In the last case, the
assessee company which was incorporated in the United
States of America, was carrying on in America the
business of manufacturing carpets. Its only business
in India was the purchase of wool as raw material for
the carpets. It was held that the purchase was an
operation within the meaning of section 42 (3) of the
Income-tax Act and profits from such purchases
could be deemed to arise in British India and was
consequently assessable under section 42 (3) of the
Income-tax Act.
These cases, jt must be admitted, are not of much
assistance to the respondents in this case, though they
do not help the appellant either. They were decided
on the express language of section 42 of the Incometax Act, 1922, as it then stood or the section corresponding to it in the earlier Act. There remains for me to
refer to the other line of authorities upon which the
judgment of the High Court seems to be primarily
based. In my opinion, they cannot also be regarded
as direct authorities on the. point requiring consideration in the present case. In Commissioner of IncomeTax v. Kirk l 4), the profits derived frnm extraction of
ore from the soil and also from the conversion of the
crude ore into merchantable product were held to be
taxable, as the source of these profits was situated in
New South Wales and that was the basis of taxation
~nder the New South Wales Act. The High Court
was not right in holding that as a matter of law, profits must be held to arise at the place where the source
of the profit is situated. The Privy Council clearly
laid. down in the case of the Commissioner of Incometax1 v. Cltunilal( 5) that income from business does not
Cl) I.L.R. 3 Rang. 614.
.(3) [1950) 18 I.TR. 33.
,9
(2) A.I.R. [19,5] Born. 285 •
C'l [1900] A.C. 588.
(5) 65 I.A. 332.
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
necessarily arise or accrue at the place from which
directions are given or skill and judgment exercised,
Co11unissioncr
the operat1ons may take place elsewhere ; and
although
of Jnconu:.tax,
it
is
not
the
scheme of the Income-tax Act that the
Bonibay
v.
profits in the case of a business cannot be taken distriAJ1111edbhai
butably but must be taken as a single indivisible
Umarbliai &- Co.
result accruing at one place.
M'ikhcrfca /.
The learned Chief Justice of Bombay in support of
his judgment relied strongly upon the decision of the
Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v .
•Uathias('). In that case, the assessee, who was a
resident of Mangalore in British India, owned coffee
plantations in Mysore. The harvested crops were
brought to Mangalore to be dried and cleansed there
in the factory of the selling agents of the assessee and
sold there by that company, the sale proceeds being
received and retained at Mangalore by the assessee
himself. The question was whether the assessee was
entitled to claim the benefit of the second proviso to
~ection 4 (2) of the Income-tax Act and if so, to what
extent? It was held by the learned Judges that the
assess~~ was entitled to exemption of the whole profits
earned 'by the sale of the produce at Mangalore, · and
the ground upon which the decision rested was that the
agricultural produce itself could be taken to be income
in kind which accrued at Mysore outside British
India. On appeal to the Privy Council, this decision
was reversed and the Privy Council took the view that
as the income was received in British India, the proviso
to s~ction 4 (2) had no application(•). The particular
point upon which the Madras High Court based its
decision was not considered by the Judicial Committee
and was left open. Obviously in the case before us the
manufactured oil that was produced at Raichur could
not be taken to be income or profits in kind. The
manufactured products themselves cannot be regarded
as income though the process of manufacture yields
profits which form a portion of the profits ultim~tely
realised at the time of the sale. The question before
1950
(1) I.L.R. (1938] Mad. 25.
(2) Vide Co1111nissioncr of lncome·tax v. Matltias-66 I.A. 23.
'S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
389
1950
us is, where do the profits resulting from the manufacturing process accrue or arise ?
Cou111iissioner
It was pointed out by Mu~herji J. in Re Rogers of Income-tax,
Pyatt Shellac and Co. v. Secretary of State for India ( 1 )
Bombay
v.
that etymologically the word "accrues" connotes the
idea of a growth, addition or increase by way of acces- Alwicdbhai
sion or advantage, while the word " arises " suggests Umarbhai &o Co,
the idea of growth or accumulation with a -tangible .llukherjea J.
shape so as to be receivable. The two expressions
denote almost the same idea and the difference only
lies in the fact that one is more appropriate than the
other when applied to particular cases. It is clear,
however, as the learned Judge pointed out that these
words have been used in contradistinction to the word
« received " and both of them represent a stage anterior to the point of time when the income becomes
receivable ; they connote a character of income which
is more or less inchoate. As I have stated already, in
proviso (3) to section 5 of the. Excess Profits Tax Act, the
legislature has deliberately left out the word "received"
and has spoken only of " accruing" or "arising." This
shows that the legislature l).ad in "'.ind cases where
profits could accrue to parts of a busmess before they
were actually received. When a raw material is worked
up into a new product by process of manufacture, it·
obviously increases in value ; in other words, there is
an accretion of profit to it and the increased value represents this income or profit which is the result of
manufacture. As these profits accrue by reasW>n of
manufacture, the accrual, in my opinion, cannot but
be located at the place where the manufacturing -process is gone through. It is immaterial that the manufacture:d goods are sold later on at various places. If
the manufacturer is himself the seller, it might be that
he receives the entire profits including that of the
manufacture only at the time of the sale ; but in an
inchoate shape, a portion of the profits does accrue at
the place of manufacture, the exact amount of which
is 0•1~,y ascertained after the sale takes place. For
purposes of computation, the two parts of the business
may be conceived of as being carried on by two
(1) 'I.L.R. 52 Cal. 1 at p. 30.
390
1950
Commissioner
of lncomc·tax,
Bombay
v.
Ahmedbliai
Umarbllai & Co.
Mt4khcrjea /.
Das/.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950J
different sets of persons. As soon as the manufacture is
complete, that part of the business is finished and the
profits that accrue to that part certainly arises at the
place where the manufacture is carried on and not
where the sale ultimately takes place. As the principle
of section 42 of the Income-tax Act applies to this case
the profits to be deemed under that section to accrue
or arise in British India would only be the profits that
may reasonably be attributed to one part of the operations, namely, sales of part of the oil; and the profits
accruing or arising out of the other part of the operation, namely, the manufacture of the oil which takes
place outside India could not be deemed to accrue or
arise in In'dia. Where then these profits would arise
or accrue or be deemed to arise or accrue except at
the place of manufacture?
My conclusion, therefore, is that the profits of the
manufacturing part of the assessees' business did accrue and arise at Raichur and the judgment of the
High Court should be affirmed, though I do not concur
in all the reasons given by the learned Judges.
DAS J.-1 substantially agree with the .reasonings given in the judgment just delivered oymy learned brother Mukherjea and concur in dismissing this
appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the Appellant: P.A. Alehta.
Agent for the Respondents: Ranjit Singh Narula.
''
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